• Our new ticketing site is now live! Using either this or the original site (both powered by TrainSplit) helps support the running of the forum with every ticket purchase! Find out more and ask any questions/give us feedback in this thread!

Rail workers in 'train near-miss'

Status
Not open for further replies.

Ploughman

Established Member
Joined
15 Jan 2010
Messages
2,987
Location
Near where the 3 ridings meet
Not seen any mention of this.

Nine rail workers in north Lancashire were nearly hit by an 80mph (129km/h) passenger train, accident investigators have said.

The track workers were operating on a small bridge on the West Coast main line near Hest Bank on the afternoon of 22 September.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-29746214
Nine rail workers in north Lancashire were nearly hit by an 80mph (129km/h) passenger train, accident investigators have said.

The RAIB said the workers were "forced to take immediate evasive action" because the curvature of the track restricted their view and they did not know an Edinburgh to Manchester Airport train was approaching...

http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/current_investigations_register/140923_hest_bank.cfm

RAIB is investigating a near-miss incident involving a group of nine track workers who were working on the West Coast Main Line, south of Hest Bank between Carnforth and Lancaster. The incident occurred at about 14:23 hrs on Monday 22 September 2014...

RAIB’s investigation will examine the reasons why no warning was provided to the track workers. It will consider the sequence of events and factors that may have led to the incident, and identify any safety lessons....
Is there a problem with LOWS?
 
Sponsor Post - registered members do not see these adverts; click here to register, or click here to log in
R

RailUK Forums

TOCDriver

Member
Joined
24 Jan 2013
Messages
609
Not seen any mention of this.

Nine rail workers in north Lancashire were nearly hit by an 80mph (129km/h) passenger train, accident investigators have said.

The track workers were operating on a small bridge on the West Coast main line near Hest Bank on the afternoon of 22 September.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-29746214
http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/current_investigations_register/140923_hest_bank.cfm

Is there a problem with LOWS?

Only with the people who operate it.
 

Saint66

Member
Joined
15 Dec 2013
Messages
817
Location
Herts
Considering how rare these incidents seemingly are (I don't have encyclopaedic knowledge of such incidents) I'd certainly be more inclined to suggest there isn't a problem with the LOWS itself, but quite possibly other factors, including human error.

But, that is why we've got an investigation which will hopefully work out what went wrong.
 

21C101

Established Member
Joined
19 Jul 2014
Messages
2,555
Thirty years ago you just dusted yourself down, gave the lookout what ho (or maybe a please explain if he had really dropped off) and carried on working, thanking your lucky stars.

On one occasion I was caught in a tunnel where there was a bend in the line just beyond it and had to leg it back to the nearest refuge hole in pitch darkness (with live rail too) when a train appeared coming round the corner at 90.

Different world then, and quite a few workers died every year. Much less paperwork though and you could wear shorts in summer and no hard hat unless you were on a building site.
 
Last edited:

Olaf

Member
Joined
29 Mar 2014
Messages
1,054
Location
UK
Thirty years ago you just dusted yourself down, gave the lookout what ho (or maybe a please explain if he had really dropped off) and carried on working, thanking your lucky stars.

On one occasion I was caught in a tunnel where there was a bend in the line just beyond it and had to leg it back to the nearest refuge hole in pitch darkness (with live rail too) when a train appeared coming round the corner at 90.

Different world then, and quite a few workers died every year. Much less paperwork though and you could wear shorts in summer and no hard hat unless you were on a building site.

So, would you prefer to go back to those arrangements?
 

celeborne

Member
Joined
15 Nov 2013
Messages
5
The RSSB and network rail don't like lookouts. They would rather have the very busy signaller use a reminder appliance to protect staff working on the track. It's not like the signaller has anything else to worry about, like set swaps, plat alts, trespassers, track circuit failure, rail contamination, Oh god I have to stop as I will go on for hours.
 
Last edited:

21C101

Established Member
Joined
19 Jul 2014
Messages
2,555
So, would you prefer to go back to those arrangements?

and a few others from the last 24 hours

You are deluded and probably being humoured by your colleagues; the suggestions you came up with do not belong in the current millennium.

The only ones that consider BR of notable achievement are the railway insiders that generally contributed to the fiasco.

many of the problems with the current railway system arose because of the inept work carried out during BR's tenure.

