If you were controlling the Reshaping of the railways, which lines would you shut or save?

[Gareth Marston]

Really? I doubt most people cared that much at all. They weren't affected by the cuts (didn't use trains at all or not lines that closed) and aspired for the freedom of a private car. Probably shocked and upset at the grossness of the railway losses too. The 'powers that be' wanted rid of the losses that they were having to fund - the more you close the less subsidy it will take overall. No-one would want to close a profitable business - and the railways were not that at any time since the early '50s. The first real public outcry to a line closure was the S&C in the 1980s, by which time most of the closures had taken place long ago, and public opinion and the political landscape had completely changed.

The Waverley route closure was met with great anger and the Highland lobby was effective at keeping the lines beyond Inverness and the West Highand.

 

[yorksrob]

I wonder how much the Beeching cuts and Wilsons broken promise on stopping them damaged public trust "in the powers that be". The 60's were a time of great change in public views and attitudes and this was a fairly large event at the time.

Indeed. I suspect that the closures at least played a part in the end of the 'age of deference' amongst other things.

 

[RT4038]

Yes really. The expose of the 1972 Rail Policy review and the illegal activities of the state concerning it, made the national press. I presume I don't need to outline the response to the Serpell report.

I was referring to the public response to the 'Reshaping' cuts of the early to mid 60s. Some of the cuts in the late 60s/early 70s were becoming contentious (with the rail network more or less to where it is now) the public woke up and made it clear that further cuts (on any large scale) were unacceptable [The Serpell Report and the public outcry against the S&C closure being the final straw]. This is how the level of subsidy came to be 'democratically' arrived at. Such is the way of politics. Whether this was in exactly the right place can be argued forever, but this is how we got to where we are now.

 

[yorksrob]

I was referring to the public response to the 'Reshaping' cuts of the early to mid 60s. Some of the cuts in the late 60s/early 70s were becoming contentious (with the rail network more or less to where it is now) the public woke up and made it clear that further cuts (on any large scale) were unacceptable [The Serpell Report and the public outcry against the S&C closure being the final straw]. This is how the level of subsidy came to be 'democratically' arrived at. Such is the way of politics. Whether this was in exactly the right place can be argued forever, but this is how we got to where we are now.

The DfT and some in BR were demonstrably decades behind where public opinion was.

 

[Gareth Marston]

I was referring to the public response to the 'Reshaping' cuts of the early to mid 60s. Some of the cuts in the late 60s/early 70s were becoming contentious (with the rail network more or less to where it is now) the public woke up and made it clear that further cuts (on any large scale) were unacceptable [The Serpell Report and the public outcry against the S&C closure being the final straw]. This is how the level of subsidy came to be 'democratically' arrived at. Such is the way of politics. Whether this was in exactly the right place can be argued forever, but this is how we got to where we are now.

The two examples I gave were both report listed closures. My grandfather was active in succesfully fighting the "closure sychosis" attempt to close Birmingham Moor St in the early 70's.

 

[RT4038]

The two examples I gave were both report listed closures. My grandfather was active in succesfully fighting the "closure sychosis" attempt to close Birmingham Moor St in the early 70's.

Do you think that the Beeching report was some kind of fully worked up master plan? Of course it wasn't. It is well known that all sorts of political machinations went on behind the scenes. No doubt Beeching put some lines up for closure for Government to refuse. He had little idea how much support or opposition would be garnered by the individual components of the plan. This didn't make the plan bad or wrong. I realise this might come as a shock to some, but this is the way of business, politics and the world, then and now.

A parallel could be drawn ( not exactly but similar) with the recent library closures that have happened round England. Everyone knows that libraries are little used now, but have fond memories of using them as a child. Savings need to be made. Propose closure of two and only get a murmur, so they get closed. Propose six more, much louder complaint so close three and keep three as a compromise, with Library service proposing running cost reductions. Propose closure of last two - huge furore. Politicians back down. The people have spoken and the officials done their job of questioning expenditure. Of the original 10 under threat, 5 closed and 5 left. Substantial reduction of costs. Job done.

