Derailment in Kent between Ashford and Canterbury (26/07)

[NSEFAN]

I have seen pictures on Facebook of the 2 car DEMU hauling the 375. Quite a sight! I will try to find some globally accessible pictures later, unless someone else would like to post them first!

Edit: here's another video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHedP-1ySFw

 

[eastwestdivide]

Thanks for the video link.
If you'd told me in 1986, when I was watching the final days of the 1957-built Hastings units, that a pair of power cars would be used nearly 30 years later as a "loco" to move an EMU with a wheel skate, I'd have laughed my head off.

Anyone know why the Hastings power cars and not a loco?

 

[NSEFAN]

Apparently, the coupler on the EMU was completely buggered and would not have worked with one of the Thunderbird 57s designed to rescue such failed units. The next best thing available seems to have been the Hastings unit.

 

[Lockwood]

Good that they were able to find someone still signed on them and the route

 

[notadriver]

They can be piloted by someone who does know the route.

 

[yorksrob]

Cheers for all of the footage folks !

Good that they were able to find someone still signed on them and the route

It did a railtour up the same route a couple of years back so maybe they've used the same drivers.

 

[Ploughman]

Yes it was that bad, a quarter mile of it damaged beyond repair.

Following an incident at Copmanthorpe near York a few years back when a Voyager was derailed 1 wheelset, we had to relay just over half a mile of track due to every sleeper being cracked by the derailed wheelset.

 

[Lockwood]

If it is just the sleepers cracked, do you use the same rails on new sleepers or replace the entire length with new?

 

[Ploughman]

All depends on the state of the rail and if it has been damaged.

 

[SpacePhoenix]

Apparently, the coupler on the EMU was completely buggered and would not have worked with one of the Thunderbird 57s designed to rescue such failed units. The next best thing available seems to have been the Hastings unit.

How would they have coupled the units? Did the Electrostar's coupling at least still work for the mechanical coupling?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsV47zJ2G7s

 

[Kentish Paul]

Great to see the Hastings units coming to the rescue, but is this the way the modern railway should work? The only way to move a failed train is to use a heritage unit after 4 days of knowing the problem seems a little strange to me.:roll:

 

[edwin_m]

Great to see the Hastings units coming to the rescue, but is this the way the modern railway should work? The only way to move a failed train is to use a heritage unit after 4 days of knowing the problem seems a little strange to me.:roll:

Maybe not the only way, just the easiest or cheapest as decided by whoever made the decision.

 

[Clip]

Ive been struggling to think in all my years of living down there and getting the train still via that way that I simply cant remember ever seeing cows there.

 

[theageofthetra]

Has the investigation gleaned any information on how the cows ended up on the line?

 

[jon91]

How would they have coupled the units? Did the Electrostar's coupling at least still work for the mechanical coupling?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsV47zJ2G7s

I'm not completely certain but I think it would have been coupled via an emergency coupling adapter, which mechanically connects to the Electrostar and can use whatever coupler the DEMU has.

 

[sbt]

I'm not completely certain but I think it would have been coupled via an emergency coupling adapter, which mechanically connects to the Electrostar and can use whatever coupler the DEMU has.

As per a comment by them on the video, Hastings Diesels Ltd already had a Dellner coupling adaptor.

 

[talldave]

Since they were capable of doing the job it's nice to see funds going their way rather than to just another bland corporate entity.

 

[MarkyT]

Since they were capable of doing the job it's nice to see funds going their way rather than to just another bland corporate entity.

Using the heritage unit may have avoided a class 66 locomotive being commandeered from an NR engineering job somewhere that as a result may have had to be cancelled or deferred.

 

[yorksrob]

And to be fair, the thumper is the same vintage of the class 20's, many of which remain in use on the railway today for operational purposes.

 

[Kentish Paul]

Maybe not the only way, just the easiest or cheapest as decided by whoever made the decision.

