Cracks in vehicle or bogie structure are a challenging issue, from an engineering perspective, to address.
Their detection through routine planned maintenance is reliant on good old fashioned visual inspection by a maintainer with a torch walking around the vehicle, and it is - from a human factors point of view - the worst kind of maintenance possible. Maintainers are expected to carry out a detailed examination - relying largely on memory as to what their mental picture to reference to determine if something is wrong looks like - hundreds of times a year and the vast majority of the time there will be nothing wrong to find.
There was an operator about 8 years ago who had a multiple unit reported by a driver for banging from the underframe. The unit was given an initial inspection by a line of route fitter at a terminal and was declared fit for an ECS move back to a maintenance depot at reduced speed. Went back to depot on the back of a formation. Moved into the shed and given an underframe examination overnight. NDF. Given a clean bill of health and released for an ECS from that depot to one about 15 miles away to form an early morning departure. Taken from the first depot, now being driven from the vehicle originally reported, and hadn't got 5 miles down the line when the driver rings the bobby and tells him there's something seriously wrong with this train. It runs at severely reduced speed and is met at the depot entrance by the fitters who take one look at the train and s**t themselves. The leading bogie is only attached to the vehicle by the traction motor cables and the brake air hoses and every time the driver takes power it shoots forward under the vehicle and is crashing into the suspension air tanks. Turns out the centre pivot bolster had completely cracked through. But it was never spotted by the pit exam or any of the previous underframe inspection carried out every 10,000 miles because everything was sitting in the correct place at the time and you had to look very closely and have a very good appreciation of what that part of the train should look like normally to spot it.
Failure to detect cracks through through routine visual inspection is in no way a reflection on the competency of the inspector, it's a fact of life that it will be missed by the majority of people and it takes a confluence of circumstances for cracks to be detected through routine maintenance before outright failure occurs.
I'd be willing to bet good money that the cracks found in the yaw damper brackets last month have resulted in an increased in diligence - if nothing else - and a focussing of minds on the shop floor where the 800's are maintained, irrespective of any fleet/special checks or new VMI's etc. and that is what has prompted the discovery of the new cracks in the vehicle structure.
When a crack such as this is found there are numerous questions that have to be asked in order to quantify the risk; the most important of which is how confident are you that the crack wasn't there the last time the specific part of the vehicle was inspected? The answer is generally "Not very", because of the reasons described above. So you don't have a reliable frame of reference to determine how long it has taken the crack to propagate and without that information any inspection regime - both in terms of frequency and pass/fail criteria - has to assume worst case and it is only as data starts to be gathered that the inspection regime can row back.
Issues like this have two phases: containment and counter measure.
Containment: how to mitigate against the consequence of failure in the short term. You don't have to definitively know the cause of the failure to contain it. Containment is a movable feast - in terms of the actions taken, between do nothing and ground the whole fleet - as more data is developed. Initial responses could be considered excessively risk adverse with hindsight but are appropriate given the limited data that will be available initially.
Counter measure: how to permanently remove the cause of failure. You do have to definitively know the cause of the failure to employ a counter measure.
The two can run in parallel, but generally the counter measure phase starts some significant period of time after the containment for obvious reasons.
Hitachi/Agility/GWR/LNER etc. are all very much in the containment phase at the moment.
Talk of weld repairs and the like, as the counter measure, are massively premature (as is worrying about bonding out for welding!) because I am absolutely 100% certain that no one in any of the organisation, at this very early stage in the life cycle of such an issue, knows definitively what is causing the cracking.