Beeching closures

[coppercapped]

What would probably have happened was a larger build of something based on the DP2 / class 50 designs - leased (as the 50s were) to avoid goverment spending caps. Its exactly the same scenario as resulted in the 50s being used north of Crewe.

Of course if the Deltics were never built its quite possible that DP2 and the 50s may have had different body construction, more like a 37

I certainly take your point about the use of DP2/Class 50 designs north of Doncaster - that could have been quite possible.

To your point about the body structures. The Deltics pre-dated all the other designs and if the BR engineering hierarchy hadn't got its collective knickers in a twist concerning axle loading and load-to-wheel-diameter ratios leading to the abortive 1Co-Co1 configuration it is quite likely that, based on the experience from Ivatt's 10000 and 10000 and its own exported locomotives, a Co-Co arrangement would have been adopted for all the higher powered diesels. Left to its own devices English Electric's 2,000bhp diesel for BR may have been a Co-Co looking like a Deltic, so saving drawing office costs and resources by avoiding a new body design. And DP2 would have been the next iteration...

Alternative history! Fun, isn't it?

 

[Dr Hoo]

I dispute that there wasn't a potentially profitable line between York and Beverley as the £81k betterment relied on passengers transferring to the other route for through journeys.

It's essentially cooking the books, like saying "we know that x number of fare paying passengers use the line, but we're going to ignore a proportion of these from our calculation as they may or may noot use another route".

The point that seems to missed is that alternative route from York to Hull via Selby (either with reversal or via Church Fenton and the curve in the Milford Area) was over lines that had a long term future and where costs were shared with many other services and freight. The costs of the Market Weighton Line could be saved entirely, including two main line junctions and 24 level crossings, let alone the stations, and there was then scope for significant scrap and land sales.

Although the costing approach had rather changed by the time that subsidies were introduced under the Transport Act 1968 I find it interesting that the York-Selby-Hull services still required significant support and only got a one-year deal from the Minister, Richard Marsh. This hardly suggests that there was any remunerative axis between York and Hull.

On the point about ‘conductor guards’ it is worth noting that quite a few lines had had on-train ticket sales and unstaffed ‘halts’ for years although this seemed to vary between the regions. It was a pity that the National Union of Railwaymen took until 1968 to agree to a productivity package (the ‘Pay & Efficiency Agreement’) that really got re-structuring of the guards’ role into the mainstream.

 

[randyrippley]

I certainly take your point about the use of DP2/Class 50 designs north of Doncaster - that could have been quite possible.

To your point about the body structures. The Deltics pre-dated all the other designs and if the BR engineering hierarchy hadn't got its collective knickers in a twist concerning axle loading and load-to-wheel-diameter ratios leading to the abortive 1Co-Co1 configuration it is quite likely that, based on the experience from Ivatt's 10000 and 10000 and its own exported locomotives, a Co-Co arrangement would have been adopted for all the higher powered diesels. Left to its own devices English Electric's 2,000bhp diesel for BR may have been a Co-Co looking like a Deltic, so saving drawing office costs and resources by avoiding a new body design. And DP2 would have been the next iteration...

Alternative history! Fun, isn't it?

And of course Deltic itself took the cab and body design cues from an exported class of narrow gauge electric locos
Yet other export designs of the time were various mix and matches of Ivatt inspired models and what became the class 20 body, some with Ivatt cabs
But my understanding is that even within EE there were a lot of senior managers who believed the Deltic stressed skin body wasn't strong enough and refused to support building it. The export designs were nearly all solebar designs and I suspect even if the type 4 had been built as CoCo it would still have resembled the class 40 more than Deltic

 

[Dyncymraeg]

I have a some questions about the Beeching cuts :-

* Was there a widespread view in the 50s and 60s the railways as a means of transport were an outdated relic from the Victorian age and motor vehicles would be the transport of the future.

* There was a documentary on BBC 4 by Ian Hislop on the Beeching cuts. If I recall correctly the documentary said replacement bus services were to be provided but this didn't happen. If this was true, why did attempts to provide alternative buses end in failure.

* Are there any documents available online written at the time of Beeching arguing against the Beeching cuts.

 

[yorksrob]

The point that seems to missed is that alternative route from York to Hull via Selby (either with reversal or via Church Fenton and the curve in the Milford Area) was over lines that had a long term future and where costs were shared with many other services and freight. The costs of the Market Weighton Line could be saved entirely, including two main line junctions and 24 level crossings, let alone the stations, and there was then scope for significant scrap and land sales.

Although the costing approach had rather changed by the time that subsidies were introduced under the Transport Act 1968 I find it interesting that the York-Selby-Hull services still required significant support and only got a one-year deal from the Minister, Richard Marsh. This hardly suggests that there was any remunerative axis between York and Hull.

On the point about ‘conductor guards’ it is worth noting that quite a few lines had had on-train ticket sales and unstaffed ‘halts’ for years although this seemed to vary between the regions. It was a pity that the National Union of Railwaymen took until 1968 to agree to a productivity package (the ‘Pay & Efficiency Agreement) that really got re-structuring of the guards’ role into the mainstream.

Interesting point about York - Hull via Selby being unremunerative. Presumably Selby would have been served by some ECML services at this time, so York - Hull might have been more reliant on end to end passenger traffic.

Perhaps the York - Hull required intermediate traffic between Stamford Bridge, Market Weighton, Beverley etc to bring York - Hull anywhere near viability.

