atillathehunn
Established Member
Good.
We had a circular from UNDSS (our security department) banning flights from being booked on the MAX as UN policy, though now it seems like its irrelevant.
Good.
Bloomberg is reporting that Garuda Indonesia is cancelling an order for 49 Boeing 737 MAX following these two crashes and the subsequent groundings. Other airlines are also re-evaluating their orders for the 737 MAX.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...-seeks-to-cancel-4-8-billion-boeing-max-order
I don't see why. Lion Air cancelled all their 737 orders after the first crash.They should suffer severe penalty clauses for that.
I don't see why. Lion Air cancelled all their 737 orders after the first crash.
They should suffer severe penalty clauses for that.
Exercising such market power before anything conclusive has been determined only serves to encourage companies like Boeing to cover-up future safety incidents.
A piece of software that wouldn't have been necessary had they not bodged the design of the entire aircraft.Or maybe Boeing could fix problems properly rather than bodging on a poorly-written piece of software?
A piece of software that wouldn't have been necessary had they not bodged the design of the entire aircraft.
Or maybe Boeing could fix problems properly rather than bodging on a poorly-written piece of software?
A poorly written piece of software that seems to have a propensity to nosedive the aircraft.
By now (post Lion) all pilots should know where it is but recognizing the problem is another thing.
As an aside how different is this to the issue with the Airbus flight laws?
Which specific issue? The one involving the pitot tubes?
I think a fairly key difference is that the Airbus flight laws won't actively counteract what the pilot is doing, they just keep it within an envelope. Loss of that envelope can cause confusion, which I think was the root of that crash.
But it was not working as intended. The aircraft was climbing normally and Boeing's software decided it was a approaching a stall and trimmed it nose down as a stall recovery or stall prevention maneuver. The pilot who sees the aircraft climbing normally can override this on the column and use the stick to raise the nose but 5 seconds later the the Boeing gimmick cuts in again and down goes the nose.I think this may boil down to being the issue. As a layman with a vague understanding of flight physics, pilots suddenly having their aircraft adopt a nose down attitude, not realising this is (apparently) MCAS working as intended, trimming to attempt to fix the nosedown attitude then suddenly finding themselves nose up and stalling.
As an aside how different is this to the issue with the Airbus flight laws?
Exercising such market power before anything conclusive has been determined only serves to encourage companies like Boeing to cover-up future safety incidents.
Or maybe Boeing could fix problems properly rather than bodging on a poorly-written piece of software?
I would not think G would be significant but lack of knowledge or practise on a sim or for real would be the issue. For example if I get into a spin I do not think about it I recognise it and automatically carry out spin recovery action. It is programmed in just, for example, once you have learned you do not think how to change gear in a car- you just do it.Thanks for that link - explains better how they deactivate it - it's not as bad as I thought as it can be deactivated from their seat - but that does rely on them having the time and wherewithal to do that (and manually re-trim) while under a lot of pressure and experiencing a lot of G-forces.
As an aside how different is this to the issue with the Airbus flight laws?
This has parallels with many other avoidable disasters, e.g., wasn't it deemed OK to do a 'desktop' fire risk assessment on cladding of the type used on Grenfell Tower.
The European (note 1) ethos, as you have indicated is, with ensuring compliance with rules and standards that have been evolved over decades (in some non-aviation spheres - centuries), where compliance generally takes priority over profit/political ambitions. In theory, the US has a similar aim, however the shadow of affordability, (in the commercial sense) is omnipresent and frequently raises its head to cloud the due process of ensuring compliance with legal (and certainly moral) safety obligations.... There may also be the difference between European ("you need to comply with all these standards") and American ("you can do what you like but if you mess up someone will sue you out of existence") safety management principles, although I'm not sure how much that applies to aviation.
Now both criminal and civil investigations launched into the FAA approval of the 737 Max. Principally investigating whether Boeing and the FAA were too close and the FAA rushed approval to give Boeing a commercial response to the A320 Neo, secondly the fact that the approval was granted on a false or fraudulent safety case with the MCAS capable of commanding maximum rudder moves when it was supposed to be limited to only one quarter moves and also the safety case put forward having no corroborating data.