There was a proposal for NATO to build an army sufficient to repel the Soviets conventionally, but it would have required something approaching ninety manoeuvre divisions. The finance ministers of Europe recoiled from such a commitment and the plan was abandoned in the 50s in favour of battlefield nuclear weapons.
Indeed by the 80s the BAOR had come to the conclusion that its previous estimates of a thirty-day battle were optimistic and that it would only be able to contain the Soviet attack on the North German Plain [with support from the West Germans, Dutch, Belgians, French, Luxembourgers and Americans] for six days, suffering massive casualties.
By day seven it would be on the retreat and would have suffered over 60% casualties, and by day eight it would have exhausted the entire 30-day ammunition scale.
At which point your solutions are surrender or use battlefield nuclear weapons to shatter the Soviet second (or third) echelon before it rolls over the ruins of the first echelon and the combined Western European (and American) Armies.
And if the Soviets reach France the French were well known to have a theory that they would start using nuclear weapons to prevent them from crossing over the border.