 

[randyrippley]

I have a some questions about the Beeching cuts :-

* Was there a widespread view in the 50s and 60s the railways as a means of transport were an outdated relic from the Victorian age and motor vehicles would be the transport of the future.

* There was a documentary on BBC 4 by Ian Hislop on the Beeching cuts. If I recall correctly the documentary said replacement bus services were to be provided but this didn't happen. If this was true, why did attempts to provide alternative buses end in failure.

* Are there any documents available online written at the time of Beeching arguing against the Beeching cuts.

In many cases the replacement buses failed because the traffic flow wasn't there. Think about it: the railway didn't have enough passengers, replacing the service with buses was more likely to reduce passenger numbers further.
Also the buses tried to follow the old railway routes too closely. When Yeovil-Taunton closed, the replacement 200 service ran a dogleg route via the Somerset levels paralleling the tracks, rather than the logical direct route via Ilminster. What should have been an hour end-to-end took close to three.
Also the closures to a large extent precipitated the 1960s expansion in car use.

 

[Dr Hoo]

I have a some questions about the Beeching cuts :-

* Was there a widespread view in the 50s and 60s the railways as a means of transport were an outdated relic from the Victorian age and motor vehicles would be the transport of the future.

* There was a documentary on BBC 4 by Ian Hislop on the Beeching cuts. If I recall correctly the documentary said replacement bus services were to be provided but this didn't happen. If this was true, why did attempts to provide alternative buses end in failure.

* Are there any documents available online written at the time of Beeching arguing against the Beeching cuts.

Welcome to the Forum (and this most absorbing thread).

In response to your three questions:
1. Yes, there was a widespread view in society in the 1950s and 60s that railways were outdated. However, in the context of this thread this was NOT a view espoused by Dr Beeching, who focussed on what railways were most suited for - such as bulk, long-distance freight, inter-city passenger and commuting into London and the largest metropolitan areas (probably with subsidy for the latter).
2. I would commend an excellent post about contemporary bus services from RT4038 at number 52 on this lengthening thread.
3. Plenty has been written arguing that the cuts were misguided but the material at the time was obviously pre-internet. A lot of the opposition was on the basis of things like social and environmental effects and not particularly numerate.

It is possible to amass shelves-full of material about the era if you are keen on the topic!

 

[edwin_m]

In many cases the replacement buses failed because the traffic flow wasn't there. Think about it: the railway didn't have enough passengers, replacing the service with buses was more likely to reduce passenger numbers further.
Also the buses tried to follow the old railway routes too closely. When Yeovil-Taunton closed, the replacement 200 service ran a dogleg route via the Somerset levels paralleling the tracks, rather than the logical direct route via Ilminster. What should have been an hour end-to-end took close to three.
Also the closures to a large extent precipitated the 1960s expansion in car use.

A bus service had some chance of succeeding where rail hadn't, firstly because it had much lower running costs and secondly because it could serve the places along the route rather than being constrained by where it was possible to build a railway. These are two of the reasons the buses had taken much of the traffic from rural railways in the decades before Beeching. But the objective should have been to ensure that every significant settlement had a reasonable public transport link to nearby towns from which onward travel was possible, rather than linking a string of minor places just because that's where the railway happened to go. The competing bus providers probably did a lot of this already, but what was missing was the element of integration.

I can't agree with the Beeching closures precipitating growth in car use. Car use had already at least doubled between 1950 and the Beeching years and as I posted above rail use (in passenger-miles) didn't fall off much afterwards though the number of journeys did.

 

[RT4038]

A bus service had some chance of succeeding where rail hadn't, firstly because it had much lower running costs and secondly because it could serve the places along the route rather than being constrained by where it was possible to build a railway. These are two of the reasons the buses had taken much of the traffic from rural railways in the decades before Beeching. But the objective should have been to ensure that every significant settlement had a reasonable public transport link to nearby towns from which onward travel was possible, rather than linking a string of minor places just because that's where the railway happened to go. The competing bus providers probably did a lot of this already, but what was missing was the element of integration.

I can't agree with the Beeching closures precipitating growth in car use. Car use had already at least doubled between 1950 and the Beeching years and as I posted above rail use (in passenger-miles) didn't fall off much afterwards though the number of journeys did.

You may well be right, but in that era politically the rail replacement services really had to do just that - replace the railway. Some of these still exist today (Bodmin Parkway-Padstow for instance) where the route made sense, but many withered because they were competed with by the existing services (getting subsumed into them as soon as the subsidy stopped) and/ or simply that there were never enough passengers on the trains to make even a one-man bus pay its way. Some replacement routes had a combination of both conditions on different sections. On the Taunton-Yeovil route (mentioned in #156) the railway had no incentive to have a fast end-to-end replacement service, as it was still possible to make the journey by a circuitous rail routeing, and would be seen by BR as competitive.
As mentioned in my #52, integration of existing services was not seen as particularly desirable by the bus operators. Additionally this was way before electronic ticketing, so issue of through tickets would have been very difficult, particularly on board buses, with enormous accounting problems and more to the point, (for the bus companies) receiving an equitable share of revenue.

 

[70014IronDuke]

...
* There was a documentary on BBC 4 by Ian Hislop on the Beeching cuts. If I recall correctly the documentary said replacement bus services were to be provided but this didn't happen. If this was true, why did attempts to provide alternative buses end in failure. ... ?

If Hislop said this, I think he was (mostly) incorrect.

Indeed, because United Counties could not guarantee replacement buses, BR was precluded from closing Bletchley-Bedford St Johns in 1967.