BR was never up to the job, no matter how much money you might throw at it.

We are living in the 21st Century, can not afford to waste money on these stone-age fantasies.

I have no regard for what was BR at all.

Nice
 
Last edited:

Tomnick

Established Member
Joined
10 Jun 2005
Messages
5,889
Assume OP mean't lookout?!
That'd make more sense, yes - in which case, it's a valid point! It doesn't help anyone in the long run either, as it just results in line blockages being refused if the resulting workload is becoming excessive.
 

carriageline

Established Member
Joined
11 Jan 2012
Messages
1,897
Unless he was talking about T2H (or whatever it was, t'was before my time!)



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 

Mugby

Established Member
Joined
25 Nov 2012
Messages
2,023
Location
Derby
So, would you prefer to go back to those arrangements?

I would if I still worked on the railway, because you were taught how to be responsible, how to look after yourself and each other and how to work as a team. Today there are many situations where the men on the ground don't know each other and probably have never met before.

In BR days virtually all departments were run by people who had many years experience, knew the job and their responsibilities intimately and knew every inch of the sections they managed. After privatisation, such structures fell out of favour or were deemed to be old fashioned, graduates were seen as the future of the rail industry even though they had no railway knowledge, experience or interest.

When I took redundancy after over thirty years service, I left a large part of my heart with the railway. I had never or would never put myself or anyone else at risk but it's totally impossible to create a situation where there are never any accidents or nothing ever goes wrong. There was never any such thing as a near miss - who decides it? one persons call may be quite different from another's perception.

Yes I would go back to those arrangements simply because they were better.
 

carriageline

Established Member
Joined
11 Jan 2012
Messages
1,897
You even said so yourself more people were being killed each year, more than now. How on earth can you say them arrangements were better? Yes it may of made it better/easier to work, but if it's safer now in this day and age then it's a no brainier.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 

Hornet

Member
Joined
16 Jul 2013
Messages
741

I would not worry about those who you have quoted. They would need to go on a week long course, so that they could get a certificate of competence to cross the road.
 
Last edited:

Olaf

Member
Joined
29 Mar 2014
Messages
1,054
Location
UK
You even said so yourself more people were being killed each year, more than now. How on earth can you say them arrangements were better? Yes it may of made it better/easier to work, but if it's safer now in this day and age then it's a no brainier.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Yes agreed; these old timers have a rose-tinted view of BR.

In this particular case, the initial assessment appears that there was a problem with a device, not specifically a human error.
 

Mugby

Established Member
Joined
25 Nov 2012
Messages
2,023
Location
Derby
Yes agreed; these old timers have a rose-tinted view of BR.

Some of these old timers have many years experience of working on the railway and a wealth of knowledge of railway operations.

Perhaps you would like to tell us what experience, or knowledge you have?
 

carriageline

Established Member
Joined
11 Jan 2012
Messages
1,897
Some of these old timers have many years experience of working on the railway and a wealth of knowledge of railway operations.



Perhaps you would like to tell us what experience, or knowledge you have?


Yes they do, but you clearly ignored my post? Tell me how something that is more dangerous and equaling in more deaths, is better? What is your definition of better?

In my eyes something that equals more people going home every day to their loved ones is always better. H+S is a pain, but it's necessary. If one track worker dies every year, that's still far too much.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 

Tomnick

Established Member
Joined
10 Jun 2005
Messages
5,889
It can't be as simple as "everything's better now than it was" (or indeed "everything was better back then"). I've no doubt that, overall, the railway's a far safer place to work now than it used to be - which can only be a good thing - but I'm sure that some aspects have taken a few backward steps too, such as (for example) the potential use of inexperienced agency staff who are unfamiliar with the area that they're working in. I suppose that, as the structure of the industry has changed, it's natural that the balance of the risks should change too - but it's difficult to argue that an overall improvement is a bad thing!
 

Llanigraham

On Moderation
Joined
23 Mar 2013
Messages
6,371
Location
Powys
Some of these old timers have many years experience of working on the railway and a wealth of knowledge of railway operations.

Perhaps you would like to tell us what experience, or knowledge you have?

