North Downs line electrification

[XDM]

I'd be open to discussion with you or the LSE academic who saw it and chortled, about why you think it is subjectively weighted
If you could please avoid sulking and taking it out on me all the time

Sorry no. He would not enjoy being publicly called a ranter,sulker or corrosive by you,or your habit of calling debate 'taking it out on me'. So he will stick to his academic friends & avoid your gracious offer. But I have taken your insults & vulgarities with wry amusement, as have others.

 

[Philip Phlopp]

Sorry no.

That's a shame, if you would like to paraphrase what he said, we could at least discuss that.

I only ask as any identified flaws or failures in the risk assessment could be highly relevant to the North Downs Line - if it's wrong, it throws into question whether the ORR are then wrong to prevent further third rail electrification, at least on a safety cases basis, which could be very important for the North Downs Line being two infill schemes (likewise Marshlink and Uckfield).

 

[QueensCurve]

Let's live in the real world rather than the world of the bureaucrat. TfL third railing the Overground extensions saved millions compared with your AC advocacy. And has it been more dangerous? In the real world has it been more dangerous in the real,rather armchair risk assessment world you advocate? No we have saved millions,done the job quickly & no one has since been hurt. Third rail is dangerous from your armchair. It is safe in practice. You have been unable to quote real world stats, only risk tabletop assessments.

.
The real world is now a post-factual one.

 

[OxtedL]

XDM, are you saying that because you think third rail is safe the rail industry should fudge its data to make it change the outcome of its risk assessments? If so, that is a dangerous road to start walking down.

 

[QueensCurve]

I suppose there is no reason that the RSSB, ORR, DfT and rail professionals are all opposed to significant expansion of the third-rail network since they, apparently, don't have the 'right' facts.

Not only that, but the experience of railway administrations all over the world favours high voltage AC OHLE and, with a few exceptions, DC 3rd rail is not used except on urban railways.

But perhaps I forget that to be born British is to draw the winning ticket in the lottery of life and our practices must be better than foreign ones.

 

[43021HST]

Can I just suggest the UK third rail system is supposed to be based on practices pioneered by the Americans. Like many so called uniquely British quirks, it turns out to be a foreign import

Statistics and bureaucracy aside, doesn't basic common sense also suggest that an exposed electric source is safer well above head height rather than at a height that's easily stepped on.

 

[Taunton]

Well, I think some (a few) of us have given it our best shot here. We are opposed by those from the professional side who, apart from benefiting far more from 25Kv work (it takes probably 10 times more man-days to put in than DC), have written, quite seriously, that trains will run at 110mph on the North Downs Line, and that maintenance staff who spend maybe 95% of their time on third rail lines out of Guildford or Reigate are somehow much more at risk if DC is installed on the remaining 5% of their territory.

Well, you probably think that someone from the Western doesn't know much about electrification, because it was hardly installed anywhere on the old WR until very recent times. But since just a little bit was, we have had two major accidents on it, Southall (7 fatalities 139 injuries) and Ladbroke Grove (31 fatalities 520 injuries), with the destruction of three passenger and one freight trains. Now in both these cases the lack of forward sighting of signals was a key component, at Ladbroke Grove there were apparently only a few seconds. Now the Western is a pretty straight line, and it's normal that you not only have a good view of the next signal from a distance, but quite often the one after that as well - that is, until 25Kv masts came along. Because those elsewhere have had overhead wires for a long time, this aspect was generally glossed over in the accident reports, and is ignored in "risk assessments". But the view on the Western is that without the overhead wires obstructing the view well ahead neither would have happened. Are these casualty numbers taken into account by any of those writing above about risks?

 

[Domh245]

Well, I think some (a few) of us have given it our best shot here. We are opposed by those from the professional side who, apart from benefiting far more from 25Kv work (it takes probably 10 times more man-days to put in than DC), have written, quite seriously, that trains will run at 110mph on the North Downs Line, and that maintenance staff who spend maybe 95% of their time on third rail lines out of Guildford or Reigate are somehow much more at risk if DC is installed on the remaining 5% of their territory.

The only reference I can find in this thread to 110mph operations is talking about Basingstoke and "The potential to operate services at 110mph using AC". Not "Will operate at 110mph". Also, its rather naive to say that DC is installed to improve the safety of track workers. Other people can and do access the track who aren't professionally trained.