But how long the replacement bus services lasted is another matter. Take the closure of the GC north of Aylesbury. You could, albeit with only 3-4 trains per day, up to 1966 go from Aylesbury to Brackley, Woodford Halse, Rugby, Leicester and Nottingham.
I don't know how many buses were put on, but trying to do that journey by road would be, at least south of Rugby, a total disaster in terms of time, and I suspect would have carried about 5 passengers a day.

In many cases, however, I suspect the buses actually served many local passengers better - but at the same time destroyed longer distance passenger opportunities. Take, for example, the Hitchen - Bedford branch. The new bus service (which would have been a beefed-up service which already ran in parallel to the railway) dropped most local passengers in or near the centre of town. But that was 1,000 yards away from the station. So any Hitchen to (say) Wellingborough or Kettering link, previously possible with a single change, was effectively destroyed, forcing people into cars even if they didn't want to drive. (Sure, there were not many passengers nor trains per day on such a route, but it was perfectly possible to do it. And this happened to earlier links between hundreds, in not thousands of locations.)

Unlike say, Germany and Austria, the lack of coordination by public transport operators in the UK was and has been so often miserably poor.

 

[RT4038]

Interesting point about York - Hull via Selby being unremunerative. Presumably Selby would have been served by some ECML services at this time, so York - Hull might have been more reliant on end to end passenger traffic.

Perhaps the York - Hull required intermediate traffic between Stamford Bridge, Market Weighton, Beverley etc to bring York - Hull anywhere near viability.

But not with the cost of modernising the line to reduce the costs (24 level crossings converted to automatic, new signalling system, remodelling the track, opportunity cost of not moving the diesel trains elsewhere) , the money for which was not being made available. This line would definitely not be one to do an analysis on, unless it was wishing to show why your cost reduction option was not going to work!

 

[yorksrob]

But not with the cost of modernising the line to reduce the costs (24 level crossings converted to automatic, new signalling system, remodelling the track, opportunity cost of not moving the diesel trains elsewhere) , the money for which was not being made available. This line would definitely not be one to do an analysis on, unless it was wishing to show why your cost reduction option was not going to work!

To quote Dr Beeching's own worked example, York - Hull via Market Weighton cost £107,500 per annum to run. It generated £90,400, leaving a gap of £17,100. At the time the route was closed, it was a fully signalled, double track route with fully staffed stations. It is very unlikely that some savings couldn't have been made out of that lot to close that gap.

As for "opportunity cost" of moving diesel stock elsewhere, or assumning that all passengers would transfer via Selby, this has no bearing on whether the route itself could have been made to cover it's.

 

[RT4038]

If Hislop said this, I think he was (mostly) incorrect.

Indeed, because United Counties could not guarantee replacement buses, BR was precluded from closing Bletchley-Bedford St Johns in 1967.

But how long the replacement bus services lasted is another matter. Take the closure of the GC north of Aylesbury. You could, albeit with only 3-4 trains per day, up to 1966 go from Aylesbury to Brackley, Woodford Halse, Rugby, Leicester and Nottingham.
I don't know how many buses were put on, but trying to do that journey by road would be, at least south of Rugby, a total disaster in terms of time, and I suspect would have carried about 5 passengers a day.

In many cases, however, I suspect the buses actually served many local passengers better - but at the same time destroyed longer distance passenger opportunities. Take, for example, the Hitchen - Bedford branch. The new bus service (which would have been a beefed-up service which already ran in parallel to the railway) dropped most local passengers in or near the centre of town. But that was 1,000 yards away from the station. So any Hitchen to (say) Wellingborough or Kettering link, previously possible with a single change, was effectively destroyed, forcing people into cars even if they didn't want to drive. (Sure, there were not many passengers nor trains per day on such a route, but it was perfectly possible to do it. And this happened to earlier links between hundreds, in not thousands of locations.)

Unlike say, Germany and Austria, the lack of coordination by public transport operators in the UK was and has been so often miserably poor.

I think Ian Hislop was probably referring to an integrated replacement bus service, rather than any replacement services at all.

Rail replacement services were not put on to cover every possible journey option - the number of passengers travelling intermediately on the (as you point out) infrequent service between Aylesbury-Brackley-Woodford-Rugby would have been very small indeed. I expect Aylesbury-Rugby passengers would have been expected to take the United Counties 346 bus to Northampton and then take a train to Rugby, likewise those travelling to Leicester and Nottingham would have been expected to take the United Counties 141 to Bedford or 61 to Luton and change to a Midland train there. Brackley had a frequent bus service to Banbury, for a connection to the main line rail network, and small Woodford Halse, well, there were buses to Banbury and a bus at works times was put on to Rugby.

As for the Bedford-Hitchin line, closed before the Beeching era, there were no rail replacement services put on, as the local bus routes provided a splendid service in the area, presumably already taking virtually all the local traffic. It must be remembered that the line was latterly operated by a Park Royal 4 wheeled railbus about 5 times per day, which does indicate the likely peak loads! The splendid omnibus services, run by United Counties (182) and Birch Bros. (203) ran twice per hour Bedford-Shefford [the main intermediate small town]- Hitchin from early morning until late night. The village at the poorly sited intermediate station of Cardington (poorly sited on the edge of the village) had an hourly plus extras service to Bedford or Biggleswade(176/9) and Henlow Camp was served by both the Birch route and an hourly Biggleswade-Hitchin route (183). Southill Station was a long way from Southill (infrequent route 180 to Bedford or Biggleswade) and produced virtually no passengers.
There were alternatives for longer distance passengers from Hitchin by travelling by routes 52/52b (every 20-30 minutes) to Luton and changing to a Midland train there.
The rail service had no chance. Yes, the closure did inconvenience some long distance rail passengers, but the number was so small and uneconomic it simply couldn't be catered for.
But O for a 29 minute Bedford-Hitchin journey time now!

