If I were you I would wait to see what
@John Palmer and others have to say.
I hope I've made clear my assessment of the OP's present position in post #156, but I'll add a couple of further thoughts that occur to me.
Since the written charge served on the OP repeats in part the wording of Section 5(1) Regulation of Railways Act 1889 it is reasonable to infer that Merseyrail intended to allege commission of the offence created by that section. This notwithstanding that Merseyrail has no authority to use the SJP to bring a charge under that Act; it has wrongfully done so on at least one previous occasion.
If Merseyrail instead intended to allege an offence under its Byelaw 18.2 in the form that seems now to appear on the court record, then why was that wording not used to specify the written charge served on the OP? The very fact that Merseyrail used different wording suggests that it intended to charge a different offence.
If it is accepted that the offence alleged on the written charge appears to be one involving contravention of Section 5(1) RoRA then the OP has an unanswerable defence to that charge on the basis of the prosecution's own evidence, namely that a penalty fare was issued to her, that this could only have been done if she had given her name and address to the issuing official, and that by doing so she had taken one of the three courses exonerating her from commission of a Section 5(1) RoRA offence.
If Merseyrail instead intend to allege a breach of its Byelaw 18.2 then an entirely different question would be before the court: has the prosecution proved that the defendant failed to hand over her ticket for inspection and verification of validity? Put in slightly different terms, can the prosecution satisfy the court so that it is sure that Merseyrail's officials made the requisite request for handover of the Chester-Liverpool via Runcorn ticket held by the OP and that she failed to comply with that request? Those are the facts that the prosecution must prove and it seems likely that they will be in dispute.
I foresee the possibility that a further issue of interpretation of Byelaw 18.2 might arise in the event that Merseyrail, whilst conceding that the OP did produce her 'via Runcorn' ticket, contend that the wording of Byelaw 18.2 connotes the production of a ticket that was
valid for the journey being made, and that the 'via Runcorn' ticket produced did not satisfy that condition so that the Byelaw was accordingly infringed. I do not agree with such an interpretation of Byelaw 18.2, but if it were held to be correct then the application of NRCoT 9.5.2 comes into play – but only in those circumstances.
The decided cases point to the likelihood that an application to amend the charge to one of breach of Byelaw 18.2 would be granted, at any rate provided such application is made promptly after the failure to comply with CPR Part 7.3(1) is brought to the prosecution's attention. The allegation of the byelaw offence would arise out of the same alleged 'misdoing', and the 'interests of justice' test would be satisfied by removal of any doubt the defendant might otherwise have as to the nature of the case she is being called upon to meet. Nevertheless it is still up to Merseyrail to make such an application to amend. Until such an application has been made, and granted by the court, it would be quite wrong for the case to proceed on the basis that a Byelaw 18.2 offence is being alleged, as suggested by the current state of the court record. The written charge served on the OP suggests no such thing.
Based as it is on an assumption that the written charge served with a Single Justice Procedure notice will be unambiguous, the procedure introduced by Section 29 Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not admit of a 'don't know' response to the question of plea. The response must make clear whether a 'guilty' or 'not guilty' plea is being tendered. If, as in this case, the written charge
is ambiguous, I see no alternative to tendering a 'not guilty' plea until the nature of the charge has been clarified. On what basis could you sensibly plead guilty to commission of a criminal offence the nature of which has been concealed from you?
The court ought to take a grave view of the difference between the written charge served on the OP and the specification of charge that apparently forms part of the current court record. At best this must involve a serious error of administration. At worst it could have been the result of the prosecution having taken steps that have misled the court as to the nature of the charge brought against the OP, and could involve a failure to comply with Section 29(3A) Criminal Justice Act 2003, as quoted in my previous post. In my view the OP is fully entitled to an apology and an explanation of how this has come about, and for that reason my previous post recommended her to seek such an explanation when responding to the SJPN. It is important that if she does so she should enclose a copy of the written charge served upon her so that the court is left in no doubt about the extent of the differences between that written charge and the current state of the court record.
I think I've probably now said more than enough about my views of the matter.