I don't buy your 'closure psychosis' theory. Throughout the 60s and 70s into the 80s the railways (and the country) were under considerable financial pressure. Railway management were under constant pressure to save costs to improve profitability. One way of doing this is to shrink unprofitable activity and this would include an ongoing scrutiny of network size. In recent years this pressure has simply not been there, and it can be easily forgotten (or never known about if you are younger than about 50 !). I think the last closures were in a package of savings in the early 80s (Northampton-Market Harborough, March-Spalding, Clayton West branch, Kilmalcolm, Elmers End-Sanderstead, and possibly several other bits). I guess that this list started much bigger, and both internal and external opposition/alternatives would have kicked them into touch. All sorts of other economies were proposed and some introduced over this period. Anyone working in railway management at the time will know exactly what I am talking about!

 

[yorksrob]

Do you think that the Beeching report was some kind of fully worked up master plan? Of course it wasn't. It is well known that all sorts of political machinations went on behind the scenes. No doubt Beeching put some lines up for closure for Government to refuse. He had little idea how much support or opposition would be garnered by the individual components of the plan. This didn't make the plan bad or wrong. I realise this might come as a shock to some, but this is the way of business, politics and the world, then and now.

A parallel could be drawn ( not exactly but similar) with the recent library closures that have happened round England. Everyone knows that libraries are little used now, but have fond memories of using them as a child. Savings need to be made. Propose closure of two and only get a murmur, so they get closed. Propose six more, much louder complaint so close three and keep three as a compromise, with Library service proposing running cost reductions. Propose closure of last two - huge furore. Politicians back down. The people have spoken and the officials done their job of questioning expenditure. Of the original 10 under threat, 5 closed and 5 left. Substantial reduction of costs. Job done.

I don't buy your 'closure psychosis' theory. Throughout the 60s and 70s into the 80s the railways (and the country) were under considerable financial pressure. Railway management were under constant pressure to save costs to improve profitability. One way of doing this is to shrink unprofitable activity and this would include an ongoing scrutiny of network size. In recent years this pressure has simply not been there, and it can be easily forgotten (or never known about if you are younger than about 50 !). I think the last closures were in a package of savings in the early 80s (Northampton-Market Harborough, March-Spalding, Clayton West branch, Kilmalcolm, Elmers End-Sanderstead, and possibly several other bits). I guess that this list started much bigger, and both internal and external opposition/alternatives would have kicked them into touch. All sorts of other economies were proposed and some introduced over this period. Anyone working in railway management at the time will know exactly what I am talking about!

What made the Beeching plan bad and wrong, was not considering ways to reduce terminal and track costs before deciding on closure, not taking into account inward revenues from outside of the line, not taking into account seasonal traffic flows etc.

Of course, when you have a Department of Transport which was even more overwhelmed by closure psychosis, and prepared to resort to nefarious activities to pursue closures at any cost, then you have the perfect storm for the railway.

What we shouldn't do is to try and justify away this state of affairs to make ourselves feel better, because it might mean future policy makers are more likely to make bad decisions if they feel that future historians will judge them more leniently.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Yes really. The expose of the 1972 Rail Policy review and the illegal activities of the state concerning it, made the national press. I presume I don't need to outline the response to the Serpell report.

I met Reg Dawson a couple of times at RUG Meetings - no idea he was the mole who leaked the 72 policy review until after his death. Apparently he only told a handful of close confidants as he feared they would still come after him even in his 80's 40 years on.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Throughout the 60s and 70s into the 80s the railways (and the country) were under considerable financial pressure

Sounds like this is the omni excuse for everything?

It doesn't matter we were under financial pressure......any old decision good or bad is OK as we have the perfect excuse. Fiscal pressure doesn't mean you have to be sloppy and make poor choices....