Well, you probably think that someone from the Western doesn't know much about electrification, because it was hardly installed anywhere on the old WR until very recent times. But since just a little bit was, we have had two major accidents on it, Southall (7 fatalities 139 injuries) and Ladbroke Grove (31 fatalities 520 injuries), with the destruction of three passenger and one freight trains. Now in both these cases the lack of forward sighting of signals was a key component, at Ladbroke Grove there were apparently only a few seconds. Now the Western is a pretty straight line, and it's normal that you not only have a good view of the next signal from a distance, but quite often the one after that as well - that is, until 25Kv masts came along. Because those elsewhere have had overhead wires for a long time, this aspect was generally glossed over in the accident reports, and is ignored in "risk assessments". But the view on the Western is that without the overhead wires obstructing the view well ahead neither would have happened. Are these casualty numbers taken into account by any of those writing above about risks?

Oh FFS. Did I really just read a thinly veiled allegation that the presence of OHLE was responsible for two major rail crashes? Perhaps the most bizarre arguments against OHLE.

 

[najaB]

We are opposed by those from the professional side who, apart from benefiting far more from 25Kv work (it takes probably 10 times more man-days to put in than DC)

I'm not one of those professionals, but I think it quite insulting to say that their opinions are driven by a desire to fatten their pockets.

have written, quite seriously, that trains will run at 110mph on the North Downs Line

I must have missed that one, could you quote it for me, please?

...and that maintenance staff who spend maybe 95% of their time on third rail lines out of Guildford or Reigate are somehow much more at risk if DC is installed on the remaining 5% of their territory.

Risk = probability of an event x probability of event occurring. More third rail makes contact with that rail more likely. Simple maths, really.

But the view on the Western is that without the overhead wires obstructing the view well ahead neither would have happened. Are these casualty numbers taken into account by any of those writing above about risks?

Every accident involves a chain of occurrences, any of which being slightly different would have stopped the eventual outcome. Signal visibility due to OHLE isn't the single 'smoking gun' that you attempt to make it out to be.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

Oh FFS. Did I really just read a thinly veiled allegation that the presence of OHLE was responsible for two major rail crashes? Perhaps the most bizarre arguments against OHLE.

It's not a totally baseless statement. Signal 109 was partially obstructed by electrification equipment. I'm not sure how it is relevant to Southall though.

 

[Nippy]

The Southall crash had nothing to do with the signal sighting, and everything to do with the driver not looking where he was going and having no ATP/AWS.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
SN.109 was partially obscured, but driver training then wasn't what it is now either. In all the other SPADs I've been involved in, I have never had the driver state at the time that the reason was the signal was obscured by the OLE.

 

[Philip Phlopp]

Signal sighting and safety considerations have moved forward considerably from when the Mark 3b OLE was installed, with complex CGI packages used to visualise the route and assess potential signal sighting difficulties.

Signal sighting is a particular issue with headspan systems as they require a mast at each side of the track, a mechanically independent system can more easily switch between portals, twin track cantilevers or even four track cantilevers to enable the best signal sighting.

 

[Domh245]

It's not a totally baseless statement. Signal 109 was partially obstructed by electrification equipment. I'm not sure how it is relevant to Southall though.

Sure, but it's the fact that Taunton says "without the overhead wires obstructing the view well ahead neither would have happened". A functioning safety system would be just as effective at stopping a crash from a SPAD.

 

[fergusjbend]

I have followed this thread with great interest. It seems to me to exemplify the current disaffection with expert opinion, which is now accounted as self-interested, anti-democratic and elitist. The postings by Phillip Phlopp and others are clearly informed by specialist knowledge, intellectual study and analytical skills. Their views are shouted down as 'armchair' by contributors who seem to have no specialist knowledge, but think that their views, uninformed as they are by theory, study or education are just as good as those of professional people who have spent many years making a rational and disinterested analysis of the problem.

 

[Taunton]

The Southall crash had nothing to do with the signal sighting

A different view to some older Western crews, who pointed out that the YY and Y signals in advance had been visible for far longer in advance before OHLE installation. Of course, it still met the minimum regulations, so the enquiry ignored it. A look at the front cover photograph of the Southall accident report is a pretty good indication of what the OHLE had done to GWML signal sighting.

 

[Philip Phlopp]

Sure, but it's the fact that Taunton says "without the overhead wires obstructing the view well ahead neither would have happened". A functioning safety system would be just as effective at stopping a crash from a SPAD.

I'd also say, combining the two - safety systems and signal aspects - as we move to ETCS Level 2 and in-cab displays, signal sighting ceases to be an issue. That benefits not just electrification, but all manner of other factors including things like frost/snow build up on lenses, sunlight and eases other infrastructure changes which will not have to consider signal sighting.

It's something that's in the future, but not far in the future when considered alongside some electrification works.

