Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

[Wolfie]

To be replaced with...?

Voyagers, Meridians would be the obvious answer. Twenty years ahead in safety design.

Sorry Yorkie, hadn't got to your post when l responded.

 

[quantinghome]

Indeed. It certainly seems like a bit of an odd response when there are still other (almost) equally venerable classes still operating. However, there are detail differences between an HST or other Mk3 stock and MU stock based on the same design, such as the type and characteristics of the couplers, that may have an effect on a train’s performance during a derailment/collision that makes a difference.

An additional point we need to bear in mind is that HSTs are the only class of that age running on the network at 125mph (although obviously the train was running at a lower speed in the case of this accident).

My reason for focussing on the rolling stock is because a lot of the issues highlighted by the RAIB in response to this accident are the same as those mentioned in accident investigation reports going at least as far back as Ladbroke Grove. I am dismayed that aspects common to these reports, such as bogie retention, appear never to have been addressed.

I have never particularly liked this line of reasoning because it can just as easily be seen as an reason to do nothing. Ultimately it is up to individuals to make their own travel choices based on their own assessment of risk, which holds true every day. I do agree that a knee-jerk reaction is perhaps not warranted, but I do think that maybe it’s coming towards the time when we wave the HST goodbye.

Clearly the HST design was not the cause of the crash, but the age of its design had consequences compared to more modern high speed trains. It was extremely fortunate that the train was lightly loaded. I dread to think of the consequences if a similar accident were to happen to an HST doing 125mph with a full load of passengers.

HSTs are 40 to 46 years old already. The entire class will likely be withdrawn within the next few years. I can't really see that the option of installing further safety measures across the HST would rate higher than replacement with modern rolling stock in an ALARP assessment. They should be replaced with modern rolling stock in as short a time as reasonably practicable.

 

[gimmea50anyday]

No idea, but something safer for the Drivers to work in than the HST does at present.

it’s ironic in a way but HSTs when introduced were only ever meant to be a stop-gap for future introduction of the APT, and 40 years later in their current roles at GWR and Scotrail are still only intended as stop-gaps for future new builds to replace them in a few years. This late in their careers there won’t be any cab modifications or rebuilds to the remaining HSTs and while they will be missed they will no doubt receive their one way trips to Newport in the near future. Blame however cannot be held solely at the design of the power cars and there are many other ways risk of collision impact can be mitigated. CAF and Hitachi now have production line capacity coming up so once the handover to GB Rail starts I would imagine a rolling stock replacement program will see off the last examples

 

[Rockhopperr]

Stock that doesn’t involve the whole cab shearing off and being catapulted through the air to its landing spot.

Exactly. Why is there not more emphasis on this design failure. The image of the loco Bulkhead and floor with no cab is unsettling.

 

[Dai Corner]

Exactly. Why is there more emphasis on this design failure. The image of the loco Bulkhead and floor with no cab is unsettling.

Presumably back in the early 1970s the design was considered no less safe for drivers than the Deltics, Westerns, 47s, 50s and other locos the HSTs replaced and I believe this is the first time this sort of failure has occurred in nearly 50 years of operation. I'm not sure it can be considered a 'design failure'?

 

[swt_passenger]

I'm only on page 27 of 298 but my lord I hope some of the people involved in building that drain end up in front of a court.

I think this subject will get too little visibility. The gap between what was designed by Arup and what was installed by Carillion appears significant, but even then what was built suffered from bad workmanship. (Eg the randomly cut catchpit holes, the missing geotextile, impermeable membranes etc etc.

Theres a statement at paragraph S13 that the “as designed” system should have worked - so a new third party Aecom has checked Arup’s design. Is that a correct interpretation?

 

[TheEdge]

I think this subject will get too little visibility. The gap between what was designed by Arun and what was installed by Carillion appears significant, but even then what was built suffers from bad workmanship. (Eg the randomly cut catchpit holes, the missing geotextile, impermeable membranes etc etc.

Theres a statement at <insert later> that the as designed system should have worked - is that a correct interpretation?

From my reading of it last night, yes, the RAIB consider if the drain had been build as designed then it would have coped with the rainfall and not washed out.

 

[norbitonflyer]

From my reading of it last night, yes, the RAIB consider if the drain had been build as designed then it would have coped with the rainfall and not washed out.

There is also the mysterious berm that seems to have been added later and added to the load onthe draiunage system - the report says that it couldn't have been there in 2012 as it would have impeded,or even damaged, by the construction of the drainage system.

Who built it, and why?