Totally agree. Just seems a bit wierd. Thinking of highways england bringing in a historical organisations breakdown truck to remove a lorry from the M25. :cry::cry:

 

[theageofthetra]

The preliminary report from RAIB is out (sorry can't post at present) and suggests that a lineside fence had been flattened.

 

[PermitToTravel]

Link: link

Forum policy copyright infringement:

At approximately 21:40 hrs, the 20:10 hrs service from Charing Cross to Ramsgate travelling at approximately 70 mph (110 km/h) struck a number of cows that had gained access to the railway at Godmersham, between Wye and Chilham. Both bogies of the leading vehicle of the eight-car train derailed, and the vehicle then struck an underline (rail over river) bridge. The train stopped with the leading vehicle listing at about 20 degrees.
The driver of a train that had passed through the area an hour earlier, had reported seeing cows alongside the line near to the area where the accident subsequently occurred. The signaller cautioned the next train, which passed through the area at reduced speed. When the driver of this train reported seeing no cows, trains were permitted to run at normal speed again. Two further trains passed through with no reports from the drivers of anything unusual. In the meantime, staff had been sent to site to conduct a search and were starting to look for the animals when the accident happened.

 

[theageofthetra]

Off topic but 15/20 escaped horses closed the M20 at Wrotham late last night. Any guesses as to who might own them?

 

[Metrailway]

A train has hit a few cows today on the West Anglian ML. The train has not derailed.

 

[Bald Rick]

A train has hit a few cows today on the West Anglian ML. The train has not derailed.

Pretty sure this latest one wasn't travelling as fast. Still rather nasty though by all accounts.

 

[Zoidberg]

The RAIB has published it's report at

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploa...ata/file/514310/R052016_160406_Godmersham.pdf

Extract ...

Summary

At around 21:40 hrs on 26 July 2015, a passenger train derailed after striking eight cows that had gained access to the railway at Godmersham in Kent, between Wye and Chilham stations. There had been a report of a cow on the railway an hour earlier, but a subsequent examination by the driver of the next passing train did not find anything. There were no further reports from other trains that passed before the accident occurred.

The train involved in the accident was travelling at 69 mph (111 km/h) at the point of impact. There were 67 passengers on board plus three members of staff; no injuries were reported at the time of the accident. Because the train’s radio had ceased to work during the accident, the driver ran for about three-quarters of a mile towards an oncoming train, which had already been stopped by the signaller, and used its radio to report the accident.

The accident occurred because the fence had not been maintained so as to restrain cows from breaching it, and because the railway’s response to the earlier report of a cow on the railway side of the fence was insufficient to prevent the accident. In addition, the absence of an obstacle deflector on the leading unit of the train made the derailment more likely.

Recommendations

As a result of this accident, RAIB has made five recommendations addressing the fence inspection process, clarification of railway rules in response to reports of large animals within the boundary fence, the fitting of obstacle deflectors to rolling stock (two recommendations), and the reliability of the train radio equipment.

RAIB has also identified two learning points for the railway industry, relating to the railway’s response to emergency situations, including the response to reports of large animals within the boundary fence and the actions to take following an accident.

 

[BestWestern]

How very interesting - no radio. Kinda scuppers the popular argument that GSMR renders trained staff superfluous...

 

[OxtedL]

Some relevant paragraphs on the radio issue (my bold). Apologies for the extra long quotes.

Post-accident actions
77 The actions of the driver and the signaller following the accident were not fully in accordance with the Rule Book.

[78 - what the rule book says]

79 Although the Rule Book instructs drivers to use track-circuit operating clips, these will have no effect in areas that use axle counters as a means of train detection. In such areas, emergency protection is largely dependent on being able to make an emergency radio call to the signaller in order to stop train movements. Godmersham is a track-circuited area.

