I know that old fashioned courtesy and respect is no longer in fashion these days, but I'm a bit surprised you should think I'm not appreciative.
And the answer to your question is YES and NO - YES I'm involved with the different groups ( communities, residents and AsONB ) who together have been talking with NR about the Project for the past 18 months....And NO not campaigning, as the situation has moved on considerably since I was posting regularly on here more than a year ago, but then stopped posting after (1) NR agreed to a full study of the potential of replacing the OLE and which is now happening and (2) childish posts and comments from other posters.
No, not looking for nuggets of mismanagement - the report by the National Audit Office has already identified and reported plenty of examples of mismanagement and confusion by both NR and the DfT. The example of the bridge at Steventon is yet another where it's possible either to believe that NR really have mismanaged the Project ( they were first aware that the bridge was a Listed Structure in 2012 and it would require consultation with SODC and Historic England before just demolishing it at will ) or it's possible to believe that it is another example of the way NR has shown a consistently flagrant disregard for statutory consultation.
Anyway....The reason for my question was simple - COPPER quoted that the project was detrimentally affected by NR having to comply with ( new ? ) EU regulations, which our old friend PHILLIP PHLOP also used to remind us of but without ever providing the links to the regulations, and I was looking for the appropriate legislation, as that obviously impacts on the design of the existing OLE and any redesigned OLE which may or may not replace the current OLE after consultations have finished.
That's the reason for my question - none of us would have to search too hard for nuggets or examples of NR's mismanagement
If I may use your post to respond to you and others who have posted on this theme.
As I see it there are two main grounds for unrest - one is the cost increase and delay to the programme and the other is the design and size of the overhead equipment. The two things are intertwined, but it makes things clearer if they are described separately. I have no 'inside' information - what I write is based on articles in the popular and specialist railway press, on documents published by the various players and reports and hearings in Parliament by the Public Accounts Committee and organisations such as the National Audit office.
Some background. For many years the DfT would countenance no discussion of electrification - in retrospect it would seem that this was a result of the explosion in the cost of running the railway after the Hatfield crash and the expenditure on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The Government had no more money to spend on the railway.
However, in 2010 there was to be a general election. In 2009, as one of the sweeteners to the public, the Transport Minister unexpectedly announced the electrification of the triangle of lines between Manchester, Liverpool and Blackpool and parts of the Great Western. The DfT published
Britain’s Transport Infrastructure Rail Electrication in July 2009 following on from NR's Electrification RUS in May 2009. Some correspondence in
Modern Railways a year or so ago from one of the people involved with the original costings for the GW - a retired former BR engineer - suggested that these costings were based on an updated and more robust version of the East Coast main line work done 20 years earlier using the same top speed. In view of time pressure detailed designs were not prepared but best efforts were made based on experience of the earlier work. These were the costings publicised by Adonis.
However the DfT was also committed to ordering 140mph capable Super Express Trains as part of the IEP deal. At a stroke the overhead had now to be capable of coping with a 140mph train with two pantographs because of the use case of two coupled 5 coach units.
In the field of standards, new European regulations had dropped the derogation permitting smaller clearances because the UK representatives had agreed. References to these Directives and the corresponding RSSB standards have been made in the printed press - I'm not going to search now! If I have correctly understood the situation these representatives were ORR staff so they had no direct experience of electrification and no direct responsibility for keeping costs down. Certainly any corporate memory of Stanley Warder's tests in the late 1950s had been lost. In these the actual flashover distance from 25kV conductor to a steam locomotive's chimney was made in a tunnel at Crewe using a Stanier Black 5 generating lots of smoke and steam by lowering the overhead until an arc occurred. If I recall correctly the distance was only 2 or 3 inches. Based on this separation of the overhead to fixed
structures could be reduced and the use of the reduced voltage 6.25kV abandoned.
Added to all this were the updated
The electricity at work regulations 1989 which, among other things, laid down the separation between
people, i.e., both workers and passengers, and high voltage conductors.
To cope with the two pantograph 140mph use case the overhead had to be strengthened - all the details may be found in Philip Phlopp's earlier postings - and the use of independent suspension of the wires for each track was adopted based on experience with parts of the East Coast's equipment.
The conclusion to the whole sorry story must be to decide what it is you want to buy before you rush into the shop. And knowing what you want to buy means being an informed purchaser - and in this case NR clearly wasn't. It had skills in the
maintenance of existing electrification but had few skills in the
design of new equipment - partially at least because it had been told by its sponsor over many years previously that electrification was off the agenda. To a certain extent it was more sinned against than sinning - but its subsequent programme management at the highest level appears, or at least appeared to be as things have changed in the meantime, wanting.
All this was compounded by split responsibilities - the DfT had taken upon itself the procurement of new trains but had not considered in sufficient detail the effects these would have on the overhead, the ORR was, at least partly, responsible for the regulatory framework but was also closely involved with the costings but didn't seem to be able to comprehend that the two things are interlinked. All the programmes which affected the GW were being run in separate silos - Crossrail to Maidenhead, resignalling closely followed by replacement of the signalling by ERTMS/ETCS, route modernisation, IEP and so on.
Heaven be praised that the rebuild of Reading station was run by Bechtel and didn't have so many interdependencies. That at least worked well.