A recruitment drive has already happened. Drivers are in training but there is a limited pool of DI's. Are the Dft going to magic extra DI's from somewhere or perhaps they will offer a better enhancement for drivers to become instructors. If that happens would existing DIs have said additional enhancement back dated and for how long?
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Also is it fair to say an element of drivers pay relates to the antisocial hours? Therefore would the union be able to negotiate a Monday to Thursday/ Tuesday to Friday 09:00-17:45 which will not include antisocial hours and therefore maybe a slight reduction in salary. (I know that is slightly off topic)
Already happens, no reduction in pay.
That was my point, from just those single lines they read more like blows to people by passing trains. If they were dispatch incidents I'd have expected there to be an RAIB report, or bulletin at least.
a_c_skinner
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Oh gawd, I seriously hope that the future is not part-time drivers on zero hours contracts working on an "as required" basis and upon taking charge of their train realise that their route knowledge isn't up to date
Zero hour contracts would have their problems but is there a recognised lower limit of hours to remain competent? Assuming the hours are enough to keep traction and route knowledge on the routes and traction needed. This is drifting off topic mind you. Genuine question, all I do with trains is write the numbers down and visit the mother in law.
Andrew
There is a wider political and economic debate regarding this one. Namely the over reliance of our economy on London and the South. That we lag behind other countries when it comes to reliable and far reaching superfast internet and mobile communications. The fact that people are having to travel so far to work because of over inflated house prices in the London area along with lack of well paid jobs locally. (off topic again sorry)
G136GREYHOUND
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and YOUR knowledge of DOO operations springs from ? please do enlighten us .
Yes it'll be there if revenue collection is still done in the conventional way ,others are probably better qualified than myself to say when that'll change to something different
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If they were not investigated it suggests that they involved people that cane in to contact with the train once it was moving. There is no chance of the driver seeing that, and a guard might dependent on where it occurs, stock type etc.
What would of course be safest would be for the train to have onboard CCTV which is monitored by the guard once all the doors are closed. He could then hit an emergency stop button if someone came in to contact with the train as it moves.
O L Leigh
Established Member
Thank you.
As it happens, if you'd read further down through the document you would have found details of all the incidents. They all happened when there was a train in the platform, although I will agree that in not all incidents the actual despatch of the train had any bearing on the incident. For example, the Clapham 2011 fatality involved a train arriving at the platform while the Ainsdale fatality was considered a criminal act and therefore not attributed to the railways.
The four fatalities that you mentioned earlier were highlighted because all of these involved collisions with trains that had already been despatched (even though the Clapham 2011 fatality doesn't actually fit with that) which makes them of a similar type to the James St incident.
All the italicised text below is taken directly from the report to which you linked. I've not added or altered anything, just cut and pasted it into the thread.
63 The following are examples of similar accidents and incidents that were not investigated by the RAIB:
a. 29 July 2001 at Clapham Junction. A departing train had travelled approximately 10 metres when a man opened a passenger door, stepped onto the platform then fell through the platform edge gap and was killed. The accident summary stated that the employee on the platform responsible for dispatch was looking in the opposite direction and so did not see the man disembark. It also stated that had he seen the man disembark he could not have stopped the train in time to prevent the accident.
b. 22 March 2003 at Wivelsfield. A man ran alongside the train he had just left until he fell through the platform edge gap and was killed. The train driver, who was responsible for dispatch, did not see the man approach and then run alongside the train as it had moved a short distance beyond the platform mirrors/monitors and he was unable to see back along his train.
c. 11 June 2003 at Gunnersbury. A man walked alongside the train he had just left, banging on its side until he fell through the platform edge gap. A bystander tried to pull the man up but was unable to do so and as the train moved the man was struck and suffered serious injuries. The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling that both the injured man and the train operator were liable for the accident: the injured man because of his behaviour while under the influence of alcohol; the train operator because their guard did not act on the passenger’s behaviour but instead boarded the train and dispatched it while the man was out of his line of sight.
d. 2 May 2004 at Ainsdale. A man was pushed into the train he had just left, fell through the platform edge gap and was killed. The guard did not see this happen; he had followed Merseyrail’s dispatch procedure and was behind his closed door with the man out of his line of sight when he sent the ‘ready to start’ code. He became aware of the incident soon after the train moved off because the man struck and activated a door release valve as he fell, which automatically braked the train to a stop. This incident is not included in railway industry statistics as it was judged the consequence of a criminal act.
