Scotrail 334 becomes uncoupled near Uphall (26/11)

[Ben Glasgow]

Is 30 minutes not the time it took passengers to leave the train (by media reports) ?

Presumably as the next station is a few minutes away, the signaller would have been notified by the driver at this point, in addition to whatever errors the signalling system was showing.

If the driver was at the next station was it not a lack of someone suitable to take charge of the stranded train and release the doors that was the issue ? Presumably services in the opposite direction passed in that time.

It sounds like a very regrettable PR incident for Scotrail rather than one in which passengers were placed in real danger. RAIB will doubtless have something preliminary out relatively quickly.

Do RAIB publicise their findings? I’m not familiar with how information is handled surrounding incidents like this.

 

[robbeech]

I know 222’s automatically extinguish the lamps in the centre and then they come back on to whatever setting they were prior to coupling if the uncouple button is pressed.

So in this scenario a person pressing the uncouple button by mistake whilst in AB territory could have disasterous consequences. Somehow the uncouple button is pressed, or a fault activates that circuit as if it had been pressed (unlikely) and the train uncoupled, the tail lights come on and away the train goes. The signaller will be none the wiser. Incredibly unlikely scenario of course.

Do RAIB publicise their findings? I’m not familiar with how information is handled surrounding incidents like this.

Yes. A report is generally publicised when things have been concluded.

 

[Surreytraveller]

Do RAIB publicise their findings? I’m not familiar with how information is handled surrounding incidents like this.

https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports?report_type[]=investigation-report

You can even sign up to email updates so they tell you whenever anything is published.
It generally takes about a year from the date of the incident for the report to be published, assuming they think a full report is necessary

 

[RLBH]

https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports?report_type[]=investigation-report
You can even sign up to email updates so they tell you whenever anything is published

As the point of the RAIB (along with the AAIB and MAIB) is to learn lessons on how to operate safely, and distribute them freely so that everyone benefits, there's no sense in not publishing them.

This point is particularly relevant for the MAIB, as the bar for owning a boat is remarkably low, and they frequently make recommendations that are relevant to small craft. Presumably RAIB recommendations are at least somewhat relevant to miniature railways and the likes!

 

[bahnause]

According to https://assets.publishing.service.g...data/file/456936/guidance_to_rair_regs_v4.pdf paragraph 14, I'm not shure if RAIB will be very interested in this incident.

 

[krus_aragon]

According to https://assets.publishing.service.g...data/file/456936/guidance_to_rair_regs_v4.pdf paragraph 14, I'm not shure if RAIB will be very interested in this incident.

Page 87 of that document notes that "the unexpected separation of trains or trams whie in service or being prepared for service" is one of the types of incident the RAIB must be notified of. It includes the specific example "A train formed of two 2-car multiple units (not gangwayed between units) departs from a station and parts between the two units."

 

[JN114]

The RAIB should (and almost certainly will) have been informed.

Whether a full report emerges or not will depend on what safety learning the RAIB identify that would benefit the rest of the industry.

I don’t think members here realise just how much is reported to RAIB, and how few of those incidents result in a full report.

 

[Surreytraveller]

The only thing in this event that went wrong (apart from the unexpected separation!) was the fact the front unit wasn't brought to a halt. The rear unit was brought to a halt (or never moved from the station), and it was protected by the signalling system.
Another query - with GSMR, a signaller can speak to passengers on a train (for example if a driver was incapacitated). Does the equipment have to be logged on for a signaller to do that - i.e. would the signaller have been able to use the public address in the stranded portion of the train? This might have been more of an issue if the train was standed between stations.

 

[DanDaDriver]

Another query - with GSMR, a signaller can speak to passengers on a train (for example if a driver was incapacitated).

That’s not on all stock though.

 

[Bletchleyite]

This might have been more of an issue if the train was standed between stations.

Indeed. This, combined with the risk of people starting uninformed murmur like "what if we're hit from behind", might well have led to a highly dangerous self-evacuation, possibly even onto the adjacent running line.

That said, trains should not be uncoupling randomly in any case, emergency braking or no, and so this is something that will need due investigation, not least because had it been a gangwayed unit like a Class 350 someone going through at the time it happened could have been killed. And that the brakes did not apply on the front unit (so the driver had no idea it had happened, nor would a guard if present had they too been in the front unit) makes it even worse.

 

[Surreytraveller]

That’s not on all stock though.

Is it not? Presumably just older stock with less technical public address? Is there still any stock about without public address?