Perhaps they did, but also many more of them were killed and injured in accidents whilst they were on track. Knowledge proves worthless if you are working in an unsafe manner, which is why we have different working practices now which take into account the different world we live in.

Experience: I'm a signaller!
 

21C101

Established Member
Joined
19 Jul 2014
Messages
2,555
Perhaps they did, but also many more of them were killed and injured in accidents whilst they were on track. Knowledge proves worthless if you are working in an unsafe manner, which is why we have different working practices now which take into account the different world we live in.

Experience: I'm a signaller!

There was a huge difference in staff fatalities between the 1970s and the early 1990s before privatisation, in particular a lot changed in the 1980s.

The early 80s saw the introductions of high viz vests., by the late '80s end of things like working in tunnels with trains running through, had occured along with heavy restrictions in working after dark in what are now red zones and the introduction of PICOWs (now COSS). Also the 1980s saw the end of most goods traffic and yard shunting of unfitted stock (by far the most risky environment). Spotlights on the front of trains also appeared in the last years of BR (try being lookout in the middle of the night with only an oil lamp or 2 figure headcode illuminated at the front of the train!) By the time of privatisation staff fatalities were I would suggest little higher than they are now.

Since privatisation the big changes have been:


  • 1) Rimimi
    2) Introduction of large numbers of contract/agency workers and much more mobility whereas under BR people stayed in a particular area.
    3) Mandatory hard hats and covered head to foot in orange overalls (eg shorts banned)
    4) Massive amounts of paperwork to prove that things are safe.
    5) Train delay charges

1) Rimini has undoubtably lowered staff incidents, however from a very low base and at a high financial cost as evey last thing has to be planned and documented in advance, ending the days when a gang could be instructed to go onto the track, work out a safe system of work on the spot and do the job. It could be argued that if the government abolished this and put the subsidy into eg the NHS more lives would be saved, but that is a far wider philosophical question.

2) Introduction of large numbers of contract/agency workers and much more mobility whereas under BR people stayed in a particular area and worked under senior staff who knew their patch as well as a driver knows his route. I don't think anyone here is likely to argue that it has made things safer. It has undoutably made Rimini essential.

3) Mandatory hard hat wearing (anywhere rather than at "building site zones") and staff covered head to foot in orange overalls (eg shorts banned). This has no doubt saved some minor to moderate injuries, however a hard hat is very uncomfortable in hot or very cold weather and heavy overalls as opposed to shorts are very uncomfortable in hot weather. If someone is uncomfortable they don't concentrate properly and are therefore more at risk on the track. I'm not convinced the balance of risks is correct with this one, especially as it seems to me to be as much about image as protection.

4) Massive amounts of paperwork to prove that things are safe. This is partly due to (2), partly due to there now being many contract interfaces rather than command structure and in big part due to numerous EU health and safety regulations such as the Construction Design and Management regulations aimed mainly at the poor record of the construction industry but also applicable to the rail industry. This means that something that was left to an engineers professional judgement now has to be proved exhaustively with all sorts of tests and reports which is expensive. There is also a danger of people thinking lots of paper = safe. This largely is a result of outside regulations that coincided with privatisation and would have happened under BR if privatisation had not occured. The allowing of lawyers to advertise and conditional fee arrangements under the Major government also made all companies and their insurers VERY risk averse even on trivial matters (as does the need for companies to be insured by commercial insurers - BR self insured)

5) Train delay charges mean an incident in which, say a power cable is accidentally cut with minor or no injuries becomes a far more serious matter due to train delay charges (whereas before it was just an annoyed area manager and a dressing down for someone after a "Dear Bill" letter from the regional manager to the regional head of engineering discipline). The problem is that although real money these are pass the parcel payments within the industry, but the money to fund procedures to avoid them comes from extra government subsidy.

In summary. BR were well on top of the problem by the early 1990s, and staff injuries were by then so low that measures to reduce them further were disproportionately expensive (cost to reduce staff incidents like anything else follows an exponential curve that means the closer to zero you get the more the cost of every reduction). Additionally outside regulation and the increased mobility and use of contract labour associated with privatisation made more restrictive safety measures such as Rimini essential.

It is very simplistic and frankly childish to claim BR were useless and things now are a new nirvana, the issue is far more complex than that.