 

[etr221]

A couple of thoughts I had looking through the report, which came out of it, but didn't seem to be commented on:
1) The 'conductor travelling as passenger' was able to contact the (civil) emergency services (para 582) by dialling 999 (from their mobile phone) immediately after the accident; was not able to use the train GSM-R phone; and was only able to contact the Carmont signalman (and hence the railway) after walking (or hobbling) to a lineside telephone. Wondering why she could not contact the railway control (Scotrail or Network Rail) from her mobile? (Directly or via the emergency services). Similarly, the contractors for the scouring works at the bridge (who would perhaps seem to be the first to able to say 'train crash HERE') were not seemingly not able to relay that (however).
2) Had the Carmont signalman been able to work (including clamping) the crossover, rather than have wait (an hour or more) for the NR MOM to arrive, the train could have been on its way much earlier, with at least a chance of passing before the landslip occured.

 

[Bikeman78]

ASLEF demanding withdrawal of HST fleet by next year.


Have a look at the crash reconstruction video of the leading power car and then tell me if you still agree with your statement.

I have watched it. It's horrible. But it won't put me off going on HSTs. Belting down a hill at 30 mph on my bike every day is far more likely to kill me but I'm not going to stop doing that either.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

To be replaced with...?

22x from EMR and Avanti.

 

[GB]

A couple of thoughts I had looking through the report, which came out of it, but didn't seem to be commented on:
1) The 'conductor travelling as passenger' was able to contact the (civil) emergency services (para 582) by dialling 999 (from their mobile phone) immediately after the accident; was not able to use the train GSM-R phone; and was only able to contact the Carmont signalman (and hence the railway) after walking (or hobbling) to a lineside telephone. Wondering why she could not contact the railway control (Scotrail or Network Rail) from her mobile? (Directly or via the emergency services). Similarly, the contractors for the scouring works at the bridge (who would perhaps seem to be the first to able to say 'train crash HERE') were not seemingly not able to relay that (however).
2) Had the Carmont signalman been able to work (including clamping) the crossover, rather than have wait (an hour or more) for the NR MOM to arrive, the train could have been on its way much earlier, with at least a chance of passing before the landslip occured.

1: Maybe she did not have those numbers to hand.

 

[etr221]

1: Maybe she did not have those numbers to hand.

Maybe - but I would ask why on earth not? (She was I understand 'on duty', just not working her booked train)

 

[WelshBluebird]

The image of the loco Bulkhead and floor with no cab is unsettling.

I must say I've just got to that bit and it has made me somewhat reconsider my previous post about the rolling stock. I still think the main focus should be on the infrastructure and control related factors, but maybe the rolling stock question is more important than I previously thought.

 

[Rockhopperr]

Presumably back in the early 1970s the design was considered no less safe for drivers than the Deltics, Westerns, 47s, 50s and other locos the HSTs replaced and I believe this is the first time this sort of failure has occurred in nearly 50 years of operation. I'm not sure it can be considered a 'design failure'?

The GRP cab design was new idea. Positives included ease of replacement in the event of damage. Negatives were poor driver protection. This was known

 

[MadCommuter]

Maybe - but I would ask why on earth not? (She was I understand 'on duty', just not working her booked train)

You would imagine that a personal mobile would still have some kind of work number in it, if only to report unavailable for work. Perhaps it didn't occur to the conductor and elected to get to the lineside phone ASAP.

 

[Dai Corner]

Maybe - but I would ask why on earth not? (She was I understand 'on duty', just not working her booked train)

No signal from the relevant network at the location? 999 calls use any available network.

 

[Crossover]

It’s staggering that the coaches aren’t retained to the bogies in the vertical direction. This is a big factor in the post impact dynamics. Are the coaches just resting on some form of lug or locating pin then?

This was something of a surprise to me as well to be honest. I presume they are usually "held" in place via gravity alone in normal service?

 

[GB]

No signal from the relevant network at the location? 999 calls use any available network.

The report does indeed state that mobile phone reception was poor at the site and that the LOM and MOM themselves couldn't contact route control.

You would imagine that a personal mobile would still have some kind of work number in it, if only to report unavailable for work. Perhaps it didn't occur to the conductor and elected to get to the lineside phone ASAP.

Not necessarily. I used to have a separate personal phone and a work phone. No work numbers were in personal phone and I am not inclined to give work my personal number.

 

[Stow]

One point, which does not get enough emphasis in my view, is the lack of accurate build drawings which appears to be an endemic issue. How many other things out on the Network have inadequate and insufficient records and are just waiting for the right conditions to fail?

Looking at the pictures i suspect that the construction team never saw the offending berm as part of the drainage system, and that it may have been put in place simply to manage spoil and run off during/following the construction.

 

[Taunton]

I actually drove down the A90 just before the derailment happened on the way to the Edzell supply base. I had never seen rain like that in my life and I'm 55. It was worse than torrential.

Had to stop the car in a lay by as it was impossible to see out the windscreen.