 

[Dr Hoo]

To quote Dr Beeching's own worked example, York - Hull via Market Weighton cost £107,500 per annum to run. It generated £90,400, leaving a gap of £17,100. At the time the route was closed, it was a fully signalled, double track route with fully staffed stations. It is very unlikely that some savings couldn't have been made out of that lot to close that gap.

As for "opportunity cost" of moving diesel stock elsewhere, or assumning that all passengers would transfer via Selby, this has no bearing on whether the route itself could have been made to cover it's.

Err, sorry Yorksrob but you seem to have forgotten the Track and Signalling Expenses of another £43,300.
Also the line didn’t ‘generate’ the £32,780 of Contributory Revenue that would be retained (e.g. a slice of journeys like Hull-Edinburgh that would in future be made via Selby). This was just allocated to the line.

 

[yorksrob]

Err, sorry Yorksrob but you seem to have forgotten the Track and Signalling Expenses of another £43,300.
Also the line didn’t ‘generate’ the £32,780 of Contributory Revenue that would be retained (e.g. a slice of journeys like Hull-Edinburgh that would in future be made via Selby). This was just allocated to the line.

Right. So we're expecting £81k of gains.

This is based on £66.4k of track, signalling and station expenses, on a double track line with full signalling and full station facilities - a figure that it must have been possible to reduce, but no attempt to reduce costs has been made.

Secondly, we're expecting £25.6k of direct revenue, plus £37.7k of longer distance business just to transfer to the route via Selby, without any improvement or extra expenditure on that service, because we all know that train services between York and Hull via Selby have traditionally been so generously provided and attractive to travellers (the last bit is sarcasm, for those not aquainted with local train services around East Yorkshire).

I'm sorry, but this £81k net gain is clearly a figment of Dr Beeching's imagination.

£25k of earnings supposedly retained out of £90.4k is a pitiful amount. £65.4k of real business sacrificed for £81k worth of made up/imaginary savings.

 

[Journeyman]

In terms of duplicate routes, I think the whole discussion around this was wrong. The Brighton main line problem is what you get without duplicate routes, so the emphasis should have been on trying to find ways to keep them. This is all much longer term than Beeching.

While I agree that in some places closure of duplicate main lines has caused problems, in many other cases the BR network was saddled with dozens of lines, stations and goods depots that simply duplicated others and did not generate anywhere near enough traffic to sustain themselves. If BR had got to grips with getting rid of unremunerative and unnecessary duplication earlier, it may well have been able to save some of the closed lines that didn't have duplicates. Beeching was right to tackle this problem.

I agree that Beeching had his remit of identifying unremunerative lines, The bit that was in his power to do, but that he didn't, was in taking an analytical and data driven approach to driving down costs on marginal lines, with a view to ensuring that routes were kept open where possible in the interests of passengers.

Every attempt made to drive down costs was resisted by the unions, in an enormous shooting-themselves-in-the-foot battle.

 

[Bevan Price]

My problem with Marples / Beeching is that closure of lines was often seen as the only option. Yes, some lines were basket cases and should never have been built. But others ought to have had potential to be saved - if someone had taken time to consider why some lines were so poorly used. Often, the timetables must have been to blame. I suppose there was complacency - it has always been that way - why change things ? And anyone criticising "the system" too loudly would probably doom their career prospects.

Just consider the above-mentioned York - Market Weighton - Hull service. In the 1955 timetable, the first train from Market Weighton arrived in Hull at 09:26; for whom was that likely to be any use ? Maybe a few rich business people and early shoppers - but certainly not anyone who wanted to commute daily to a workplace in Hull. By 1963, that had changed to arrival in Hull at 08:51 - still much too late for most workers. Return options from Hull were at 17:15, followed by the last train of the day at 19:37 (1955) or 19:30 (1963). Did anyone wonder why so few people used the trains ? Travel to/from York had marginally better options - but the first train from Market Weighton reached York at 08:24 (1955) - still too late for many workers who started work at 08:30 or earlier.

And some closure proposals were stupid - and fortunately eventually not proceeded with. Remember that these included proposals to close Liverpool to Southport, and Liverpool to St. Helens & Wigan - both busy commuter lines.

Introduction of diesel trains, and more importantly, regular interval services had started to regain passenger traffic, but I suggest they were not allowed long enough to reach their maximum potential. It can take many years for people to change their travel habits; maybe as much as 5 to 10 years, but numerous lines were abandoned after much shorter periods of having improved regular intervval services.

Dr Beeching was highly intelligent, but he comes across as having poor perception of human behaviour. He thought that many people would drive to main line railheads and travel onwards by train. That may happen now, but in the 1960s, with lower levels of road congestion, many chose to drive for the whole journey, deserting the railways. Likewise, his rail replacement buses were often seen as a poor, slow replacement for trains, and mostly disappeared within a few years.