Personally I think it would be a lot better, now that newspaper trains are a thing of the past, night freight is on a few routes only and sleeper trains very rare to do most work on most lines in Engineering Hours with the power off every night (on 4 track routes a different pair of tracks every night) as a certain other still nationalised railway already does, which gets rid of the need for things to be booked three months in advance with a three month wait if it goes wrong on the day. Wouldn't work on all lines but I suspect it would on a lot.

Edit

Figures for fatalities struck by train due to failure of safe system of work 1990-2009

1990 - 11
1991 - 9
1992 - 2
1993 - 5
1994 - 1
1995 - 1
1996 - 1
1997 - 0
1998 - 3
1999 - 2
2000 - 2
2001 - 4
2002 - 1
2003 - 1
2004 - 2
2005 - 3
2006 - 0
2007 - 2
2008 - 1
2009 - 1

2009/10 to 2013/14 (all staff fatalities on NR)

2009/10 - 3
2010/11 - 1
2011/12 - 2
2012/13 - 2
2013/14 - 3

It is clear the big change was in the early 1990s before privatisation, since when figures have been more or less constant at 0-4 a year.

Source 1990 - 2009: Annex 1 of this document: http://www.deathbyhealthandsafety.co.uk/platformx/resources/1010DRKTWSv1.pdf

Source 2009/10 onwards: http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/4815.aspx
 
Last edited:

TDK

Established Member
Joined
19 Apr 2008
Messages
4,164
Location
Crewe
You even said so yourself more people were being killed each year, more than now. How on earth can you say them arrangements were better? Yes it may of made it better/easier to work, but if it's safer now in this day and age then it's a no brainier.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

And of course years gone by you could hear a train coming from miles away, it really makes me think when you these people quoting "in my day" sorry by "my day" has now gone, get over it. Safety is so much more important now than it has ever been.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
Perhaps they did, but also many more of them were killed and injured in accidents whilst they were on track. Knowledge proves worthless if you are working in an unsafe manner, which is why we have different working practices now which take into account the different world we live in.

Experience: I'm a signaller!

What box are you in?
 

carriageline

Established Member
Joined
11 Jan 2012
Messages
1,897
And of course years gone by you could hear a train coming from miles away, it really makes me think when you these people quoting "in my day" sorry by "my day" has now gone, get over it. Safety is so much more important now than it has ever been.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---




What box are you in?


That's it. Things may or may not have been better in your day, but we are were we are!! And plus, this is all I know so don't confuse me! ;)

I believe the clue is in his name (I may be wrong) There's a few of us bobbies on here don't you know ;)


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 

Marklund

Member
Joined
18 Nov 2010
Messages
827
There was a huge difference in staff fatalities between the 1970s and the early 1990s before privatisation, in particular a lot changed in the 1980s.

The early 80s saw the introductions of high viz vests., by the late '80s end of things like working in tunnels with trains running through, had occured along with heavy restrictions in working after dark in what are now red zones and the introduction of PICOWs (now COSS). Also the 1980s saw the end of most goods traffic and yard shunting of unfitted stock (by far the most risky environment). Spotlights on the front of trains also appeared in the last years of BR (try being lookout in the middle of the night with only an oil lamp or 2 figure headcode illuminated at the front of the train!) By the time of privatisation staff fatalities were I would suggest little higher than they are now.

Since privatisation the big changes have been:


  • 1) Rimimi
    2) Introduction of large numbers of contract/agency workers and much more mobility whereas under BR people stayed in a particular area.
    3) Mandatory hard hats and covered head to foot in orange overalls (eg shorts banned)
    4) Massive amounts of paperwork to prove that things are safe.
    5) Train delay charges

1) Rimini has undoubtably lowered staff incidents, however from a very low base and at a high financial cost as evey last thing has to be planned and documented in advance, ending the days when a gang could be instructed to go onto the track, work out a safe system of work on the spot and do the job. It could be argued that if the government abolished this and put the subsidy into eg the NHS more lives would be saved, but that is a far wider philosophical question.

2) Introduction of large numbers of contract/agency workers and much more mobility whereas under BR people stayed in a particular area and worked under senior staff who knew their patch as well as a driver knows his route. I don't think anyone here is likely to argue that it has made things safer. It has undoutably made Rimini essential.