The Reshaping Report was sloppy and had much statistical ineptness in it.

 

[B&I]

Sounds like this is the omni excuse for everything?

It doesn't matter we were under financial pressure......any old decision good or bad is OK as we have the perfect excuse. Fiscal pressure doesn't mean you have to be sloppy and make poor choices....

The Reshaping Report was sloppy and had much statistical ineptness in it.

Well, it is in vogue once more as the go-to reason for.politicians looking for am excuse to do / not do something. It never ceases to.amaze me how many people seem to fall for it, without asking why we always seem to be under financial.pressure, or why certaij aspects of public spending always seem to experience this pressure more than others.

 

[B&I]

.There's a definite whiff of deference around those on here defending the closure programme, assuming that because the Government of the day decided on a course of action, it must have been inevitable and the assumptions upon which that decision was based, must have been true and correct.

And there you've hit the nail on the head about why so many debates on here, and why so many discussions about policy in general in this country, follow the course that they di.

 

[B&I]

I'm going to play extreme devil's advocate here.......

What about adopting the GCML between Rugby and Nottingham as the new main line.... and closing the MML north of Bedford?
That way trains between standard midland main line destinations and london could have been operated using electric traction, at least as far as Rugby?

All it takes is a Chord in Rugby to connect the GCML and the WCML.
And it allows you to avoid a chord to utilise Nottingham Victoria instead of Midland.

The MML south of Bedford could be heavily rationalised into two track suburban railway, like the Chiltern.

What about connecting the sizeable towns between Leicester and Bedford to the outside world ?

But at a more general level, rationalisation should have involved consideration of whether faster traffic could have been concentrated on some lines, even if what Beeching would have considered 'duplicates' should still have been retained for local and freight traffic.

 

[B&I]

Well Victoria already had access to the lines to the East (Newark and Grantham), and there appears to have been a whole second suburban network based around the GNR/GCR - so I think you could have replaced Midland with Victoria, but it would make the system look a lot different.

Services would have needed to remain on at least some of the ex-Midland lines, even if chords etc had been used to filter them into Victoria eg suburban services through Beeston.

 

[yorksrob]

I met Reg Dawson a couple of times at RUG Meetings - no idea he was the mole who leaked the 72 policy review until after his death. Apparently he only told a handful of close confidants as he feared they would still come after him even in his 80's 40 years on.

Indeed. I think all rail users in this country owe him a very great debt of gratitude.

 

[HSTEd]

Services would have needed to remain on at least some of the ex-Midland lines, even if chords etc had been used to filter them into Victoria eg suburban services through Beeston.

Well indeed, but they would have been rationalised to suit their new role - gaining substantial savings in operational costs.
Just as some GCR/GNR lines survived - like the one to Grantham.

What about connecting the sizeable towns between Leicester and Bedford to the outside world ?

Those towns are not much larger than many towns that did without substantial services for years elsewhere in the country.
They only kept services by virtue of happening to be on a major line.

And many of them have extended population regions that bring them close to WCML stations (Wellingborough is close to Northampton for example)

But at a more general level, rationalisation should have involved consideration of whether faster traffic could have been concentrated on some lines, even if what Beeching would have considered 'duplicates' should still have been retained for local and freight traffic.

Indeed, but in many cases it seems that the lines were closed for the heinous crime of not being ex-Midland.

 

[muddythefish]

And many of them have extended population regions that bring them close to WCML stations (Wellingborough is close to Northampton for example)

No one is going to drive from Wellingborough to Northampton (and vice versa) to catch a train. If Northampton were reconnected to Wellingborough by rail however .................

 

[HSTEd]

No one is going to drive from Wellingborough to Northampton (and vice versa) to catch a train. If Northampton were reconnected to Wellingborough by rail however .................

Noone is going to drive 13 miles to get a train?
Then where do all the people driving to stations like Newark and Grantham come from?

 

[muddythefish]

Noone is going to drive 13 miles to get a train?
Then where do all the people driving to stations like Newark and Grantham come from?