 

[edwin_m]

You may well be right, but in that era politically the rail replacement services really had to do just that - replace the railway. Some of these still exist today (Bodmin Parkway-Padstow for instance) where the route made sense, but many withered because they were competed with by the existing services (getting subsumed into them as soon as the subsidy stopped) and/ or simply that there were never enough passengers on the trains to make even a one-man bus pay its way. Some replacement routes had a combination of both conditions on different sections. On the Taunton-Yeovil route (mentioned in #156) the railway had no incentive to have a fast end-to-end replacement service, as it was still possible to make the journey by a circuitous rail routeing, and would be seen by BR as competitive.
As mentioned in my #52, integration of existing services was not seen as particularly desirable by the bus operators. Additionally this was way before electronic ticketing, so issue of through tickets would have been very difficult, particularly on board buses, with enormous accounting problems and more to the point, (for the bus companies) receiving an equitable share of revenue.

And that I think is the crux of the issue. If a bit of the cost saving from closing the railways had been used to subsidise a sensible and sustainable set of tweaks to the bus network to maintain connectivity and provide some degree of integration, then things might have been different. But the buses as well as the trains were seen as commercial businesses, and then just as now it's very hard to inject subsidy into a bus network that isn't regulated.

 

[yorksrob]

While I agree that in some places closure of duplicate main lines has caused problems, in many other cases the BR network was saddled with dozens of lines, stations and goods depots that simply duplicated others and did not generate anywhere near enough traffic to sustain themselves. If BR had got to grips with getting rid of unremunerative and unnecessary duplication earlier, it may well have been able to save some of the closed lines that didn't have duplicates. Beeching was right to tackle this problem.



Every attempt made to drive down costs was resisted by the unions, in an enormous shooting-themselves-in-the-foot battle.

One only has to look at the 'duplicate' routes 'not selected for development' (not to be run down for closure - "honest guv") in Beeching's second report to see that he was on the wrong track with this. Leeds - Manchester via Huddersfield and London to Birmingham via Banbury.

And that I think is the crux of the issue. If a bit of the cost saving from closing the railways had been used to subsidise a sensible and sustainable set of tweaks to the bus network to maintain connectivity and provide some degree of integration, then things might have been different. But the buses as well as the trains were seen as commercial businesses, and then just as now it's very hard to inject subsidy into a bus network that isn't regulated.

It's ironic that Bodmin Road - Padstow is mentioned in this thread. Having actually used the replacement bus on this route, I can confirm that it is a long and winding route down country lanes that are clearly not suitable for a medium distance bus route.

This closure was clearly more about the Western Region settling old scores, than prtoviding an adequate transport service to passengers.

It's really a shame that the Select Committee system wasn't brought into use until 1979. A good committee would pulled Beeching's reasoning apart.

 

[A0wen]

In many cases, however, I suspect the buses actually served many local passengers better - but at the same time destroyed longer distance passenger opportunities. Take, for example, the Hitchen - Bedford branch. The new bus service (which would have been a beefed-up service which already ran in parallel to the railway) dropped most local passengers in or near the centre of town. But that was 1,000 yards away from the station. So any Hitchen to (say) Wellingborough or Kettering link, previously possible with a single change, was effectively destroyed, forcing people into cars even if they didn't want to drive. (Sure, there were not many passengers nor trains per day on such a route, but it was perfectly possible to do it. And this happened to earlier links between hundreds, in not thousands of locations.)

But there was never a demand for travel from Hitchin to Wellingborough or Kettering - in fact there was a coach from Rushden to London (Birch Bros, later United Counties) which outlasted the Bedford - Hitchin line, but even then the bulk of travel was for London so the quicker "via M1" services soon became more popular.

It was still possible to do Hitchin - Wellingborough or Kettering with a single change - indeed it still is - either by bus to Luton (which does stop outside the rail station) and train to Wellingborough or Kettering or via Peterborough.

I suspect into the 80s, United Counties Coachlinks probably offered some alternatives - though somebody who knew that network could comment better.

The Hitchin - Bedford line, once the Midland had built their own line to London, was always very quiet apart from traffic to / from Henlow Camp, but by the 60s that was in decline as well.

 

[edwin_m]

One only has to look at the 'duplicate' routes 'not selected for development' (not to be run down for closure - "honest guv") in Beeching's second report to see that he was on the wrong track with this. Leeds - Manchester via Huddersfield and London to Birmingham via Banbury.

But there was plenty of very close duplication - look at the Midland and Great Central networks north of Sheffield for example. Gerry Fiennes made a start at linking these at strategic places to allow the best parts of each to be combined, but the process didn't really finish until the 1980s.

 

[RT4038]

My problem with Marples / Beeching is that closure of lines was often seen as the only option. Yes, some lines were basket cases and should never have been built. But others ought to have had potential to be saved - if someone had taken time to consider why some lines were so poorly used. Often, the timetables must have been to blame. I suppose there was complacency - it has always been that way - why change things ? And anyone criticising "the system" too loudly would probably doom their career prospects.

Just consider the above-mentioned York - Market Weighton - Hull service. In the 1955 timetable, the first train from Market Weighton arrived in Hull at 09:26; for whom was that likely to be any use ? Maybe a few rich business people and early shoppers - but certainly not anyone who wanted to commute daily to a workplace in Hull. By 1963, that had changed to arrival in Hull at 08:51 - still much too late for most workers. Return options from Hull were at 17:15, followed by the last train of the day at 19:37 (1955) or 19:30 (1963). Did anyone wonder why so few people used the trains ? Travel to/from York had marginally better options - but the first train from Market Weighton reached York at 08:24 (1955) - still too late for many workers who started work at 08:30 or earlier.