3) Mandatory hard hat wearing (anywhere rather than at "building site zones") and staff covered head to foot in orange overalls (eg shorts banned). This has no doubt saved some minor to moderate injuries, however a hard hat is very uncomfortable in hot or very cold weather and heavy overalls as opposed to shorts are very uncomfortable in hot weather. If someone is uncomfortable they don't concentrate properly and are therefore more at risk on the track. I'm not convinced the balance of risks is correct with this one, especially as it seems to me to be as much about image as protection.

4) Massive amounts of paperwork to prove that things are safe. This is partly due to (2), partly due to there now being many contract interfaces rather than command structure and in big part due to numerous EU health and safety regulations such as the Construction Design and Management regulations aimed mainly at the poor record of the construction industry but also applicable to the rail industry. This means that something that was left to an engineers professional judgement now has to be proved exhaustively with all sorts of tests and reports which is expensive. There is also a danger of people thinking lots of paper = safe. This largely is a result of outside regulations that coincided with privatisation and would have happened under BR if privatisation had not occured. The allowing of lawyers to advertise and conditional fee arrangements under the Major government also made all companies and their insurers VERY risk averse even on trivial matters (as does the need for companies to be insured by commercial insurers - BR self insured)

5) Train delay charges mean an incident in which, say a power cable is accidentally cut with minor or no injuries becomes a far more serious matter due to train delay charges (whereas before it was just an annoyed area manager and a dressing down for someone after a "Dear Bill" letter from the regional manager to the regional head of engineering discipline). The problem is that although real money these are pass the parcel payments within the industry, but the money to fund procedures to avoid them comes from extra government subsidy.

In summary. BR were well on top of the problem by the early 1990s, and staff injuries were by then so low that measures to reduce them further were disproportionately expensive (cost to reduce staff incidents like anything else follows an exponential curve that means the closer to zero you get the more the cost of every reduction). Additionally outside regulation and the increased mobility and use of contract labour associated with privatisation made more restrictive safety measures such as Rimini essential.

It is very simplistic and frankly childish to claim BR were useless and things now are a new nirvana, the issue is far more complex than that.

Personally I think it would be a lot better, now that newspaper trains are a thing of the past, night freight is on a few routes only and sleeper trains very rare to do most work on most lines in Engineering Hours with the power off every night (on 4 track routes a different pair of tracks every night) as a certain other still nationalised railway already does, which gets rid of the need for things to be booked three months in advance with a three month wait if it goes wrong on the day. Wouldn't work on all lines but I suspect it would on a lot.

Edit

Figures for fatalities struck by train due to failure of safe system of work 1990-2009



2009/10 to 2013/14 (all staff fatalities on NR)



It is clear the big change was in the early 1990s before privatisation, since when figures have been more or less constant at 0-4 a year.

Source 1990 - 2009: Annex 1 of this document: http://www.deathbyhealthandsafety.co.uk/platformx/resources/1010DRKTWSv1.pdf

Source 2009/10 onwards: http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/4815.aspx

Very well put, and much better than I could.

I'd throw in that there seems to be much less staff out on track, with greater mechanised work, so what would be interesting would be how many fatalities for every hour spent on track.

Also the D&A policy has made massive cultural changes which shouldn't be overlooked either.
 

SPADTrap

Established Member
Joined
15 Oct 2012
Messages
2,354
There was a huge difference in staff fatalities between the 1970s and the early 1990s before privatisation, in particular a lot changed in the 1980s.

The early 80s saw the introductions of high viz vests., by the late '80s end of things like working in tunnels with trains running through, had occured along with heavy restrictions in working after dark in what are now red zones and the introduction of PICOWs (now COSS). Also the 1980s saw the end of most goods traffic and yard shunting of unfitted stock (by far the most risky environment). Spotlights on the front of trains also appeared in the last years of BR (try being lookout in the middle of the night with only an oil lamp or 2 figure headcode illuminated at the front of the train!) By the time of privatisation staff fatalities were I would suggest little higher than they are now.