Newark and Grantham are on the same line? Wboro and Nton are on different lines and basically London commuter stations. Why would anyone drive from one town to the other ?

 

[HSTEd]

Newark and Grantham are on the same line? Wboro and Nton are on different lines and basically London commuter stations. Why would anyone drive from one town to the other ?

What?
Someone is suggesting that the traffic from the likes of Wellingborough would be entirely lost if the MML had been closed during the Beeching Axe, the fact that it is only 13 miles from Northampton and significant amounts of traffic from significant distances flow into the likes of Newark and Grantham make this assumption rather weak, at least in my opinion.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Well, it is in vogue once more as the go-to reason for.politicians looking for am excuse to do / not do something. It never ceases to.amaze me how many people seem to fall for it, without asking why we always seem to be under financial.pressure, or why certaij aspects of public spending always seem to experience this pressure more than others.

Everything is always under some sort of financial pressure there's nothing unique about the early 60's.

 

[coppercapped]

I find it interesting. Please continue.

One small addition to your point about the sudden and huge increase in own account road vehicles: one of the comically absurd elements of the rail nationalisation was that privately owned rail wagons, most of which were in very poor condition, were also and quite unnecessarily taken into public ownership. The result was that tax-payers' money had to be handed over in exchange for this worthless junk, and the money was spent on brand new road vehicles which were then used instead of the railway! Such a clever and expensive way to lose business!

The next instalment of my magnum opus…

This bit covers the missed opportunities and mis-judgements of the early nationalisation period.

The 1947 Act nationalising inland transport set up the British Transport Commission (BTC) as the top level organisation to encourage each form of transport to specialise in the types of services for which it was most suited. It also set up the public bodies known as 'Executives' for each of the businesses to assist it in this task and to act as its agents. The history of the relationships between the BTC and its various 'agents' is complex.

The form of nationalisation was flawed (not necessarily nationalisation per se) in the sense that the structure of the organisations defined in the Act was not capable of delivering the aims set out in the Act. The aim was the coordination of inland transport, so it would have been sensible to have set up the BTC functionally - operations, commercial, engineering, financial and so on - so the most effective mode, or modes, for a particular movement could have been identified. But the Act setting up the BTC also set up its 'agents' by form of transport, e.g., the Railway Executive (RE), the Docks and Inland Waterways Executive, Road Transport Executive, London Transport Executive and later there was to be a Hotels Executive.

The aim of the Government was the integration of inland transport, but the Act did not include bus operations. There was no Road Passenger Traffic Executive, only a pious hope (section 63 (1)) that the BTC would consider each geographical area and prepare and propose a ‘scheme’ to meet the needs of each area to the Minister. So, integration between trains and buses did not happen because, as far as I am aware, no ‘scheme’ was ever prepared or approved.

The section covering road haulage defined closely the types of organisations that would be ‘acquired’, but then goes on to say that if you are running an organisation which looks as if it fits the bill for acquisition, but you don’t receive a notice of acquisition then you have inform the RHE and say you think you should be acquired…

How to win friends.

Clearly, the drafters of the Act could cope with a few large entities, and even then they ducked out by stating that the railway and canal companies to be nationalised were those

…the whole or any part of which is at the date of the passing of this Act under the control of the Minister by virtue of an order made under Regulation sixty-nine of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939…

(Although, to be fair, the companies were listed in the Third Schedule).

One can draw two conclusions:

• the Government saw nationalisation of the railways and canals as a continuation of the (Government controlled) wartime status quo

and​

• they were on uncharted territory when confronted with the diverse road industry.

If the BTC’s organising remit was essentially that of the war-time railway group in the Ministry of Transport, it partially explains why the BTC’s financial remit was, to say the least, vague. Section 3 (4):

…and the Commission shall so conduct that undertaking and, subject to the provisions of this Act, levy such fares, rates, tolls, dues and other charges as to secure that the revenues of the Commission is not less than sufficient for making provision for the meeting of charges properly chargeable to revenue, taking one year with another.