 

[Bald Rick]

A different view to some older Western crews, who pointed out that the YY and Y signals in advance had been visible for far longer in advance before OHLE installation. Of course, it still met the minimum regulations, so the enquiry ignored it. A look at the front cover photograph of the Southall accident report is a pretty good indication of what the OHLE had done to GWML signal sighting.

The last few posts have really opened my eyes. OLE is clearly unsafe.

When I get to work in the morning I will be instructing my Project Managers and Engineers to start work on conversion of OLE to Third rail, and the new railways I'm working on must be third rail only.

Yes, I know the GEML has managed perfectly well with OLE for 67 years, and the busiest mixed traffic railway in the world has managed for 50 years, and almost the entire Swiss railway network has had OLE, some parts for over a century, but the evidence is clear. It's got to go.

:roll:

 

[najaB]

A different view to some older Western crews, who pointed out that the YY and Y signals in advance had been visible for far longer in advance before OHLE installation.

Mr Harrison passed both the YY and Y without slowing, it's hard to see how additional sighting distance would have made any difference.

 

[najaB]

A look at the front cover photograph of the Southall accident report is a pretty good indication of what the OHLE had done to GWML signal sighting.

If you're referring to the picture attached below, then thanks very much for the red herring, it'll go well in a stew.

The picture is taken from at least 15 feet higher than the 'driver's eye' view, so is completely irrelevant.

 

[J-2739]

The last few posts have really opened my eyes. OLE is clearly unsafe.

When I get to work in the morning I will be instructing my Project Managers and Engineers to start work on conversion of OLE to Third rail, and the new railways I'm working on must be third rail only.

Yes, I know the GEML has managed perfectly well with OLE for 67 years, and the busiest mixed traffic railway in the world has managed for 50 years, and almost the entire Swiss railway network has had OLE, some parts for over a century, but the evidence is clear. It's got to go.

:roll:

If we went ahead with that 'unsafe' philosophy, we wouldn't be making progress.

Third rail isn't any safer than OLE, considering arcing. Also look up on the Valhalla train crash in 2015.

If something is unsafe, the best thing to go about it is to improve it. For example, we've come a long way since the first car was on the road...

 

[Philip Phlopp]

If we went ahead with that 'unsafe' philosophy, we wouldn't be making progress.

Third rail isn't any safer than OLE, considering arcing. Also look up on the Valhalla train crash in 2015.

If something is unsafe, the best thing to go about it is to improve it. For example, we've come a long way since the first car was on the road...

:roll:

Somehow, I don't think we're in Kansas anymore, Toto.

 

[SpacePhoenix]

If we went ahead with that 'unsafe' philosophy, we wouldn't be making progress.

Third rail isn't any safer than OLE, considering arcing. Also look up on the Valhalla train crash in 2015.

If something is unsafe, the best thing to go about it is to improve it. For example, we've come a long way since the first car was on the road...

Another recent incident with 3rd rail that could be considered is the one at Gatwick where a drinks can caused a dead short between the 3rd rail and one of the running rail. Given the amount of rubbish sometimes seen trackside, it's surprising that dead shorts caused by drinks cans aren't more common

 

[edwin_m]

Eh? The Class 387s, which GWR is now receiving, have enabled 3rd rail equipment. So a battery fitted EMU would not be too different.

Through services such as Oxford or Newbury to Gatwick would then become possible quite easily.

I didn't realise it was enabled, but the fact remains that it would only be used on a small minority of GWR services whereas Southern could potentially have several routes needing a third rail IPEMU. Assuming of course that such a thing is possible within the current limits of the third rail. If batteries are also required then they would be a non-standard sub-fleet and from what is said about the economics it wouldn't be cost-effective to fit more of them to get to places like Oxford.

 

[SpacePhoenix]

Would the supply be able to handle the extra load of a battery charging circuit? Isn't 3rd rail pretty much max out for demand as it is?

 

[NSEFAN]

Would the supply be able to handle the extra load of a battery charging circuit? Isn't 3rd rail pretty much max out for demand as it is?

Surely you'd just current-limit the trains as they do now? When the train is coasting and braking, the battery can be charged at its maximum current rating.

 

[Deepgreen]

The last few posts have really opened my eyes. OLE is clearly unsafe.

When I get to work in the morning I will be instructing my Project Managers and Engineers to start work on conversion of OLE to Third rail, and the new railways I'm working on must be third rail only.

Yes, I know the GEML has managed perfectly well with OLE for 67 years, and the busiest mixed traffic railway in the world has managed for 50 years, and almost the entire Swiss railway network has had OLE, some parts for over a century, but the evidence is clear. It's got to go.

:roll:

Could you just get them to fill in the NDL first? Ta.