80 The driver of train 2R66 was understandably distressed after the accident. Upon noticing that the GSM-R radio in his cab was inoperative, he placed a short circuiting bar on the down line and then ran along the track carrying a red light to warn any approaching train (paragraph 27). He did not realise that the GSM-R radio in the rear unit was still operational, so he intended to use a telephone on a signal (if he reached one before an up train approached) to contact the signaller.
At the time he placed the short circuiting bar, train 2W74 had not yet passed signal EBT6 at Chilham station, which was the last stop signal on the up line before the accident site. Had he placed track-circuit operating clips on the up line at this time instead, then train 2W74 would have been held at Chilham station because the stop signal would have reverted to red when the clips were applied. However, the driver felt that he was acting in the best interests of passengers’ safety by short-circuiting the conductor rail and then going forward to warn an approaching train and/or contact the signaller from a signal post telephone. At that time, the up line was still energised (until it was switched off at 21:56 hrs).

[81 -signallers actions]

82 None of these actions had an adverse effect on the outcome of the accident.

and

The inoperative GSM-R train radio
83 The GSM-R radio in the leading unit of the train became inoperative as a result of the accident, which meant that the driver could not use it to immediately contact the signaller to report the accident.

84 Although there are other forms of communication available to drivers (such as signal post telephones), the GSM-R radio is the primary means of communication between drivers and signallers, and its functionality becomes particularly crucial in the immediate aftermath of an accident. Post-accident inspections of the train showed that the miniature circuit breakers (MCBs) for the GSM-R radio had tripped in both cabs of the leading unit. This is likely to have been the result of a transient electrical fault during the derailment (the manufacturer of the radio unit, Siemens, advises that this was not a scenario that was considered during the development of the GSM-R cab radio units). Post-accident testing in the depot by LSER showed that the radio successfully re-started when the MCB was reset.
However, in the immediate aftermath of the derailment, at a time when the driver was experiencing increased stress, he did not realise that the MCB had tripped and so did not consider that resetting it might have remedied the problem.

85 [standards on continuous operation for 2 hours after power loss]

86 None of the units operated by LSER have a secondary power supply. Ongoing work by the industry in collaboration with the GSM-R manufacturer is currently inconclusive as to whether the radio could have remained functional for the driver after the accident if such a secondary power supply had been fitted; this would have depended on how the power supply had been designed and fitted.

The immediate action point for South Eastern on this front will be how it trains its drivers to respond to incidents like this - the drivers actions were commendable and remarkable, but the RAIB points out some simpler responses he could have made with the same outcome that more closely match what is required from the Rule Book.

The industry will be needing to review how GSM-R is tested and operates, since the RAIB have indicated some different circumstances that would have made its proper operation much more important.

 

[ComUtoR]

With regard to the MCB reset. It takes too long for the radio to reboot for that to have been a reasonable action to take. It would be a more significant risk to reboot the radio, wait till it reloads and tests, then hit the big red button. You would still not be confident for the radio to work.

It would introduce further risk if that became procedure because if that was a 4 car unit and it had tripped in both cabs then it adds too much time to your actions in an emergency. (reset your cab + reset rear cab)

If your MCB's tripped in an accident then it should be reasonable to accept that they had tripped correctly and are doing their job of protecting the electrical supply etc.

As to how Southeastern train their Drivers on emergency procedures. I can assure you its pretty much on every single assessment they do. Scenarios are walked through and your actions talked over at every step. I don't believe that this is a training issue.

 

[westcoaster]

Anyone notice a mistake at point 47 or is it me. It's makes out its now a group standard, to me it makes no sence

Witness evidence and the RAIB’s site examination suggest that the train initially struck two cows and at least one wheelset derailed as a result of this initial impact (paragraph 25). Several other carcasses were found under the train, on the tracks behind the train, and on the lineside. The farmer who used the adjacent field reported that eight of his cows were unaccounted for, which is consistent with the number of carcasses found on site. This later became a requirement in the relevant Railway Group Standards (see paragraph 66).