The bizarre thing about this is that, with the Common Carrier obligations from the various Canal and Railway Traffic Acts still in force, the “fares, rates, tolls, dues and other charges” were not directly under the control of the BTC, but of the Traffic Commissioners (also specified in the Act) who had to adjudicate on rates and charges but were under no time pressure to do so.

Capital expenditure required ministerial approval, Section 4 (2):

In framing programmes of reorganisation or development involving substantial outlay on capital account, the Commission shall act on lines settled from time to time with the approval of the Minister.

The BTC was allowed to borrow by issuing British Transport stock, but only up to a limit of £250 million.

The Act made no requirements about return on capital or service levels or improvements or customer satisfaction or anything else. Interestingly the BTC was supposed to generate sufficient funds to pay the dividend on the Government stock which had been issued to the shareholders of the Big Four and the other nationalised organisations. How this was supposed to work is anybody’s guess - the business was essentially the same as that run by the Big Four, at least one member of which which reputedly had difficulties in paying its dividends, but now it was expected to pay out more than the private companies would have done. Perhaps the missing money was to come from the canal business…

The Executives were curious beasts, not in the least that the Government appointed the members of these Executives directly. The result was of course that each Executive fought its own corner and the BTC had precious little control over them - it did not control the Executives' budgets except at the highest level and it could not move Members of an Executive to a different job or fire those who were thwarting the aims of the Commission because these Members had been appointed by the Government.

So the RE kept the Commission - which it saw more as a supervisory board - at arm's length by sending it only edited copies of its Minutes. It ran itself as if it were a railway company operating in isolation so when the BTC was concerned that the RE was pressing for new designs of steam locomotives and showing a complete lack of interest in the potential of diesel traction it could not change the RE’s stance. The BTC's records show that it took action after noting the speed with which the Railway Executive was tackling the standardisation of steam motive power - the RE had set up the Locomotive Standards Committee on 8 January 1948 within a week of nationalisation. In April 1948, the same month that the locomotive exchanges took place, the BTC’s Chairman (Cyril Hurcomb) wrote to the Chairman of the RE (Eustace Missenden) to express his dissatisfaction with the progress made in assessing the merits of different forms of traction. The reaction was grudging - it took over 8 months for a committee to be set up at RE Headquarters (on 20 December 1948) under J. L. Harrington, the Chief Officer (Administration) to study other forms of traction. It finally reported at the end of 1951 - three and a half years later.

One of the extraordinary features of the Harrington report was the very crude nature of the financial figures presented. The cost comparisons were for built cost of the locomotives - no effort was made to relate operating costs to different manning levels or utilisation or to identify costs/ton-mile or per passenger-mile. It would seem that the RE had little need for financial analysis in deciding its traction policy, nor did it need the BTC to shove its oar in.

The point to remember is that others at the time were critical of the choices made by the RE - but the structure of the railway business made it impossible for anyone to change the RE’s policy. The later abolition of the RE and the takeover of the railways by the BTC didn’t really change much - if anything things got worse because of the increase in the span of command at the top levels. Having an army man in charge, as good a soldier as he was, didn’t result in commercial, financial and money matters being giving the attention they deserved. The railways were an organisation to be administered, not a business to be managed.

If, that little word again, the 1947 Act had set up the BTC not only to co-ordinate but also to manage inland transport and then left the details of its organisational structure for it to work out itself, then there would have been a fighting chance that the development of the railways in the years to come would have been very different. For this to have happened would have required a very different attitude at the top of the organisation and, indeed, the Government. With the mindset at the time - and the choice of a long serving civil servant (who was previously Permanent Under-Secretary of, successively, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Shipping and then of its successor the Ministry of War Transport from 1941 until his appointment as Chairman of the BTC in 1947) it was clear that administration rather than active management was the order of the day. Britain has just emerged from a war one of the aims of which was the preservation of its way of life - so, logically, everything that had worked before the war would continue to work the same way - it was what we were trying to preserve. Although the Attlee government had nationalised about a fifth of the economy in essence nothing had changed - only the ownership.