The MOM had to drive through it as well, down from Aberdeen to Carmont just to apply facing point clips to a crossover where neither FP locks nor clips in the signalbox had been provided. It took them a substantial length of time because of this adverse weather.

Quite why, in such conditions, the train was then expected to accelerate up to full line speed, is extraordinary, as I have previously commented.

I'm also disappointed at the glib approach to sticking it on Carillion, who conveniently went bust a few years ago so have no comeback. The works were done by them 10 years before the accident. But whoever checked them from Network Rail? Who signed them off? How did they get paid for the work without the result being looked at? Who periodically inspects them to see they are not failing? It wasn't a half day job for a couple of labourers. This is basic construction industry 1.01.

 

[northernbelle]

Have you not seen the images later on of the inside of the leading vehicle? No one would have been ok if the train had been loaded.

The leading vehicle was the front power car - it fared much better in terms of the internal space being compromised (cab excepted) than the first passenger vehicle, Coach D, which was the second vehicle in the formation.

My comment was in response to the point about what would have happened if the leading vehicle was a passenger carrying vehicle as on a conventional DMU.

 

[Rockhopperr]

The leading vehicle was the front power car - it fared much better in terms of the internal space being compromised (cab excepted) than the first passenger vehicle, Coach D, which was the second vehicle in the formation.

My comment was in response to the point about what would have happened if the leading vehicle was a passenger carrying vehicle as on a conventional DMU.

And the rear section of the lead power car completely crumpled when the coach rode up on it!
The main body of the power car, housing theclean air compartment and engine, didn’t suffer any significant impact it seems.

 

[northernbelle]

Surely the upside of it being an HST was that the first car, being a power car, and which took the bulk of the smash, didn't have any passengers in it, whereas in a modern train it would. Isn't that actually an advantage?

Given the main devastation and impact occured in the second vehicle in the formation, I don't think this is the case.

 

[Crossover]

And the rear section of the lead power car completely crumpled when the coach rode up on it!
The main body of the power car, housing theclean air compartment and engine, didn’t suffer any significant impact it seems.

If I may ask, what is the clean air compartent in a powercar?

 

[Horizon22]

ASLEF demanding withdrawal of HST fleet by next year.


Have a look at the crash reconstruction video of the leading power car and then tell me if you still agree with your statement.

It was touched on a fair bit in the report that the RAIB were unsure about whether a modern cab would have fared significantly better - although it is unlikely to have detached in such a dramatic and violent way, once hitting the bridge parapet it was going to be particularly destructive sadly.

Sometimes the collision force and closing speed is just too great to handle. Whilst HSTs should be phased out due to age anyway this is very much a secondary factor beyond the disastrously managed drainage works and the fact the train was still running at full speed.

 

[Rockhopperr]

It was touched on a fair bit in the report that the RAIB were unsure about whether a modern cab would have fared significantly better - although it is unlikely to have detached in such a dramatic and violent way, once hitting the bridge parapet it was going to be particularly destructive sadly.

Sometimes the collision force and closing speed is just too great to handle. Whilst HSTs should be phased out due to age anyway this is very much a secondary factor beyond the disastrously managed drainage works and the fact the train was still running at full speed.

I’d argue the sacrificial cab, ineffective lifesavers and coaches that lift off their bogies unchecked as primary factors contributing to the fatalities and injuries sustained.

 

[Horizon22]

I'm also disappointed at the glib approach to sticking it on Carillion, who conveniently went bust a few years ago so have no comeback. The works were done by them 10 years before the accident. But whoever checked them from Network Rail? Who signed them off? How did they get paid for the work without the result being looked at? Who periodically inspects them to see they are not failing? It wasn't a half day job for a couple of labourers. This is basic construction industry 1.01.

That’s highlighted quite a lot around sections 250-280. Nobody seemed to be able to find the relevant documentation for sign off, when the works were checked it wasn’t the full amount (because there were no “as-built” drawings) and there were a few missed opportunities to get this right; for instance the landowner was rather proactive in highlighting issues but seems these were secondary concerns to the main message, went to a different team and got lost in the ether

 

[Rockhopperr]

If I may ask, what is the clean air compartent in a powercar?

Area between the driving cab and engine compartment. Houses alternator, electrical equipment and various air and brake systems. Separated by bulkheads.

 

[Horizon22]

I’d argue the sacrificial cab, ineffective lifesavers and coaches that lift off their bogies unchecked as primary factors contributing to the fatalities and injuries sustained.

It’s very much secondary because if the debris wasn’t there nor the train (or if the train was running at a reduced speed and able to stop in time), there wouldn’t be any crash at all or the consequences substantially reduced. Reading the full report it is clear the RAIB make this casual analysis first. The fact the train was an old HST is a consequence which had a factor in events. Prevention is better than cure.