tygar2
Member
- Joined
- 28 Nov 2009
- Messages
- 39
When was the last time a load of trains got stuck for 6 hours?
Its hardly 'real world' is it!
After six hours I would be leaving the train!
When was the last time a load of trains got stuck for 6 hours?
Its hardly 'real world' is it!
After six hours I would be leaving the train!
If you can't communicate with the controlling signalman though (because the box is closed!), it doesn't matter who else you can communicate with. No-one else, in this scenario, can authorise you to pass the signal at danger.No it doesn't. Intermediate block signals, and signals controlled from a signal box that has been confirmed to be closed may be passed under the driver's own authority. In practice, I am guessing, with almost universal train radio coverage and mobile phones everywhere, it's unlikely you'd ever be completely stranded without communication, even if you have to walk a bit to make contact.
The probability of a modern control centre (not just ROC's but ECR's as well) finding itself in a close down position is pretty remote. The buildings are fire compartmentalised such that each control room is a 2hr fire resistant room, cabling is LSZH, Air con systems shut down or are designed to extract any smoke and not circulate it. There are two separate Grid power supplies with either a diesel generator or Traction derived third supply - no traction supply means that not very many trains can run in most areas!
With two hours before enforced evacuation that should be enough to bring services to a controlled stop with the minimum of risk.
The rule book still implies that we can pass these if the box is closed. Surely if the box is on fire and the staff are all outside at the assembly point, it's closed!?
If the signalling equipment is decoupled from the control equipment and they speak through a standardised communication interface (which is my understanding) why isn't it possible for any workstation in any ROC to replicate any workstation in any other ROC?Not even in theory. Plans to have ROCs backing each other up were dropped at least 7 years ago.Theory only. It cannot be done in practice.
My (relatively limited) understanding is that the whole system would have to be fully tested every time the communications channels between control system and signalling equipment were, so to speak, 'rerouted'. That, plus the fact that most workstations have some bespoke equipment - CCTV crossings, monitors and controls, emergency overrides and that sort of thing - that can't easily be replicated elsewhere. I'm sure that it could be done fairly quickly - probably days rather than hours - if necessary, though. Hopefully a more enlightened S&T chap will be along shortly!If the signalling equipment is decoupled from the control equipment and they speak through a standardised communication interface (which is my understanding) why isn't it possible for any workstation in any ROC to replicate any workstation in any other ROC?
I understand that staff knowledge would be the limiting factor, I was just wondering about the hardware side of things.The big short-term problem, though, is that it isn't practical to ensure that there are suitable competent staff (bearing in mind the specific competency required for each workstation, and the frequency with which each must be worked to retain that competence - refer to the recent level crossing collision on the Ely - Norwich line), and in sufficient numbers, to allow any ROC's workload to be quickly taken over by another.
If the signalling equipment is decoupled from the control equipment and they speak through a standardised communication interface (which is my understanding) why isn't it possible for any workstation in any ROC to replicate any workstation in any other ROC?
If the signalling equipment is decoupled from the control equipment and they speak through a standardised communication interface (which is my understanding) why isn't it possible for any workstation in any ROC to replicate any workstation in any other ROC?
In the past I have been around when Guildford power box lost all its wiring - a 12 car train shunted into a 4 car siding and wiped out the location boxes that had been neatly placed behind the buffer stops... After a pause everyone just worked with pen and paper using what phone lines remained available - those that didn't go through the location boxes that had been squashed.
Thanks Tomnick, swills and edwin_m - sounds like we aren't there yet (unfortunately). Maybe ETCS will allow the complete decoupling of control and signalling infrastructure.
If the signalling equipment is decoupled from the control equipment and they speak through a standardised communication interface (which is my understanding) why isn't it possible for any workstation in any ROC to replicate any workstation in any other ROC?
It's the requirement to do 'through testing' that is the technical issue. Every function must be tested from the control equipment through to the ground equipment via the interlocking; every aspect in every signal, every set of points, every track circuit and every route. To put that into context, a relatively complex area will take 2-3 days to test, with no trains running. If you have a duplicate workstation, you double that time. That's an extra 2-3 days guaranteed disruption of no trains to offset what might be a once every 5-10 year problem for a couple of hours. And even then, in the event that the control equipment in a ROC goes down completely, it is likely that the interlockings would too, so you couldn't control the kit remotely anyway.
It would be possible if there was full separation of the on-ground signalling equipment from the control equipment.Yes, that requirement would have to go if backup ROCs were ever to be possible. I think it could be done without compromising safety...
It would be possible if there was full separation of the on-ground signalling equipment from the control equipment.
So there would be a box on the ground that interfaces to the actual track circuits, points, signals, etc. and the control equipment i.e. the workstation would 'speak' with that box via a communication link.
If that were the case, you would only need to prove that the workstation can speak to the box - it wouldn't really matter where the workstation was physically located.
I fully appreciate the logistical and staffing issues. I was more thinking about the technological side of things.lIf you had to shut a completed ROC when fully staffed say like TBROC In years to come where could you transfer it in its entirety, that's must be at least 600 staff including the best part of 200 trained signallers and ECRO Staff.
Passable/non passable signals don't exist anymore, in the sense that new schemes won't have them.
To the OP. Response staff would go out and manually man crossings and points. And using things like pen, paper and magnets trains could very slowly be moved on. Although it's not something I would want to be involved in!
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I fully appreciate the logistical and staffing issues. I was more thinking about the technological side of things.
Again, I get that point: logistically it isn't feasible for one ROC to do the work of two.And my point I was trying to make was...
Again, I get that point: logistically it isn't feasible for one ROC to do the work of two.
Thank you for your answer, but that isn't the question I was asking. The question I asked, and others answered, was what is involved in one workstation being replicated by another.
Again, I get that point: logistically it isn't feasible for one ROC to do the work of two.
Thank you for your answer, but that isn't the question I was asking. The question I asked, and others answered, was what is involved in one workstation being replicated by another.
The last time (and possibly the only time)a full real-life evacuation of ROC signallers started to take place, which was a few months ago at Three Bridges and mentioned on these forums at the time, the incident was brief, occurred during the close of service...
From an IT systems point of view that seems a very inefficient way to do things. I fully understand that historically that was the best way to do things, but I was hoping that more modern systems would be set up differently.The long answer, as previously discussed, is commissioning and testing would be a nightmare. Then there is things like how the equipment is set up, and what it expects to receive commands from, and where that equipment is physically located. Of course, nothing that is insurmountable, but it still applies and is stopping us.
Don't modern signalling centres do the interlocking in software rather than hardware? (Can't remember where I read about the interlocking being done in software)