Similarly the nationalised railways' early ‘Boards of Directors’, the BTC and the RE, did not understand that the world had changed dramatically from that of 1939.

There is a big difference between the ‘Direction’ of an organisation and the ‘Management’ of it, but they are complementary - competent management cannot counteract the malign effects of incompetent direction (you can be very good at doing the wrong things) and the best direction needs competent managers to implement the decisions effectively. Good direction requires that one can read the significant of the straws in the wind and change the course of the business suitably. I maintain that BR was badly served at this time.

At the end of the War there there only two properly functioning economies in the West - the USA and the UK. Europe was a basket case - cities, industries, economies and countries ravaged and starvation was only avoided in some areas due to the efforts of the American and British armies.

There were serious labour shortages in the UK; some 265,000 men had been killed in action - all of them fit and most of them young - and nearly 93,000 civilians. The Empire Windrush arrived in 1948 to try to help fill the labour shortage. Wages were increasing, it was becoming increasingly difficult to attract staff to the dirty jobs done during unsocial hours.

Technology had advanced tremendously during the War. Many, if not all, of those being demobbed had experience of high speed internal combustion engines - all those lorries, jeeps, tanks and aircraft - and electronic communications. Some of them even knew about jet engines. And yet the RE continued to build to build steam engines as if were still 1935 and operate train services using labour intensive technologies and methods dating back to the 19th century - and showed no sign of wanting to change.

The RE didn’t stop to even ask itself whether the system it inherited was matched to its current, or possible future, business. It carried out no traffic studies, it made no effect to determine whether the system could be worked with fewer people and, if so, how. It did not seek to find out how it could increase its business.

At the time BR was created the LMS had built diesel shunters and prototype main line diesels and the Southern had designed some more of the latter. The GWR had built a series of diesel railcars in the 1930s and ordered some gas turbine main line locomotives. By 1939 the Southern had already electrified significant parts of its network and the LNER had planned the Woodhead and Shinfield electrifications. The RE was correct in aiming for electric operation as the future ideal, yet it ignored the potential of diesel railcars and locomotives in improving performance step by step and getting rid of some of the most unpleasant jobs in the country as it moved towards its future goal. Instead it concentrated on the development and construction of the ‘Standard’ steam locomotives.

Whew…!

 

[HSTEd]

Had I been in charge at the BTC in 1948, and been given a free hand, I would probably have started a dozen different committees on all the ways that modern technology and integration could improve the transport business.... but that's just me.

 

[Harbornite]

A good read, Coppercapped, thanks for posting.

 

[Gareth Marston]

A good read, Coppercapped, thanks for posting.

Yes many thanks to coppercapped for taking the time and effort.

I cant help think that the BTC was a good idea that Atlee and Labour put togethar over the metaphorical beer and sandwiches the high level theory sounded good (it was) however no one thrashed out how it would work in practice. We see this ideological policy making time and time again. Rail Privatization is similar, nasty inefficient nationalized BR- you just had to bring in the "magic" of the private sector to sort it out. Proponents are so wrapped up in their theory they don't realize its the detail that matters.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Instead it concentrated on the development and construction of the ‘Standard’ steam locomotives.

The Standards (and the hundreds of Big 4 designs built after nationalization) were part of Government industrial/economic policy not a decision by incompetent railway managers in their outmoded industry that the standard narrative tries to paint.

We forget that back then a balance of payments deficit was seen as a bad thing and all oil had to be imported. Government didn't want diesels for this reason. Coal consumption had been in decline since its Edwardian peak , keeping the railways on coal helped their fellow Nationalized Industry British Coal. It also provided work for the in house railway workshops. You can argue that it did support the wider economy recover from war.