e. 11 January 2005 at Clapham Junction. A man approached a train and pressed a pushbutton to open the passenger doors but the doors did not open because they were closed and locked. The man turned away from the train but then fell back through the platform edge gap and was killed.
f. 11 January 2007 at Gidea Park. A man ran alongside a train until he fell through the platform edge gap. He was found on the track almost an hour later and subsequently died from his injuries. The railway employee that dispatched the train from the platform did not see the man approach and run alongside the train because he had returned to his cabin almost a minute before the train left the station.
g. 1 December 2007 at Alresford on the Mid Hants heritage railway. A man ran to board a train as it pulled out of the station as the guard and people on the platform shouted for him to stand clear. He operated the door handle and was able to open the door because central door locking is not required of heritage trains that operate at low speed. He then fell through the platform edge gap and was killed.
h. 25 February 2008 at Hilsea. A man ran alongside a train, banging on its side until he fell through the platform edge gap and was killed. The guard had seen the man banging on the side of the train while it was stationary.
i. 21 November 2009 at Angmering. A sixteen year-old person ran alongside the train she had just left, banging on its side until she fell through the platform edge gap and was killed. The young person was found to have a blood alcohol concentration that was approximately three times the UK legal drink drive limit and she was wearing high heeled shoes at the time of the accident. The guard had seen the young person banging on the side of the train while it was stationary and thought that once the train started to move she would move away, which she did before running alongside it.
j. 3 August 2011 at Clapham Junction. A man fell into the side of a train as it arrived at the station, fell through the platform edge gap and was killed.
64 The RAIB has investigated and reported on several similar accidents, including the following:
a. 15 February 2006 at Huntingdon. A train driver, who was responsible for dispatch, drove away from the station immediately after observing a man with his hands on the train. He did not realise that the man’s coat was trapped in the passenger doors or that the train dragged the man along the platform before he fell through the platform edge gap. The man sustained serious injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 11/2007.
b. 1 November 2007 at Tooting Broadway on the London Underground. A train driver, who was responsible for dispatch, drove out of the station without seeing a woman, visible on his in-cab monitor, who was trapped in the doors as he pulled away. The woman freed herself and sustained minor injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 17/2008.
c. 28 January 2011 at Brentwood. A train driver, who was responsible for dispatch, drove out of the station without seeing a woman held upside down in the platform edge gap by a man attempting to stop her from falling further. The man and woman were visible on the driver’s platform monitor although it is possible they were partially concealed by another person on the platform. The woman sustained minor injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 19/2011.
d. 10 October 2011 at King’s Cross. A member of staff dispatched a train from the platform and then could only watch as a woman, trapped in the passenger doors, was dragged along the platform. The woman was able to free her hand before the train left the station and sustained minor injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 09/2012.
While some of these incidents did involve trains despatched by guards a number were of the DOO variety, although it is not clear for all of them what method of despatch was used. Crucially, all of those actually investigated by the RAIB were DOO. It's also worth pointing out that this report is already more than 4 years old and therefore does not include a number of more recent incidents. Also, strangely, it doesn't include the fatality at Haddenham & Thame Parkway during 2007 mentioned in the RSSB report that Domh245 linked to.
I think you are inferring that all of these incidents took place during the despatch of the train from each of those locations. This is not clear, even from the RSSB document, unless you can link to something a bit more authoritative.
Yes, I was perfectly well aware of that even before you posted this. But thank you anyway.
O L Leigh
h. 25 February 2008 at Hilsea. A man ran alongside a train, banging on its side until he fell through the platform edge gap and was killed. The guard had seen the man banging on the side of the train while it was stationary.
i. 21 November 2009 at Angmering. A sixteen year-old person ran alongside the train she had just left, banging on its side until she fell through the platform edge gap and was killed. The young person was found to have a blood alcohol concentration that was approximately three times the UK legal drink drive limit and she was wearing high heeled shoes at the time of the accident. The guard had seen the young person banging on the side of the train while it was stationary and thought that once the train started to move she would move away, which she did before running alongside it.
j. 3 August 2011 at Clapham Junction. A man fell into the side of a train as it arrived at the station, fell through the platform edge gap and was killed.
