Why do points fall to bits, with missing or broken stretcher bars? It should be simple to model the stresses with an engineering CAD tool and then design points with the correct materials to stand up to the use. Seems very old skool thinking to rely on blokes walking the line.
The points at Greyrigg had a design flaw and were set up wrong. This is my summary from the RAIB report.Because things wear out over time? You can design something to be a tough as you can afford/like but eventually it will still wear out and need replacing and the only way to keep an eye on things is to get out there and have a look at them.
It was found that there was insufficient clamping force to hold the 3rd tie bar in place. The design had insufficient margin, by a small amount, designed in to handle bolts that were 'stiff' to do up. That was compounded by the fact that on these points the connection lay over an identification brand on the rail, which reduced the contact area and so the clamping force.
There were also issues to do with maintenance instructions and tools that made it less likely that the bolts would be tightened to the, inadequate, design level. There were no instructions on the need to do so and the correct long torque spanner was not carried by the maintenance and patrol staff who had to use an ordinary, short, spanner.
With vibration from traffic, added to by the fact that the 'closed' switch rail wasn't tight against its stock rail, the bolts loosened and eventually came fully undone.
The points had been set up with the residual switch opening to large, basically the points did not close tightly enough. With the stretcher bar in place the right wheelsets of a passing train pushed the switch and stock rails closer together, which allowed the stretcher bar to pull the open switch rail further from its stock rail. After the bolts loosened this didn't happen and the back of some, worn, left wheelsets were hitting the 'open' switch rail. This 'hammered' the mechanism of the points, including the third stretcher bar, which was repeatedly 'crushed' between the left and right switch rails until it broke.
Without the third stretcher bar parts of the point mechanism (the Secondary Drive) that were pulling the left (open) switch rail away from its stock rail could no longer do so and the gap between it and its stock rail closed. A stray bolt between the switch and stock rails held the gap partly open but eventually one of the wheelsets on the accident train went the 'wrong way' and the derailment resulted.
The points would have failed eventually with the bolts on the third stretcher bar lost but the time taken for this to happen would have been much longer if the points had been set up correctly.
The report is worth a look, get it here:
http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2008/report202008.cfm