How British Railways used the Standards was a disappointment, a former General Manager of the Severn Valley Railway was a young fireman based at Brecon he reckoned that the Swindon built LMS 46xxx 2-6-0's (not a standard but virtually the template for the 78xxx) that were delivered brand new in 1950 en masse to the ex GWR's Oswestry's Division were never never properly used to their potential. They just trundled back and fore using Victorian timetables and working practices. The Standards were an opportunity to change things on rural lines that wasn't taken - though the Common Carrier legislation was largely to blame.

 

[B&I]

What?
Someone is suggesting that the traffic from the likes of Wellingborough would be entirely lost if the MML had been closed during the Beeching Axe, the fact that it is only 13 miles from Northampton and significant amounts of traffic from significant distances flow into the likes of Newark and Grantham make this assumption rather weak, at least in my opinion.

As has been illustrated several dozen times on this thread, the more likely response of someone requires ro dirve 13 miles to reach a station is to carry on driving til they reach their destination

 

[HSTEd]

As has been illustrated several dozen times on this thread, the more likely response of someone requires ro dirve 13 miles to reach a station is to carry on driving til they reach their destination

And yet the towns are unlikely to be able to build a business case for retention of services based on their own traffic generation alone.

 

[B&I]

And yet the towns are unlikely to be able to build a business case for retention of services based on their own traffic generation alone.

Depends how you skew the criteria. If your criteria include providing substantial towns with decent public transport, I'm sure they'll do fine.

 

[HSTEd]

Depends how you skew the criteria. If your criteria include providing substantial towns with decent public transport, I'm sure they'll do fine.

The criteria should be appropriate public transport for the largest fraction of the population possible, at the minimum feasible cost.

Even today those towns aren't particularly large, in the 60s they would really struggle to justify continued rail service, except perhaps for short rail cars on a largely single line 'minimum railway'.

Maintaining lines with huge lengths of expensive infrastructure for the benefit of relatively minor towns was simply no longer feasible

 

[70014IronDuke]

.....
Those towns are not much larger than many towns that did without substantial services for years elsewhere in the country.
They only kept services by virtue of happening to be on a major line.

Are we talking about Wellingborough, Kettering and Mkt Harborough here? Ok, the latter was not so important in the sleepy sixties, but close the former two? That would have been difficult. Indeed, I never heard anything of closing the Midland completely. Rather, the talk was (and I don't know how serious it was) of electrifying Nuneaton-Leicester, and singling Wigston - Bedford, with passing loops a la Salisbury - Exeter. Not complete closure.

Indeed, but in many cases it seems that the lines were closed for the heinous crime of not being ex-Midland.

Oh dearie me. Do you REALLY believe that 'Midland-conspiracy' stuff?

If (and once) it was decided that there was too much capacity heading north of London after the outer suburban stops (meaning Aylesbury, Northampton, Bedford and Hitchin/Huntingdon) and a line has to close, which one do you think it's going to be? You are not going to close the newly electrified LNW nor the ECML, obviously. That leaves the Midland or the GC.

On the Midland, north of Bedford, you have - otherwise not served - Wellingboro-Rushden, Kettering-Corby and Mkt Harborough. In 1966 total population - I'd guess at 65,000 + 95,000 + 12,000 = approx 170,000, maybe 180,000 with villages.

On the GC you have ..... well, more or less, in revenue terms - NOTHING. Brackley at 3,000 max, Woodford Halse and surrounds 2,000, Rugby (served by the LNW) and the great metropolis of Lutterworth - popn 2,500.

To use an expression not in contemporary use in 1966 - it's a total no brainer.

Now, whether the GC could have been singled and made into a basic railway ..... that's another story. I would love to have seen it tried. But if you are going to have to close one of the GC or the Midland - please, look at the plain facts. You don't have to be born in Derby with a silver Wyvern in your mouth to see those and make the right decision. You don't even need economics O level. A kid of 15 could do it.