And some closure proposals were stupid - and fortunately eventually not proceeded with. Remember that these included proposals to close Liverpool to Southport, and Liverpool to St. Helens & Wigan - both busy commuter lines.

Introduction of diesel trains, and more importantly, regular interval services had started to regain passenger traffic, but I suggest they were not allowed long enough to reach their maximum potential. It can take many years for people to change their travel habits; maybe as much as 5 to 10 years, but numerous lines were abandoned after much shorter periods of having improved regular intervval services.

Dr Beeching was highly intelligent, but he comes across as having poor perception of human behaviour. He thought that many people would drive to main line railheads and travel onwards by train. That may happen now, but in the 1960s, with lower levels of road congestion, many chose to drive for the whole journey, deserting the railways. Likewise, his rail replacement buses were often seen as a poor, slow replacement for trains, and mostly disappeared within a few years.

Closure of lines was not seen as the only option - there is still a big network out there! Not all the lines not proposed for closure were golden money spinners - they had to have money spent on them to ensure their future, money that was very short indeed. There was also a proportion of lines that closure was refused mainly on political grounds. The operating losses, and capital required to rationalise them, on these had to be paid for from internal funds too.

For the previous 10 yeas the railways had been trimming timetables to reduce train mileage, sometimes due to fuel and staff shortages, but mainly to save money due to large losses. It was unthinkable to increase train frequencies on anything but the most promising of lines. There was not the money to run extra trains and then wait 5-10 years for passenger levels to rise. If they weren't on a solid rising trajectory after 12 months then they would be binned.

You are looking at the 1955/1963 York-Market Weighton-Hull timetable and likely traffic through the prism of 2019 conditions. In 1955 only the more senior and rich businessmen/ professional people would have been able to commute from Market Weighton to Hull, and starting work at 10h00 would have been perfectly acceptable. In those days, most people living in Market Weighton who got a job in Hull would have simply moved there. This might seem strange in this day and age of low personal living mobility, but that was perfectly possible and the preferred option then. Any long(er) distance commuting by ordinary people were probably railwaymen on reduced rate tickets. By 1963 things had started to change, and to be fair, the timetable had changed too. The amount of middle class commuting had probably started to rise (as the standard of living rose), but still relatively few would have afforded the fares. On a line like this, I am not sure of the significance of the last trains at 19h30 or thereabouts. Not many people in the provinces would be travelling to the country districts after then - we are talking 1955/63, not 2019. The cost of keeping 24 crossing keepers, and signalmen at work would probably be a good economic reason too.

Dr Beeching was a highly intelligent man, no doubt with faults and blind sides like the rest of us, but he was appointed Chairman of BR, unlike any of his critics on here! His remit (which he helped to craft) was to quickly reduce the deficit by reducing costs, without any additional investment money from the Government. He was not a champion of every passenger's interest - he was only champion of passengers interests in as far as they fitted in with his remit. Clearly he hoped/expected a proportion of passengers on closed lines would journey to a railhead by bus or car, and no doubt some did. And plenty didn't, but their revenue did not justify keeping the hopeless lines open.

Having been confronted with very similar issues in my transport career I can fully understand Dr. B's reasoning and actions. Actually having to put your money where your mouth is can be very sobering indeed.

 

[Dr Hoo]

And some closure proposals were stupid - and fortunately eventually not proceeded with. Remember that these included proposals to close Liverpool to Southport, and Liverpool to St. Helens & Wigan - both busy commuter lines.

Just to pick up on this point (as a variation from the Market Weighton line), people need to appreciate that both Ernest Marples and Dr B were far more shrewd than many people give them credit for. (Marples was probably rather 'over shrewd' when it came to his personal financial affairs but here is not the place for that discussion.)

The message had to be conveyed that 'busy' commuter lines were not necessarily profitable. Even ones that might be electrified and have regular interval services. The Newcastle-South Shields line had already been de-electrified even before the Reshaping Report was published as its cost structure was unfavourable given the way that peak-hungry electricity tariffs worked.

The Southport route suffered from all the problems of high infrastructure costs (including some four-tracking, vast stations at either end, numerous level crossings and a huge depot/works in the Southport area), peaky demand (three trains per hour off-peak but up to eleven in the commuter peak with many strengthened), minimal freight or 'main line' traffic to share costs with, three-shift working, short journeys and low fares. The Southport-Crossens extension had suffered from lost patronage as bus services had improved even before the war.

Nobody doubted local railways' contribution to Liverpool and Marples (as a Merseyside MP) had already overseen the creation of a Steering Committee on Merseyside Traffic and Transport back in 1962. This included local authorities, bus operators, BR, the Mersey Dock & Harbour Board and the MoT. A genuinely multi-modal approach was taken with plans for the second Mersey Road tunnel being developed at the same time as the 'Loop and Link' lines were conceived. All this was long before Barbara Castle's PTEs saw the light of day.

All this lay behind Beeching's advocacy of a "Total Social Benefit" approach, probably accompanied by subsidy, in the Report.

So far as I am aware the Liverpool-Southport line never actually went through the closure machinery. There was, nevertheless, some sensible rationalisation around the fringes - notably the extension to Crossens, the closure of Meols Cop depot/works, reduction and partial re-development of Southport Chapel Street station, and a rather more hard-nosed approach to peak extras. This may have removed the delights of expresses overtaking stoppers between Liverpool Exchange and Seaforth but did mean that the smaller fleet could be stabled maintained with rather less generous facilities. (This was obviously all before the Loop and Link finally came to fruition.)