64 The RAIB has investigated and reported on several similar accidents, including the following:
a. 15 February 2006 at Huntingdon. A train driver, who was responsible for dispatch, drove away from the station immediately after observing a man with his hands on the train. He did not realise that the man’s coat was trapped in the passenger doors or that the train dragged the man along the platform before he fell through the platform edge gap. The man sustained serious injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 11/2007.
b. 1 November 2007 at Tooting Broadway on the London Underground. A train driver, who was responsible for dispatch, drove out of the station without seeing a woman, visible on his in-cab monitor, who was trapped in the doors as he pulled away. The woman freed herself and sustained minor injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 17/2008.
c. 28 January 2011 at Brentwood. A train driver, who was responsible for dispatch, drove out of the station without seeing a woman held upside down in the platform edge gap by a man attempting to stop her from falling further. The man and woman were visible on the driver’s platform monitor although it is possible they were partially concealed by another person on the platform. The woman sustained minor injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 19/2011.
d. 10 October 2011 at King’s Cross. A member of staff dispatched a train from the platform and then could only watch as a woman, trapped in the passenger doors, was dragged along the platform. The woman was able to free her hand before the train left the station and sustained minor injuries as a consequence. See RAIB report 09/2012.
While some of these incidents did involve trains despatched by guards a number were of the DOO variety, although it is not clear for all of them what method of despatch was used. Crucially, all of those actually investigated by the RAIB were DOO. It's also worth pointing out that this report is already more than 4 years old and therefore does not include a number of more recent incidents. Also, strangely, it doesn't include the fatality at Haddenham & Thame Parkway during 2007 mentioned in the RSSB report that Domh245 linked to.
I think you are inferring that all of these incidents took place during the despatch of the train from each of those locations. This is not clear, even from the RSSB document, unless you can link to something a bit more authoritative.
Yes, I was perfectly well aware of that even before you posted this. But thank you anyway.
O L Leigh
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the sniper
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While it's nice highlighting and labelling all those incidents you did with the bold Guard tag, to make a statement, it's a fairly shallow point for anyone paying attention. Most of those incidents weren't the fault of the Guard, I know you know this but for the casual observer, that might not be obvious. The point you're trying to make is that having a Guard couldn't stop those incident, so DOO is justified.
I'll say this though, as far as I can see that report makes no mention of incidents where a Guard acted to prevent a fatality or injury. It isn't mentioned. For example, someone falling between the platform and the train after the ready to start has been given, but seen before/while the train moves while the Guard is observing the train out of the platform, with the Guard then putting in the brake. Some of the incidents you labelled as injuries on Guard worked services could have theoretically occurred under these circumstances, where a Guard prevented a fatality, yet you'd have used those incidents to support a pro-DOO argument. With such a lack of detail how can you say this isn't the case? Equally any preventive action taken by a Guard that avoids at least an injury in a PTI incident would mean said incident falls outside of the scope of that report. It doesn't count in those statistics.
Basically, statistics can tell us everything and nothing at the same time without looking at the detail behind them.
As a guard myself, have I ever stopped the despatch process because of passenger behaviour on the platform ? - YES
Has the driver ever stopped the train ( on which I was a guard ) because of passenger behaviour on the platform ? - YES
Must admit that the lack of droplights at local doors on our stock is a hinderance to getting a full view down the platform - oddly enough however class 142 pacers do give one of the better views despite the lack of droplights.....and they are getting retired in the not too distant future.
Bromley boy
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Since you know everything, I'm still waiting for you to produce figures backing up your previous assertion that UK drivers are "overpaid" compared to equivalent roles in other first world economies.
None will be forthcoming of course. That was that just another baseless, pig-ignorant comment, which you and a certain other poster on this thread seem to specialise in.
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The problem here in the UK is that our doors are designed to accommodate an object of up to ~25mm diameter and still indicate to the driver that they are closed and locked. Testing has shown that certain units close the doors with such force that a grown man cannot remove a hand or arm once trapped, let alone a child or elderly person. Therefore, the interlock light cannot be relied upon for assurance that nobody is trapped by the doors and the person in charge (either driver, conductor, or platform staff) must visually check the doors either directly or using CCTV.
I believe the legal environment here is also different. Just last week a driver was in court for "endangering the safety of a person on the railway", an offence of which you are guilty simply because someone was endangered, whether or not you followed your training correctly as the driver in question appears to have done. He is facing prison time as a result.
