Because it is all based off evidence from the RSSB which showed DCO trains are no less safe then traditionally operated trains with Driver and Guard. It showed most of the second persons benefit is from being able to make a GSMR REC which OBS are trained to make alongside their other safety training. In the vast majority of situations when train protection is required, you will find even when there is a Conductor with route knowledge the Driver is the one who protects the train.
Risk assessments are, of course, fairly subjective and very easily written to justify a desired outcome rather than used as a tool to help determine the most suitable outcome. It's also notable that the RSSB went to great lengths to disappear a previous report stating that the probability of each of a number of "undesired events" (or words to that effect) occurring was greater under DOO. It's pretty obvious, really, that the risk is bound to increase in at least some aspects of the train's operation - the inability of the driver to monitor the platform/train interface once the train starts moving*, for example, or the increased SASSPAD/SOYSPAD risk arising from increased workload/distraction.
* - contrary to the recommendations of, IIRC, the James Street accident report.
It is, of course, true that the Driver will normally lead the emergency protection process - until the day that they can't, because they're dead or unconscious or just unable to leave the cab. Unlikely, maybe, but still an increase in risk no matter how small.
Also a big part was that the train moving forward as DOO was no less safe than leaving passengers on a platform or squeezing them onto the next service.
Which does make sense, but presumably assumes that the proportion of trains that will end up running without a second member of staff is equal to the proportion of trains that are currently cancelled for the lack of a Guard, ignoring the inevitable reality that more trains will run without a second member of staff because the incentive to dangle carrots to cover work is very much reduced.
In the training school they are taught about evacuation, hot weather barriers and GSMR. Full PTS was never going to be delivered the company did not want them laying track circuit clips and detonators. If the train is rapidly catching fire you dont need route knowledge to know it's time for everyone to get off the train. And in any case the Driver with route knowledge would be there to take the lead.
How can you use the GSM-R to make an emergency call without the route knowledge to be able to state where the incident is occurring?
Okay say you are right is it worth striking over. We've had over 20 odd days of Strikes and lost wages for conductors and still the people in power are not convinced that DOO is dangerous and they have guaranteed jobs for the life of the franchise just in a new role. So why not give in and let DOO happen. If any accidents do happen it will be investigated and heads will role. The RMT will be exonerated and full guards will return
Why not do that instead of this action which is not getting anyone anywhere.
It's not as simple as that. If any accidents do happen, the heads that might roll will be largely protected by a mountain of paperwork showing that the risk was assessed and found to be acceptably low etc. etc.. It'll be the operational staff who will be in the firing line - bear in mind that human error is a significant factor in many accidents, and that the risk of a human making an error is very much increased when the human's workload is increased and they're subjected to more distractions.
I think its well acknowledged by the industry that technology (baliese based systems etc) will mostly provide the ansewer to the above issues going forward more effectively than reinstating tradional guards on all routes
If such balises are necessary to mitigate against an identified risk, then how can we justify transferring the Guard's operational duties to the Driver before such time as that mitigation is in place?