Since privatisation the big changes have been:


  • 1) Rimimi
    2) Introduction of large numbers of contract/agency workers and much more mobility whereas under BR people stayed in a particular area.
    3) Mandatory hard hats and covered head to foot in orange overalls (eg shorts banned)
    4) Massive amounts of paperwork to prove that things are safe.
    5) Train delay charges

1) Rimini has undoubtably lowered staff incidents, however from a very low base and at a high financial cost as evey last thing has to be planned and documented in advance, ending the days when a gang could be instructed to go onto the track, work out a safe system of work on the spot and do the job. It could be argued that if the government abolished this and put the subsidy into eg the NHS more lives would be saved, but that is a far wider philosophical question.

2) Introduction of large numbers of contract/agency workers and much more mobility whereas under BR people stayed in a particular area and worked under senior staff who knew their patch as well as a driver knows his route. I don't think anyone here is likely to argue that it has made things safer. It has undoutably made Rimini essential.

3) Mandatory hard hat wearing (anywhere rather than at "building site zones") and staff covered head to foot in orange overalls (eg shorts banned). This has no doubt saved some minor to moderate injuries, however a hard hat is very uncomfortable in hot or very cold weather and heavy overalls as opposed to shorts are very uncomfortable in hot weather. If someone is uncomfortable they don't concentrate properly and are therefore more at risk on the track. I'm not convinced the balance of risks is correct with this one, especially as it seems to me to be as much about image as protection.

4) Massive amounts of paperwork to prove that things are safe. This is partly due to (2), partly due to there now being many contract interfaces rather than command structure and in big part due to numerous EU health and safety regulations such as the Construction Design and Management regulations aimed mainly at the poor record of the construction industry but also applicable to the rail industry. This means that something that was left to an engineers professional judgement now has to be proved exhaustively with all sorts of tests and reports which is expensive. There is also a danger of people thinking lots of paper = safe. This largely is a result of outside regulations that coincided with privatisation and would have happened under BR if privatisation had not occured. The allowing of lawyers to advertise and conditional fee arrangements under the Major government also made all companies and their insurers VERY risk averse even on trivial matters (as does the need for companies to be insured by commercial insurers - BR self insured)

5) Train delay charges mean an incident in which, say a power cable is accidentally cut with minor or no injuries becomes a far more serious matter due to train delay charges (whereas before it was just an annoyed area manager and a dressing down for someone after a "Dear Bill" letter from the regional manager to the regional head of engineering discipline). The problem is that although real money these are pass the parcel payments within the industry, but the money to fund procedures to avoid them comes from extra government subsidy.

In summary. BR were well on top of the problem by the early 1990s, and staff injuries were by then so low that measures to reduce them further were disproportionately expensive (cost to reduce staff incidents like anything else follows an exponential curve that means the closer to zero you get the more the cost of every reduction). Additionally outside regulation and the increased mobility and use of contract labour associated with privatisation made more restrictive safety measures such as Rimini essential.

It is very simplistic and frankly childish to claim BR were useless and things now are a new nirvana, the issue is far more complex than that.

Personally I think it would be a lot better, now that newspaper trains are a thing of the past, night freight is on a few routes only and sleeper trains very rare to do most work on most lines in Engineering Hours with the power off every night (on 4 track routes a different pair of tracks every night) as a certain other still nationalised railway already does, which gets rid of the need for things to be booked three months in advance with a three month wait if it goes wrong on the day. Wouldn't work on all lines but I suspect it would on a lot.

Edit

Figures for fatalities struck by train due to failure of safe system of work 1990-2009



2009/10 to 2013/14 (all staff fatalities on NR)



It is clear the big change was in the early 1990s before privatisation, since when figures have been more or less constant at 0-4 a year.

Source 1990 - 2009: Annex 1 of this document: http://www.deathbyhealthandsafety.co.uk/platformx/resources/1010DRKTWSv1.pdf

Source 2009/10 onwards: http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/4815.aspx

Thanks for information, made interesting reading!
 

21C101

Established Member
Joined
19 Jul 2014
Messages
2,555
Very well put, and much better than I could.

I'd throw in that there seems to be much less staff out on track, with greater mechanised work, so what would be interesting would be how many fatalities for every hour spent on track.

Also the D&A policy has made massive cultural changes which shouldn't be overlooked either.

Yes both good points, The D&A policy also came in in the early 90s (again under BR not its succesors) as a result of the Cannon Street Rail Crash http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cannon_Street_station_rail_crash and caused a big change in culture, something since replicated in many other industries.

