How about sticking with actual fact, rather than your reality. Grenfell (and other similar blocks) had been refurbished recently and (other than the cladding, obviously) met all the applicable standards.
Facts are a good thing. So we really ought to talk about the plastic windows that didn't have intumescent sealing around the frames - or apparently any sealing in some cases, leading to residents complaining about the draught.
Or we could talk about the fire doors that weren't really fire doors - especially the ones with big gaps at the bottom that just let smoke flow straight through. Not to mention holes made through walls and floors that also weren't properly sealed.
Then with the cladding, are you talking about the rainscreen, or do you mean the whole cladding system? The one with insulation material that burns, the missing firestopping, the one with rainscreen not fitted in accordance with the manufacturers instructions, and the use of other materials that are still under investigation?
Also there's the question about the design standards that permit a refurbished building of that size and height to have only a single stairway as a means of escape. A stairway protected by firedoors that let smoke into the stairwell when they are opened, and which is only accessible from the flats by passing through a lobby containing liftshafts connecting to all floors providing a convenient means for toxic smoke to pass from lobby to lobby.
If Grenfell had been refurbished
properly, not just meeting minimum requirements, it should have had new replacement liftshafts provided in new protected lobbies and a second protected stairway. Unfortunately to do that would have involved the loss of one flat per floor, which was never going to happen as one objective of the refurbishment was to
increase the number of flats, not reduce the number to make it safer.
The reasons why buildings like Grenfell (it isn't the only one) were refurbished that way are complex. But bramling is not wrong to suggest that pressure on London's housing stock has led to the adoption of policies and standards that place quality and safety as a secondary to numbers.
If not for the cladding a fire in any flat would have been contained for at least 30 minutes (as demonstrated by previous fires in other blocks).
No. The cladding system facilitated the spread of the fire across the outside of the building, but there were a number of other defects that compromised the compartmentalisation. Previous fires in other blocks had already demonstrated that the compartmentalisation strategy was flawed. In the case of Lakanal House firestopping was missing and the single point of egress quickly became choked with black smoke. The inquest ruled that sub-standard renovation was largely to blame.
As far as I've been able to understand following the investigation and inquiry closely, even if the rainscreen had been totally fireproof, the voids and gaps and issues with firestopping would have allowed smoke and flame to spread from flat to flat quite rapidly. Quite probably faster than firefighters would have been able to catch up with it. In which case evacuation would have become essential.
All the interviews I saw with residents said that, other than minor antisocial issues, they were more than happy with the flats, which were larger than is common these days.
Wrong. Superficially the flats were nice. But there was a long list of issues the residents had been complaining about before the fire. That included concerns the electrical system was faulty (people thought the fire might have been started by a power surge). There were complaints the new gas boilers had been installed in hallways near the exit door. There were complaints the ground floor lobby of the single exit route was frequently used to dump rubbish (anti-social and a fire risk). There were concerns that parking around the block restricted access for the emergency services.
https://
www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/14/fire-safety-concerns-raised-by-grenfell-tower-residents-in-2012
Survivors of the disaster said on Wednesday they had raised fears about the fact that there was only one escape route. They also told the Kensington and Chelsea tenant management organisation (KCTMO) of their concerns over the placement of boilers and gas pipes, the absence of a building-wide fire alarm or sprinkler system, and piles of rubbish being dumped and causing a fire risk.