 

[MarkyT]

I'd also say, combining the two - safety systems and signal aspects - as we move to ETCS Level 2 and in-cab displays, signal sighting ceases to be an issue. That benefits not just electrification, but all manner of other factors including things like frost/snow build up on lenses, sunlight and eases other infrastructure changes which will not have to consider signal sighting.

It's something that's in the future, but not far in the future when considered alongside some electrification works.

Pedantically, sighting becomes LESS of an issue with cab signalling rather than no issue at all. Block marker boards and other lineside signs will not need very long range and continuous final approach visibility, as is the case with signals, so that factor should make positioning the boards and other infrastructure around them much easier. Snow build up is very rarely a problem with colour lights and NR accepts the Dorman claim that their latest LED heads, with a self cleaning finish to the lens, require no periodic manual cleaning by maintainers. Sunlight can always be a challenge although the LED types are supposed to be better. Fun fact: Traditional filament signals have no reflectors behind the lamps and the walls of the light box are finished flat black inside. That is to avoid the risk of sunlight entering through the lens and a mirror surface reflecting that light back out again and, concentrated through the fresnel lens, displaying a plausible false aspect.

 

[QueensCurve]

I'm not one of those professionals, but I think it quite insulting to say that their opinions are driven by a desire to fatten their pockets.
I must have missed that one, could you quote it for me, please?
Risk = probability of an event x probability of event occurring. More third rail makes contact with that rail more likely. Simple maths, really.
Every accident involves a chain of occurrences, any of which being slightly different would have stopped the eventual outcome. Signal visibility due to OHLE isn't the single 'smoking gun' that you attempt to make it out to be.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
It's not a totally baseless statement. Signal 109 was partially obstructed by electrification equipment. I'm not sure how it is relevant to Southall though.

My understanding was that signal sighting was a factor in both those crashes and signal sighting was said to be have been worsened by the OHLE.

That may reflect poor design of the OHLE and inadequate attention to signal sighting during electrification. This is not to be excused.

Other factors came into play. At Southall, the train which passed the signal at danger was equipped with ATP and AWS but neither was operating (allowed by the rules) at the time. Either might have prevented the incident.

Re Ladbroke, other factors affecting SN109 were that it was an unusual back to front "L" shape and its sighting was affected by the rising sun on its face or the setting sun behind. There was no flank protection to prevent a collision once it was passed at danger.

SN109 had been passed at danger more often than any other signal and no action had been taken even after the "dress rehearsal" for the accident where a collision was narrowly avoided.

Other factors were the diversity of routes set by ARSE on the relatively new track layout and the lack of experience of the driver.

As is usual, both accidents were due to a catalogue of errors and not merely the presence of OHLE.

Railways with OHLE operate safely around the world every day.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

I have followed this thread with great interest. It seems to me to exemplify the current disaffection with expert opinion, which is now accounted as self-interested, anti-democratic and elitist. The postings by Phillip Phlopp and others are clearly informed by specialist knowledge, intellectual study and analytical skills. Their views are shouted down as 'armchair' by contributors who seem to have no specialist knowledge, but think that their views, uninformed as they are by theory, study or education are just as good as those of professional people who have spent many years making a rational and disinterested analysis of the problem.

This armchair contributor agrees with you 100%.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

A look at the front cover photograph of the Southall accident report is a pretty good indication of what the OHLE had done to GWML signal sighting.

The front cover of the Southall report does not show the sighting of any of the signals on the approach to the collision and is not taken from a driver's point of view.

 

[TheKnightWho]

This armchair contributor agrees with you 100%.

Likewise - the considerable use of words like 'probably', 'likely', 'obviously', 'some people', 'real world' and 'common sense' are good indicators that what someone saying is just pure conjecture, stating what seems obvious to them in the face of evidence that doesn't suit them. They're commonly known as 'weasel words'. The last two are particularly bad, as they're manipulation intended to entrench the writer's subjective opinion as objective fact.

Reading through posts by XDM and Taunton, they are absolutely littered with them.

 

[swt_passenger]

Agreed, but no 'significant' extensions. Shalford to Reigate DC would be a rural nightmare to engineer with the safety of level crossings and unmanned stations to consider, not to mention the HV feeding arrangements for the additional substations required.

Agree likewise, I was trying to explain that the minor ELL/SLL link was perfectly logical in those specific circumstances, but the earlier poster was seemingly trying to big it up into something much longer and use it as more of a precedent.

NR had a kilometre of new third rail up slow line come into use between Southampton Parkway and Eastleigh last year, and that is another type of minor addition to the DC network that I'm sure we'll carry on seeing.

 

[J-2739]

:roll:

Somehow, I don't think we're in Kansas anymore, Toto.

Excuse me for being ignorant but what is that supposed to mean?