Being drunk on duty had always been a sackable offence but prior to this in some quarters is was something of a toothless tiger as drunk and heavily under the influence of alcohol are not necessarily the same thing. Similarly it was also sackable to be under influence of drugs on duty but prior to testing it was much harder to prove. Frankly it was a relief not to be pressured to go to the pub at lunchtime any more (think of Seargant Lewis working for Morse...)

I remember being assigned to shadow a station manager at a major station for a few days while doing postgraduate training and discovering that there had been a number of sackings under the new regime in its first few months (and few had been mourned).
 
Last edited:

Karl

On Moderation
Joined
16 Aug 2011
Messages
710
Location
Bamber Bridge
Just found this today. An update from the incident back in September.

http://news.sky.com/story/1520438/rail-workers-in-100mph-train-near-miss

An investigation has found that nine rail workers were just seconds away from being hit by a passenger train with no warning of it approaching at almost 100mph.

The track staff were working on a bend with a restricted view on the West Coast Main Line in Lancashire, south of Hest Bank between Carnforth and Lancaster, when the near-miss happened.

A Rail Accident Investigation Board (RAIB) report said the group should have received a warning of the approaching train from a lookout with a clear view of the track.

However, there was no warning and after seeing the approaching Edinburgh to Manchester Airport train, the workers had just four seconds to jump out of the way before it hurtled past.

Some staff were unable to reach a safe position and had to press themselves against a bridge parapet, the report said.

Although no one was injured, the group was left shaken and work was stopped for the remainder of the shift.

The report said the incident, which occurred in September last year, was caused largely by human error.

It said: "The incident was caused because a lookout did not give a warning, either because he operated the wrong switch on his radio transmitter by mistake, or because he forgot about the need to send a warning during an intended delay period between seeing the train and operating the warning switches.

"This delay was because he was positioned on a long section of straight track and could see approaching trains for significantly longer than the time required for the work group to move into a position of safety.

"A previous RAIB recommendation intended to mitigate this risk had not been implemented due to administrative errors.

"It is probable that the lookout's vigilance had degraded as he had been working continuously for almost two hours."

The RAIB said the track workers comprised contract staff and a controller of site safety employed by Network Rail.

It has made two recommendations to Network Rail - covering the management of working time for tasks which depend on vigilance and the circumstances in which the lookout-operated warning system should be used.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
Just found this today. An update from the incident back in September.

http://news.sky.com/story/1520438/rail-workers-in-100mph-train-near-miss

An investigation has found that nine rail workers were just seconds away from being hit by a passenger train with no warning of it approaching at almost 100mph.

The track staff were working on a bend with a restricted view on the West Coast Main Line in Lancashire, south of Hest Bank between Carnforth and Lancaster, when the near-miss happened.

A Rail Accident Investigation Board (RAIB) report said the group should have received a warning of the approaching train from a lookout with a clear view of the track.

However, there was no warning and after seeing the approaching Edinburgh to Manchester Airport train, the workers had just four seconds to jump out of the way before it hurtled past.

Some staff were unable to reach a safe position and had to press themselves against a bridge parapet, the report said.

Although no one was injured, the group was left shaken and work was stopped for the remainder of the shift.

The report said the incident, which occurred in September last year, was caused largely by human error.

It said: "The incident was caused because a lookout did not give a warning, either because he operated the wrong switch on his radio transmitter by mistake, or because he forgot about the need to send a warning during an intended delay period between seeing the train and operating the warning switches.

"This delay was because he was positioned on a long section of straight track and could see approaching trains for significantly longer than the time required for the work group to move into a position of safety.

"A previous RAIB recommendation intended to mitigate this risk had not been implemented due to administrative errors.

"It is probable that the lookout's vigilance had degraded as he had been working continuously for almost two hours."

The RAIB said the track workers comprised contract staff and a controller of site safety employed by Network Rail.

It has made two recommendations to Network Rail - covering the management of working time for tasks which depend on vigilance and the circumstances in which the lookout-operated warning system should be used.
 

carriageline

Established Member
Joined
11 Jan 2012
Messages
1,897
Green zone is working whilst trains are stopped (line blockages and T3 possessions)

Red zone is working whilst trains are still moving (look out protection, site warden etc)
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Top