 

[yorksrob]

Closure of lines was not seen as the only option - there is still a big network out there! Not all the lines not proposed for closure were golden money spinners - they had to have money spent on them to ensure their future, money that was very short indeed. There was also a proportion of lines that closure was refused mainly on political grounds. The operating losses, and capital required to rationalise them, on these had to be paid for from internal funds too.

For the previous 10 yeas the railways had been trimming timetables to reduce train mileage, sometimes due to fuel and staff shortages, but mainly to save money due to large losses. It was unthinkable to increase train frequencies on anything but the most promising of lines. There was not the money to run extra trains and then wait 5-10 years for passenger levels to rise. If they weren't on a solid rising trajectory after 12 months then they would be binned.

You are looking at the 1955/1963 York-Market Weighton-Hull timetable and likely traffic through the prism of 2019 conditions. In 1955 only the more senior and rich businessmen/ professional people would have been able to commute from Market Weighton to Hull, and starting work at 10h00 would have been perfectly acceptable. In those days, most people living in Market Weighton who got a job in Hull would have simply moved there. This might seem strange in this day and age of low personal living mobility, but that was perfectly possible and the preferred option then. Any long(er) distance commuting by ordinary people were probably railwaymen on reduced rate tickets. By 1963 things had started to change, and to be fair, the timetable had changed too. The amount of middle class commuting had probably started to rise (as the standard of living rose), but still relatively few would have afforded the fares. On a line like this, I am not sure of the significance of the last trains at 19h30 or thereabouts. Not many people in the provinces would be travelling to the country districts after then - we are talking 1955/63, not 2019. The cost of keeping 24 crossing keepers, and signalmen at work would probably be a good economic reason too.

Dr Beeching was a highly intelligent man, no doubt with faults and blind sides like the rest of us, but he was appointed Chairman of BR, unlike any of his critics on here! His remit (which he helped to craft) was to quickly reduce the deficit by reducing costs, without any additional investment money from the Government. He was not a champion of every passenger's interest - he was only champion of passengers interests in as far as they fitted in with his remit. Clearly he hoped/expected a proportion of passengers on closed lines would journey to a railhead by bus or car, and no doubt some did. And plenty didn't, but their revenue did not justify keeping the hopeless lines open.

Having been confronted with very similar issues in my transport career I can fully understand Dr. B's reasoning and actions. Actually having to put your money where your mouth is can be very sobering indeed.

The fact that there is still "a big network" out there means nothing, in terms of what alternatives were looked at and proposed alternatives.

Even in cases that were marginal, there was no alternative to closure looked at or evaluated by the board. Those lines that survived did so because someone fought the railway tooth and nail to keep them.

Anyone who thinks that the network we enjoy today was somehow gifted from Beeching/Marples/Fraser is wrong.

 

[70014IronDuke]

... As for the Bedford-Hitchin line, closed before the Beeching era, there were no rail replacement services put on, as the local bus routes provided a splendid service in the area, presumably already taking virtually all the local traffic. It must be remembered that the line was latterly operated by a Park Royal 4 wheeled railbus about 5 times per day, which does indicate the likely peak loads!

I think the railbuses left in late 59 or 60. Interestingly, reports say they boosted traffic so much they had to put on a relief steam worked push-pull on Satudays. They were replaced by 2 Car Derby lightweights - Cl 108? - and steam. IIRC, it was steam-worked at the end. But yes, of course loads were not normally heavy.

The splendid omnibus services, run by United Counties (182) and Birch Bros. (203) ran twice per hour Bedford-Shefford [the main intermediate small town]- Hitchin from early morning until late night. .... There were alternatives for longer distance passengers from Hitchin by travelling by routes 52/52b (every 20-30 minutes) to Luton and changing to a Midland train there.
The rail service had no chance. Yes, the closure did inconvenience some long distance rail passengers, but the number was so small and uneconomic it simply couldn't be catered for.
But O for a 29 minute Bedford-Hitchin journey time now!

I'm not in disagreement with most of what you write. I don't think Bedford - Hitchen could have survived even it YorksRob had been Minister of Transport c 1961-65.

And yes, even anyone living in west Hitchen (or Stevenage, or area) seeking to go to Wellingborough in 1961 may have taken the bus to Luton, then train for better connections. (And at Luton, the bus station was conveniently sited for onward rail travel.)

And yes, apart from odd days when a scout troop* decided to travel that way, I suspect the number of people using Bedford as an interchange to/from the Midland from/to the Hitchen line (and ditto Hitchen with the GN) was probably never more than ten-twelve per day, if that. Not an economically significant number.

* Yes, I know there was military passenger traffic to/from Henlow, but I believe that was usually catered for by specials.

But you misunderstand my point, intended for the OP. There were closures all over the network which effectively destroyed hundreds, if not thousands, of similar journey possibilities by rail because the replacement bus services were not designed to link in to remaining rail stations or services.

And, unlike today, with no internet, trying to work out an intinery from (say) Stevenage to Kettering once the Hitchen branch went would have been a pain, phoning bus and railways for timetable information. Or finding it in the local library. Yes, perhaps only 5 passengers a week would want to undertake such a journey, and yes, for a time there were other alternatives, of sorts (even by rail, for a few years you could go to Sandy, change for Bedford St Johns and bus it to Midland Road, then continue by rail - but who, apart from the odd hard-core travel enthusiast, would do that?)

Added up, all over the country, this only excacerbated the trend towards the car.