To my knowledge I've never actually dragged anyone, but people get trapped in my doors (when DOO) fairly regularly. Most of the time I just wait to see if they can pull themselves out, but other times I actually have to re-release to free them. Those instances won't be on any official reports because procedure was followed and nobody was injured.
My point is that the statistics only show the most serious incidents, not the routine minor ones. There may even be incidents where someone really was dragged, but the driver wasn't aware of it due to a poor view from the driver's cab or the CCTV. It's only recently that direct Twitter communication became available for the public to report things instantly; prior to that very few would bother.
Uh, good luck with that considering that the only part-time working they have on Southern is for semi-retirement once you've taken your pension.
Still, I know many Southern drivers who would welcome a return to full establishment. Though if they really want to eliminate RDW then they will need to increase establishments which I doubt they will do since their management fee will have been based on the current figure.
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AlterEgo
Veteran Member
These aren't injuries but fatalities.
The whole point is that a guard cannot often stop a fatal incident from occurring. That is not the *fault* of the guard concerned and at no point have I claimed that to be the case.
Granted, the report doesn't explain situations where a guard acted to prevent a serious event from occurring. However, it also doesn't include situations where a DOO driver acted similarly either.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
O L Leigh - no, dispatch does not finish when power is taken. It finishes when the last carriage train leaves the platform. All of the linked incidents occurred during dispatch.
From being on the trains daily, from the specialist press, from fora discussions such as this, from reports published by RSSB...... I know you are of the opinion that you can know absolutely nothng about a job unless you are actually doing it but you are obviously and demonstrably wrong, no matter how much that might hurt your ego. You've got a chip on your shoulder, and your sarcasm does not make for interesting nor friendly discussion so let's drop it for the sake of the thread please.
a_c_skinner
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Statistics won't help. My stats is rusty, but using an on line Chi Sq calcualator assuming one method of working is three times riskier than the other you need to get to in excess of 10 events per million before you approach statistical significance.
Goldfish62
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That's not unique to the rail industry. The CPS makes its own independent decision. It's not always the right one as numerous examples of them being criticised for bringing cases to court will testify, but that happens to our justice system.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
Thank you for your post. Most interesting.
O L Leigh
Established Member
Yes, I am aware of that. The distinction is one drawn by RSSB in the report Domh245 linked to. In all four of these cases (well, three actually) the guard had completed the platform checks, given the "ready to start" signal and the train was already moving. However, had the trains been DOO the train despatch probably would have been finished at the time these fatalities occurred because the driver probably would have no way to see the PTI and would therefore have been blissfully unaware of what was going on back there.
I know you've been calling for stats to prove the matter one way or the other, but stats cannot reveal what's actually going on out there. As the sniper says, there are no statistics for incidents where the traincrew acted to avoid death or injury. Also, these particular stats are annoyingly incomplete and inconsistent, as each of the two reports seems to give different numbers and details of PTI fatalities and does not make it clear when people have been struck by a train whether or not this was due to problems during despatch or something else.
And this is why I've tried not to get too bogged down in stats, prefering instead to base my objections on the processes used for different methods of despatch. Taking this approach there is no need to try crunching numbers that are not in the public domain, but rather its possible to explore where there are possible holes in the rules that could result in an incident. Consequently I feel confident that I can show that DOO is a less safe method of working than guards despatch.
I think it bears repeating that the number of incidents is low because of the high standards that the railways employ. There is a great deal of scrutiny given to the PTI by the industry and processes have been improved accordingly. The railways are safe in large part thanks to the hard work and vigilance of it's employees spotting and dealing with situations before they escalate. Personally I'd like to keep the level of safety high and the numbers of incidents at a point where they don't reach statistical significance.
Thanks for the insight. It sounds very much like the same solution that British Rail came up with early in the 1980s. Do you at least check the platform before closing the doors or do you just count 50 seconds and then press "door close"?
I don't wish to be alarmist, but part of the problem with this DOO dispute is that here in the UK we are discovering the shortcoming in this approach. Do you have many incidents of people being caught in closing doors, even by items of their clothing, bag straps etc, and still get an indication in the cab that all doors are closed?
O L Leigh
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I've flown as a passenger, watched a few war films and follow occasional links to PPprune.