 

[Crossover]

So I did some investigating and trawled through all the tweets and replies to various tweets to Scotrail or/and passengers tweeting each other when things kicked off.

*Interestingly it turns out that passengers knew something was up when they were stuck at Uphall for far too long, possibly before even the staff in the train that left knew something was amiss.*

Anyways, someone reported that the front 3 carriages lost power (lights off) temporarly whilst the whole train was sitting at Uphall before departing and leaving the 3 carriages at Uphall. Anyone want to take a stab as to what happened? This sounds like a key moment when something went wrong or was in the process of going wrong.

I have literally zero knowledge of the software and hardware intergration between all the systems but could something have tripped causing the uncoupling? Or do you reckon the loss of power in the portion of the train that left the station was a direct effect from unexpected decoupling?

I did notice from RTT that there was an extended dwell at Uphall, which would suggest something wasn't right with something

I have been on a 334 (a few years ago, a few people here will probably remember my mentioning it!) which has "sat down" before. In the event every time the driver tried to take power, the unit just dropped all power - it was a bit of a weird one

 

[krus_aragon]

I did notice from RTT that there was an extended dwell at Uphall, which would suggest something wasn't right with something

That may be related to the fact that the station track was still "occupied" by the rear unit, as opposed to the front unit being late in departing.

 

[Chuggington21]

Tail lights

On a 334 it's standard practise to turn off the taillights after coupling up as if they were left on. Once coupled they extinguish themself and once split them come on that's why drivers are trained to turn them off during coupling.

GSM-R
on a 334 the signaller can assess the PA and I don't know the answer if it has to be switched on but I know that it doesn't have to be registered (set up) for him to use it.

're coupling I don't believe the unit was coupled up that day and has been together for a while as someone else has suggested on here

 

[hexagon789]

On the contrary. I would suggest that the vast majority of trains are driven by average persons. Possibly experienced, and hopefully well trained ones, admittedly, but average in all meaningful respects.

Sorry wasn't very clear, I meant the average passenger who has received no railway training whatsoever.

 

[ainsworth74]

This thread is not for discussing DOO disputes at other TOCs and any such posts will be deleted as off-topic. Please keep to the topic at hand in relation to the incident at Uphall.

 

[snookertam]

Is 30 minutes not the time it took passengers to leave the train (by media reports) ?

Presumably as the next station is a few minutes away, the signaller would have been notified by the driver at this point, in addition to whatever errors the signalling system was showing.

If the driver was at the next station was it not a lack of someone suitable to take charge of the stranded train and release the doors that was the issue ? Presumably services in the opposite direction passed in that time.

It sounds like a very regrettable PR incident for Scotrail rather than one in which passengers were placed in real danger. RAIB will doubtless have something preliminary out relatively quickly.

Right that makes sense actually. So it may have become apparent very quickly that a train was there, otherwise the next train or train on opposite line would have examined to check.

To those speculating, I appreciate that people are intrigued to know how this would have happened, but there's probably any number of possibilities so positing explanations is probably a bit useless at this stage. Something has went seriously wrong whether that is electronic, mechanical or human error. Thankfully as others have said it sounds like passengers were never at any stage in serious danger although being on an unstaffed unit on a main line still has safety implications, so I reckon RAIB will take some interest.

 

[Sirius]

If the 1745 departure time (7L on RTT) was recording the front half heading west then the next eastbound service appears to have been 2H18 which lost 17 minutes between Bathgate and Livingston North (both to the west of the incident).

I suppose the real concern is could it have happened at a signal. The westbound Helensburgh services can often catch the Milngavie in the Bathgate to Airdrie stretch and stop in the middle of nowhere.

 

[68000]

The only thing in this event that went wrong (apart from the unexpected separation!) was the fact the front unit wasn't brought to a halt. The rear unit was brought to a halt (or never moved from the station), and it was protected by the signalling system.
Another query - with GSMR, a signaller can speak to passengers on a train (for example if a driver was incapacitated). Does the equipment have to be logged on for a signaller to do that - i.e. would the signaller have been able to use the public address in the stranded portion of the train? This might have been more of an issue if the train was standed between stations.

The 334 is equipped with a PA connection that the signaller can use although the Drivers Control Panel has to be on to do so (either with the key in or the soft power up routine). In other words, the siganller would not have been able to speak over the PA of the unit that was left behind as the DCP was not on (at either end)

 

[Meerkat]

In other words, the siganller would not have been able to speak over the PA of the unit that was left behind as the DCP was not on (at either end)

That’s a bit of a flaw isn’t it? Crash scenarios could involve the units being disconnected, or the active cab being destroyed....