And what do we have left running east-west between London and Leicester - 100 miles which once had a slew of possible cross-platform, east-west interchanges - Luton (via the adjacent Bute St), Bedford, Wellingboro, Kettering (only east - and very poor, agreed) and Mkt Harboro?

Nothing, except the Marston Vale rump.

EDIT - Apologies to the Doctor - many of the closures mentioned here were not due to Beeching, of course.

 

[exile]

Anyone who thinks that the network we enjoy today was somehow gifted from Beeching/Marples/Fraser is wrong.

On the contrary. Given the horrendous state of BR finances at the time it would have been understandable for a policy of managed decline to be adopted, with services withdrawn whenever significant repairs were required or when rolling stock became life expired (effectively a continuation of the previous policy) and with all investment in upgrades and new trains halted.

 

[yorksrob]

On the contrary. Given the horrendous state of BR finances at the time it would have been understandable for a policy of managed decline to be adopted, with services withdrawn whenever significant repairs were required or when rolling stock became life expired (effectively a continuation of the previous policy) and with all investment in upgrades and new trains halted.

What does not "selected for development" mean, if not managed decline.

 

[RT4038]

I think the railbuses left in late 59 or 60. Interestingly, reports say they boosted traffic so much they had to put on a relief steam worked push-pull on Satudays. They were replaced by 2 Car Derby lightweights - Cl 108? - and steam. IIRC, it was steam-worked at the end. But yes, of course loads were not normally heavy.



I'm not in disagreement with most of what you write. I don't think Bedford - Hitchen could have survived even it YorksRob had been Minister of Transport c 1961-65.

And yes, even anyone living in west Hitchen (or Stevenage, or area) seeking to go to Wellingborough in 1961 may have taken the bus to Luton, then train for better connections. (And at Luton, the bus station was conveniently sited for onward rail travel.)

And yes, apart from odd days when a scout troop* decided to travel that way, I suspect the number of people using Bedford as an interchange to/from the Midland from/to the Hitchen line (and ditto Hitchen with the GN) was probably never more than ten-twelve per day, if that. Not an economically significant number.

* Yes, I know there was military passenger traffic to/from Henlow, but I believe that was usually catered for by specials.

But you misunderstand my point, intended for the OP. There were closures all over the network which effectively destroyed hundreds, if not thousands, of similar journey possibilities by rail because the replacement bus services were not designed to link in to remaining rail stations or services.

And, unlike today, with no internet, trying to work out an intinery from (say) Stevenage to Kettering once the Hitchen branch went would have been a pain, phoning bus and railways for timetable information. Or finding it in the local library. Yes, perhaps only 5 passengers a week would want to undertake such a journey, and yes, for a time there were other alternatives, of sorts (even by rail, for a few years you could go to Sandy, change for Bedford St Johns and bus it to Midland Road, then continue by rail - but who, apart from the odd hard-core travel enthusiast, would do that?)

Added up, all over the country, this only excacerbated the trend towards the car.

And what do we have left running east-west between London and Leicester - 100 miles which once had a slew of possible cross-platform, east-west interchanges - Luton (via the adjacent Bute St), Bedford, Wellingboro, Kettering (only east - and very poor, agreed) and Mkt Harboro?

Nothing, except the Marston Vale rump.

EDIT - Apologies to the Doctor - many of the closures mentioned here were not due to Beeching, of course.

Local traffic on the line was very light. Both Hitchin and Bedford Midland Road stations were not in particularly good positions vis-a-vis the local bus service competition, for local passengers. The line had carried some Air Force personnel traffic (mainly in special trains), but this had largely disappeared following he end of National Service in 1960. (RAF Cardington was a major intake point of new recruits)

I guess for your itinerary that the passenger would have caught a LT Country area bus/Green Line coach from Stevenage to Hitchin St. Mary's Square, walked down to Bancroft and taken the daily (inc Sundays) hourly service of the 'Birch' to Rushden Skinners Hill, and then changed to a United Counties no. 413 to Kettering. Long bus journeys were not so onerous as they are today - in this case the buses more or less followed exactly the same routing as you would in a car (save for the 'dog-leg' via Henlow Village between Henlow Camp and Clifton).

Whilst you are right that there are no east-west links surviving, save the Marston Vale line, it would also be true to say that those links that did exist had pretty infrequent services, and certainly few meaningful connections. They may have been cross-platform, but you would spend plenty of time on those platforms between trains!

 

[RT4038]

The fact that there is still "a big network" out there means nothing, in terms of what alternatives were looked at and proposed alternatives.

Even in cases that were marginal, there was no alternative to closure looked at or evaluated by the board. Those lines that survived did so because someone fought the railway tooth and nail to keep them.

Anyone who thinks that the network we enjoy today was somehow gifted from Beeching/Marples/Fraser is wrong.

There were no viable alternatives available to look at. Nothing you have put forward as an alternative stacks up in the environment of no investment money and no agreement from rank and file railwaymen to cut costs. End of.

The size of the network we have today is a political choice of how much to pay for, some of this which you quite correctly point out, was because someone fought tooth and nail to keep them. Much like people fighting for their local library, school etc or similar. Need 18 to close to meet cost saving, propose 20 to close, reprieve 3, fudge how to pay for the 1 over - all sounds quite familiar. This is politics in this country.

 

[yorksrob]

and no agreement from rank and file railwaymen to cut costs.

And yet, mysteriously they managed to get the basic railway past those same rank and file railwaymen later on in that decade.