Obviously I'm now in a position to go criticise any pilot that dares disagree with my opinion so let's drop it for the sake of the chip on your educated shoulder :roll:
Indeed I know a lot about flying commercial jets, but I'm not a commercial pilot and do not hold an ATPL therefore I am in no way in a position to go on a pilot forum and impart my knowledge on them.
You're using hyperbole to defect discussion, which has been an unfortunate trait running between some very good posts by rail professionals. But to take your bait I did happen to fly exactly the same route to Basel weekly for three years and I can tell you that you get to know every small detail of the journey and you detect any deviation from basic routine in a second. But the crew were happy to discuss the flight in detail, especially the abnormal ones - in fact they enjoyed the chance to discuss the complexities or idiosyncracies of a particular flight if anyone took an interest. Compare and contrast with the sneers and sarcasm of some staff on here whose contempt for their passengers is as unhelpful as it is unnecessary. Most commuters can grasp the issues for and against DOO. I know that the real skill up front comes in handling all the non optimal situations and this thread has been a valuable source of information and insight. Nobody is denying the difficulties of the role, least of all me, but so it is with any job. The constant need of some on here to portray train driving as some kind of arcane process so complex that even discussing it insults the driver is wasting time. After 700 pages haven't we moved past this yet?
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As a neutral, in the discussion about safety, I find the evidence presented AlterEgo to be definitive and if I was an Inspector at an Inquiry (I have attended many road scheme Inquiries) I would be more convinced by his evidence than the other contributions. When one takes part in these things, one has to accept whatever methodology has been laid down by the responsible authority, and the statistics that that authority is prepared to accept.
Try any other angle; it may be an interesting slant on the data or other data which one prefers to be used, but one will be ignored and deserve to be ignored.
An example on safety is the following (from memory but it demonstrates the point). These data are expressed as number of collisions per million vehicle-kms travelled*. If the proposal covers 10 km and a million vehicles pass through per year, the annual veh-kms is 10 million. The collision rate, broken down into fatal, serious and slight injuries, will be expressed as a ratio to that total travel. Note that non personal injury collisions are ignored by the police. If, because you had an airbag and were wearing a seat belt, you emerged from the wreck without a scratch, there would be no collision record created by the police, for the statistics.
Now the trick. If the number of personal injury collisions rose on the stretch where the new scheme is to be built,, bypassing the old, was to rise on a yearly basis and there were 10 fatals and now there will be 20, one would think that in this respect at least, building the bypass would not be a great idea. However, if by building the bypass, a bottleneck is relieved (say 5 minutes**) and traffic doubles, the Inquiry will conclude that the new road is as safe as the old because the ratio stays the same.
So the scheme above leaves 10 more families in grief - every year - but try arguing that at the Inquiry, and that these deaths are the appalling price of relieving the current delays. Try arguing that people should accept the delays and not accept the deaths.
Guess what, you will be ignored by the Inquiry report to the SoS.
* It may be differently expressed nowadays, but it does not change the thrust of my example.
** you would be surprised how little time is lost by seemingly long delays, intensely frustrating those are of course, if you are in the daily rush hour queue. "Just put the radio on and relax" would be our friend the environmentalist's argument, or better still, go by train, it's almost infinitely safer, (even if DOO!), and use the internet.
Try any other angle; it may be an interesting slant on the data or other data which one prefers to be used, but one will be ignored and deserve to be ignored.
An example on safety is the following (from memory but it demonstrates the point). These data are expressed as number of collisions per million vehicle-kms travelled*. If the proposal covers 10 km and a million vehicles pass through per year, the annual veh-kms is 10 million. The collision rate, broken down into fatal, serious and slight injuries, will be expressed as a ratio to that total travel. Note that non personal injury collisions are ignored by the police. If, because you had an airbag and were wearing a seat belt, you emerged from the wreck without a scratch, there would be no collision record created by the police, for the statistics.
Now the trick. If the number of personal injury collisions rose on the stretch where the new scheme is to be built,, bypassing the old, was to rise on a yearly basis and there were 10 fatals and now there will be 20, one would think that in this respect at least, building the bypass would not be a great idea. However, if by building the bypass, a bottleneck is relieved (say 5 minutes**) and traffic doubles, the Inquiry will conclude that the new road is as safe as the old because the ratio stays the same.
