And of course, one should remember that train drivers have enormous responsibility. It's drilled in to us from day 1 (in fact even before when you're doing the applications!!!). He acted beyond irresponsibly, he acted criminally. He knew what he was doing and I would really struggle to accept he was naive of the consequences. While I fully agree that the distraction in the cab due to the high workload was what caused the SPAD, there was still the reset and continue incident to take account of.
Furthermore, I would suggest that he probably didn't spend 40 years driving if he was an operations manager, but irrespective of whether he did or didn't, he still reset and continued.
That is how i felt initially, then I read the report, and reflected on the contents, from the perspective of someone who's been around steam locos since he was a teenager.
Unlike what we operate day to day, the footplate of a steam loco working hard is an assault on your senses. A wall of heat (esp on a Bulleid), and high noise levels. The need to manage another person, and the boiler, in addition to driving. Driving with a restricted view of the road ahead, and being dependent on a the fireman to sight signals, which are obscured by the boiler. It's a different concept to driving modern traction, and unlike anything that you will have encountered in your everyday life either.
Particular factors over and above the normal:
1. Two extra bodies in the cab. You will have been told about the distraction risk of that in your training.
2. Steam leak in the cab obscuring forward visibility. Stuff that. If it couldn't be isolated and "nipped up" safely, the loco shouild have been out of traffic. I wouldn't have taken it. Again, you know how distracting a nagging, background traction fault can be.
3. inadequate AWS horn. Enough said in the report. Should have been sorted long before. Again, I would not have taken the loco into service.
4. BR reckined that it requires three fully trained drivers to operate a steam loco on today's network. (Driver, driver as a fireman, inspector). WCR do it with one fully trained person.
Are you atarting to get a better picture of the workload?
His mistake was to allow this situation to develop. As you correctly say, it's easy to see how the SPAD happened. I would add that people under sustained, excessive pressure can do stupid things. I have formed the impression that this is what has happened, Our is a very small world, and no one has a bad word to say about this driver, prior to this incident (Never met him myself). You don't become an idiot overnight. He's cooperated and pleaded guilty. Contrast this with the DCR business a couple of years ago. He is a full career driver BTW. The management job was in retirement for the Swanage Railway.
Not excusing what he did, but I think the suspended sentence is correct. If it had been simple negligence, then he should have gone to prison.
I'm more concerned by the Hexthorpe incident in some ways. A fireman taking it upon himself to isolate the TPWS and operate the loco, without explicitely being instructed to do so. Not in a high pressure situation. His feet wouldn't have touched on a preserved railway.