 

[Bletchleyite]

That’s a bit of a flaw isn’t it? Crash scenarios could involve the units being disconnected, or the active cab being destroyed....

Agreed. It would strike me that such a system should simply allow a unit number to be entered and for that unit to be communicated with provided the PA system and interfacing is not destroyed and the unit is not fully powered down (but it should work on as minimal battery power as possible).

 

[driver_m]

Let's collate what can't and can happen as people are running here with hypothetical situations

Multiple sets. Need a guard in AB areas. Likely to be on rear set. So split here is covered. Tail lamps shouldn't light, but if they did, there is still a guard to report split. So potential second train shouldnt enter section and run into split unit. Guard can contact Signaller via GSM as the units have battery back up and can be powered up despite cab being inactive. ECS is only DOO situation where no guard would be onboard, but train would not be doing any door duties so shouldn't be relevant anyway. Any split in this scenario would be impossible to miss.

TCB/axle counter areas .Can be DOO but will have track circuit detection on line. Signaller not under same obligation to see taillights as they have to in AB sections, as box may not be in vicinity of line or even area. TC would stay occupied and protect train by keeping signal in rear at danger. Driver could merrily plod on unaware but rear set is protected.

Signaller can do PA announcement via GSM if unable to get hold of driver. The main example of this is if the DSD pedal is released and not reapplied. Brakes apply and signaller is automatically contacted after a time limit runs out unless stopped.by driver.

There are various failure scenarios to add onto this which I won't go into. You can read a rule book on that if you so wish to know exact details .

 

[ComUtoR]

Guard can contact Signaller via GSM as the units have battery back up and can be powered up despite cab being inactive.

As highlighted by the incident at Chilham the battery backup for the GSMR was optional and may or may not be fitted. It does however, power up in an inactive cab.

 

[68000]

That’s a bit of a flaw isn’t it? Crash scenarios could involve the units being disconnected, or the active cab being destroyed....

As long as there is power, the GSM-R in all cabs is powered up and on but the Drivers Control Panel is not on unless the key is inserted or a staff member uses the soft power up routine. The 334 has a UPS which provides power to the radio in the event of OHL problems or problems like this so if there was a staff member with access to the cab, the GSM-R can be used

 

[68000]

As highlighted by the incident at Chilham the battery backup for the GSMR was optional and may or may not be fitted. It does however, power up in an inactive cab.

Correct, in general it was deemed for diesel units that the GSM-R UPS was not required as the diesel engine would hold the power up for the intended time period. The UPS was generally deployed on electric units although it was a TOC decision to fit the UPS or not

 

[6Gman]

More modern stock does on some sort of 'TMS' (train management system) though it's not always very ergonomically readable. Swr desiro have it high-up on the right hand wall . I don't think 334 would have , but I can't say for sure.

Ironically the old Blue Square DMUs had lights immediately to the left of the driver to show how many power cars were in the train.

Appreciate slightly different on an EMU.

 

[Ken H]

Ironically the old Blue Square DMUs had lights immediately to the left of the driver to show how many power cars were in the train.

Appreciate slightly different on an EMU.

were there not 3 lights per power car. as each power car had 2 engines 2 of the lights were for a running engine. But what was the middle one for?
They used to be blue, but then they replaced them with a blanking plate with a little hole. Think there were problems seeing the lights in sunlight.

Not sure what happened when they started taking some of the engines out to make half power cars.

 

[hexagon789]

were there not 3 lights per power car. as each power car had 2 engines 2 of the lights were for a running engine. But what was the middle one for?
They used to be blue, but then they replaced them with a blanking plate with a little hole. Think there were problems seeing the lights in sunlight.

Not sure what happened when they started taking some of the engines out to make half power cars.

I think it was for the control air supply.

 

[kieron]

Let's collate what can't and can happen as people are running here with hypothetical situations
...
ECS is only DOO situation where no guard would be onboard, but train would not be doing any door duties so shouldn't be relevant anyway.

I don't think it's been stated that the fact that this happened at a station call was significant. If it wasn't, ECS trains may be just as vulnerable to this sort of thing as ones with passengers on.

 

[Ken H]

I don't think it's been stated that the fact that this happened at a station call was significant. If it wasn't, ECS trains may be just as vulnerable to this sort of thing as ones with passengers on.

I thought the point of automatic brakes was that if a train divided, all the brakes come on.
if that isnt the case then thats a serious concern IMHO.
when you couple up 2 MU's dont they do a brake continuity test any more?