So the scheme above leaves 10 more families in grief - every year - but try arguing that at the Inquiry, and that these deaths are the appalling price of relieving the current delays. Try arguing that people should accept the delays and not accept the deaths.
Guess what, you will be ignored by the Inquiry report to the SoS.
* It may be differently expressed nowadays, but it does not change the thrust of my example.
** you would be surprised how little time is lost by seemingly long delays, intensely frustrating those are of course, if you are in the daily rush hour queue. "Just put the radio on and relax" would be our friend the environmentalist's argument, or better still, go by train, it's almost infinitely safer, (even if DOO!), and use the internet.
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Bletchleyite
Veteran Member
With regard to Switzerland, the country seems to have a greater emphasis on individual responsibility and less of an emphasis on health and safety rules and procedures than the UK. In particular it used to be the case (I believe there has now been some kind of modification to prevent it) that trains would frequently depart with doors open, and the departure procedure does not have a "double check" unlike the UK's and Germany's one (it took me a while to work out that this is the case).
CH guarded (pseudo DOO) dispatch procedure:
1. Guard blows whistle
2. Guard operates platform box to indicate RA to driver
3. Driver waits a short period for the guard to return to the train and close the doors. He can look in his wing mirror to sort-of see if he has or not, but on curved platforms can't see a lot.
4. Guard returns to train and closes doors immediately. He has a cursory glance before closing the local door and returning to duties, though I'm not quite sure what he'd do if there was a problem as the driver already got the RA at step 2 - perhaps pull the cord.
People can probably see the flaw in that (there's an obvious vulnerability of the guard being left behind or people being trapped) - arguably it's more dangerous than UK-spec DOO where the driver can, within the limits of the cameras, have a proper look to see if someone is trapped.
A sort-of UK adaptation of it is the Voyager, where the guard simply tells the driver to close the doors rather than doing it himself (by giving 1-2 on the buzzer) - but there is still the double feedback. You could I suppose envisage an OBS-based version where the OBS gave the driver a dispatch signal but after that he was responsible - but I don't see any particular benefit in that (unlike driver-released doors which genuinely saves time and makes a revenue guard's life much easier - and I do support rolling out driver *released* doors throughout the whole network, FWIW, noting that the approach is already very widely used including I believe throughout Southern).
Swiss and German DOO, as the driver above states, relies much more on equipment than the driver - but that equipment is more akin to a lift than a UK DOO train where pressing the close button closes the doors whether they are obstructed or not. The equipment includes a break-beam by the door, and I think some kind of obstruction detection, as well as a detection on the retracting step (I think). Furthermore, the door only stays open for a short period, so often pressing "close" just locks the doors, they're already all closed. I was on a Meridian EMU from Muenchen to Salzburg which was full and standing (and some), and was standing by the door pushed up against it, and at one station I was clearly unwittingly obstructing the beam as the driver got out, walked down, had a bit of a moan at me to squash further in, and closed the door using a local switch hidden in the equipment recess at the side of the door.
That approach would no doubt work in the UK in a safety sense (how many people are killed or seriously injured in lifts - and those are near enough all passenger-operated these days - so the technology is mature) - but I can't quite see that the typical UK passenger is actually mature enough not to cause massive delays by obstructing the doors e.g. to hold the train for their friend.
CH guarded (pseudo DOO) dispatch procedure:
1. Guard blows whistle
2. Guard operates platform box to indicate RA to driver
3. Driver waits a short period for the guard to return to the train and close the doors. He can look in his wing mirror to sort-of see if he has or not, but on curved platforms can't see a lot.
4. Guard returns to train and closes doors immediately. He has a cursory glance before closing the local door and returning to duties, though I'm not quite sure what he'd do if there was a problem as the driver already got the RA at step 2 - perhaps pull the cord.
People can probably see the flaw in that (there's an obvious vulnerability of the guard being left behind or people being trapped) - arguably it's more dangerous than UK-spec DOO where the driver can, within the limits of the cameras, have a proper look to see if someone is trapped.
A sort-of UK adaptation of it is the Voyager, where the guard simply tells the driver to close the doors rather than doing it himself (by giving 1-2 on the buzzer) - but there is still the double feedback. You could I suppose envisage an OBS-based version where the OBS gave the driver a dispatch signal but after that he was responsible - but I don't see any particular benefit in that (unlike driver-released doors which genuinely saves time and makes a revenue guard's life much easier - and I do support rolling out driver *released* doors throughout the whole network, FWIW, noting that the approach is already very widely used including I believe throughout Southern).
