Umm no this is in no way actually possible because you've forgotten one very important factor which is route knowledge, GN drivers I doubt sign the route between Finsbury Park and Liverpool Street any more. They be fine to Canonbury Curve but would need a pilotman to pilot them into Liverpool Street then of course you have restrictions with the rolling stock as 365s in particular have certain restrictions. Then not forgetting any issues with engineering works that may have been ongoing on the proposed diversionary route.
The difference with First Hull Trains is 1. Their traincrew have the route knowledge required to use St Pancras International and 2. The 180s are cleared into St Pancras International.
But is it not the case that Hull Trains drivers have the route knowledge because Hull trains took the trouble to ensure that their traincrew had the route knowledge.?
As I said a few posts back:
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---21C101 said:"The logical thing to do would be to run one GN morning peak and one evening peak service MF from Peterborough to Liverpool Street, rostering the drivers to all do this turn periodically. The train would also I suspect be quite well used as it would give a direct service to the city."
There's two things here:
a) preventing the overrun in the first place, and,
b) mitigating the effects of an overrun if it happens.
The Holloway work - and every other job on the network - went through a detailed schedule risk assessment (several times in fact) that considered every potential failure, potential resource absence, potential cause of slippage etc. Every big job like this at Christmas has to demonstrate at least a 95% chance of being handed back 4 hours before the first train service is due to operate. This is as per a process agreed with the ORR. Of course that means, in theory, 1 in 20 jobs don't make it. Actually it is a much lower rate than that, nearer 1:100. But when you are doing nearly 1000 jobs over Christmas - as this year - at that strike rate, some of them will overrun.
For mitigation, I can tell you that there was a contingency plan for an overrun on this job, as there was for every single piece of major work over the Christmas period. As an example, the work at London Bridge has about 10 different service contingency plans depending which stage might go wrong, when, and how badly wrong. Happily the first two of those haven't been needed and have gone in the bin unused. (And I have everything crossed that we won't need another 2 tomorrow morning). However, having a service contingency plan is one thing, resourcing it is quite another. It is, in theory, possible to provide fully resourced contingency plans with different rosters and stock diagrams. However it takes weeks of effort of the planners to produce each one for a big job like Kings Cross, and frankly there is not the resource available to do it on the basis that there is a 1% chance that it might be invoked. Besides, how would you tell drivers / conductors / station staff whether to come in for Plan A or Plan B (or C or D), given that the start times might be quite different? If that means they are required to be on call just in case, there becomes an issue with working hours, and again, it is a lot of potential extra cost for a 1% chance of being used.
My purely personal view is that I simply don't understand why there were 4 car units running around, nor why some services were cancelled when they weren't affected by the work. I suspect there were other factors at play unconnected to the overrun which got 'lost' within the big picture.
That is the best explanation of what happened I have seen anywhere - maybe you should move to the PR department

The question of whether extra train crew should have been on call is down to risk. I guess and whether that risk was correctly judged at 1% or whatever (and whether the combined risk of one of the half dozen worksites overrunning was correctly judged) is the million dollar question.
However I think the cost/logistics of having extra station staff on call so that lots of staff could have been deployed to places like Finsbury Park, if needed, would not have been excessive.
Looking at the track plan it seems that it is not possible to use the down and up fasts if you want to use the Canonbury spur as a turnback so when things got too overcrowded they must have used the up slow to terminate the intercities on when things got to crowded to have arrival and departure on the same platform. That would have obstructed up Moorgates. (if they had been cute they would have used platforms 5&6 on the downside, enabling cross platform transfer from the Moorgate line.
An extra island platform "0" and "-1" serving the down slow and down goods, and enabling Moorgate services to use the down Goods with intercities terminating on the down slow with cross platform connection to the Moorgates, would have made life a lot easier. Of course that island platform already exists but is closed. Doh!. It would be a good idea to put that platform back into service asap as they did with Platform 3 at Kentish Town a few years back. If this was done and at least six an hour run to Moorgate (via Highbury & Islington for cross platform connection to the Vic line) then I think the problem of what to do on the ECML when Fins Pk to KX is shut would largely go away.
Edit: it appears that they have already reopened platforms "0" and "-1" so I really cannot fathom why the operational practice outlined above was not put into effect straight away yesterday????
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