Swiss and German DOO, as the driver above states, relies much more on equipment than the driver - but that equipment is more akin to a lift than a UK DOO train where pressing the close button closes the doors whether they are obstructed or not. The equipment includes a break-beam by the door, and I think some kind of obstruction detection, as well as a detection on the retracting step (I think). Furthermore, the door only stays open for a short period, so often pressing "close" just locks the doors, they're already all closed. I was on a Meridian EMU from Muenchen to Salzburg which was full and standing (and some), and was standing by the door pushed up against it, and at one station I was clearly unwittingly obstructing the beam as the driver got out, walked down, had a bit of a moan at me to squash further in, and closed the door using a local switch hidden in the equipment recess at the side of the door.
That approach would no doubt work in the UK in a safety sense (how many people are killed or seriously injured in lifts - and those are near enough all passenger-operated these days - so the technology is mature) - but I can't quite see that the typical UK passenger is actually mature enough not to cause massive delays by obstructing the doors e.g. to hold the train for their friend.
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BestWestern
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Perhaps you could explain how that converts in the real world into a DOO train where the Driver will never in any circumstances be able to observe the last carriage leave the platform? Or, indeed, most of the length of the train.
Bletchleyite
Veteran Member
Or on the huge amount of non-droplight-fitted rolling stock around the UK, including where there is a cab droplight and the guard nonetheless dispatches from a passenger door and thus can see no more (probably less, in fact) than a passenger in the saloon can?
To me the solution is to keep the DOO monitors on with train-mounted cameras until the driver elects to switch it off, which would be after the rear coach leaves the platform. But drivers on here have said it would be an unacceptable safety overhead to do this (which I'm not quite sure about myself given that in the days of non-CDL LHCS drivers would often apparently look back along the train a couple of times during departure to check, for example, that no prat opened the door and attempted to board - but I'm not a driver of course).
Could there be a technological way of achieving this? Keep the monitors on, but have software looking for obstruction of the dispatch corridor, and sound an alarm if there is any? Could be a benefit even on guarded stock.
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And your knowledge comes from responding to AWS buzzers & bells, & from what you call a Mensa type IQ. But have you ever managed anything or anyone else? Driving a train gives you a seat at the debate but no more. Do we leave road design & rules to lorry drivers? No. The same should apply to trains drivers. Drive the trains well & leave system management to others. The DOO debate is over,DOO trains are running on 75% of Southern. Much wiser & more qualified people than either of us have decided and found it perfectly safe. And as other posters have said, DOO is widely used throughout the world & for many years. The DOO debate here is being prolonged by people who would rather sit in a stationary cab at a station & do nothing. Whereas the silent vast majority of train drivers enjoy looking at the monitors & making decisions, when they would otherwise be twiddling their thumbs or in your case sitting relishing you have a Mensa type IQ.
Bletchleyite
Veteran Member
Might also be worth adding to the Germany/Switzerland thing - for years, the rear door on buses, particularly bendies, has often worked like a lift door rather than solely on the driver supervising it - the approach is usually a push pad on the bottom step/at the door edge and a break-beam, the door is opened by the passenger and then stays open for only about 10 seconds unless you press the "pram/wheelchair" button which gives extra time. All the driver does is locks/unlocks.
BestWestern
Established Member
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- 6 Feb 2011
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Most Drivers I speak to, Neil, feel that their job is to be looking where they are going, not gorping into an array of television screens for potentially quite some time. Consider that some major stations have lengthy platforms, this isn't just about sleepy halts in the middle of nowhere. A small train can be running along the PTI for quite a while when departing certain places, and easily reach a decent speed. During that time, there is risk ahead of the Driver as well as behind him. He also needs to be alert as to the next aspect he will encounter, in what are often very complex station area track layouts. That's as well as maintain a correct speed and just, you know, concentrate on being a train Driver. Equally, the front end of a large train will be quite some way out of a station and into the big wide world before that last coach clears the PTI, again doing quite a speed. Again, all of the above applies. The Driver has other things to be doing than people watching. Leave it to the Guard, who isn't busy driving.
Your point about droplights is valid, and perhaps better facilities for observing the PTI by the Guard are something overdue for sensible consideration.
That statement does you no favours at all, for various reasons.
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