Train doing 6x speed limit at Sandy, 19/10/18

[The Planner]

There's been an ongoing issue with the signals at Bromsgrove on the Down since the December timetable change. The last signal at the bottom of the hill protecting the station (I'm sorry, but I don't recall it's number) has been set to approach control due to an issue that is still awaiting rectification. Could this be an example of this...?

I think it is, it needs a fairly big fix too from what I hear. Was meant to be done at the end of the month but I dont think they can get access.

 

[ashkeba]

Those of us who drive should consider ir they have ever been not been sure of the speed limit at their current location, if so they have missed seeing a speed limit sign. Train drivers are human and it will happen on occasions.

Car drivers have simple heuristics to pick a default (built-up = 30mph England, 50kmh France, built-up with lots of obstacles = 20mph England, 30kmh France, and so on). I doubt train drivers have any way as quick to recover, but unlike car drivers, they have the RAIB dissecting any errors, so I'm surprised that the smaller number of 100+mph trains haven't yet been equipped with in-cab limit displays like the recent cars that (as far as I can tell) can read speed limit road signs.

 

[EvoIV]

The thing is, drivers route knowledge of speeds is from the sectional appendix (which is definitive in theory). The fact it is an almost impenetrable collection of maps in seemingly random order is by the by. The speed boards are thus only an aide memoire and may or may not be present/still readable/uncovered by vegetation. Any device reading them will also not necessarily be able to understand the context of the board and whether it applies, such as divergent speeds, differential speeds etc.

 

[malc-c]

My take on this report...

The driver was at fault, being distracted by fumbling in his bag that was behind him for over the counter medication. The report states that in such cases anything that is needed should be placed in easy reach. Clearly this wasn't the case on this occasion.

The team who set up the warning boards were at fault as it mentioned that the lights on the warning boards were not set correctly so the angle give the optimum visibility.

The TOC for not advising notifications or restrictions to their drivers and other staff.

Possibly rectifying any one of those three points may have prevented the incident happening, but combined lead to the incident occurring. It was just luck that there were no track workers on the line, or that the point didn't fail completely resulting in a derailment making the event a lot more serious than what it was.

 

[ashkeba]

The thing is, drivers route knowledge of speeds is from the sectional appendix (which is definitive in theory). The fact it is an almost impenetrable collection of maps in seemingly random order is by the by. The speed boards are thus only an aide memoire and may or may not be present/still readable/uncovered by vegetation. Any device reading them will also not necessarily be able to understand the context of the board and whether it applies, such as divergent speeds, differential speeds etc.

The car ones fail in all those ways, especially in countries like France that love divergent speed limits. It's still better than not having any speed limit info displayed on the console.

 

[edwin_m]

Serious non-compliances to permanent speed restrictions are mercifully pretty rare and the more severe ones now have TPWS enforcement so any train approaching too fast will be brought to a stop. Overspeeds tend to be because the driver has become disorientated in position or misjudged their braking, not because they have forgotten all about the restriction. Also permanent speeds are typically set for comfort rather than safety and an occasional relatively minor infringement is unlikely (though not impossible) to be hazardous.

Temporary (including emergency) speed restrictions are more of a concern because, as in this case, they come and go and drivers may not always be aware of one that has just been imposed. They also have to be put in place quickly so there is a risk of errors in defining where the signs should be or in placing them correctly. So there is much more risk of a driver failing to reduce speed significantly for a TSR as happened here, so much more risk of a really gross overspeed which could lead to immediate derailment.

I wonder if at some point we may see TPWS grids for TSRs. Obvious complications are the need for a power supply and the complication of setting out the equipment, but I think these would be surmountable.

 

[Highlandspring]

I wonder if at some point we may see TPWS grids for TSRs. Obvious complications are the need for a power supply and the complication of setting out the equipment, but I think these would be surmountable.

TSRs are supposed to be risk assessed for TPWS fitment already under the Network Rail company standards (NR/SP/SIG/10137 Train Protection and Warning System - Selection of Signals and Other Locations for Provision of Track Sub-System, issue 4, appendices D & E). Self powered OSS (SPOSS) grids operated by battery already exist and are used for this purpose and similar applications.

 

[edwin_m]

TSRs are supposed to be risk assessed for TPWS fitment already under the Network Rail company standards (NR/SP/SIG/10137 Train Protection and Warning System - Selection of Signals and Other Locations for Provision of Track Sub-System, issue 4, appendices D & E). Self powered OSS (SPOSS) grids operated by battery already exist and are used for this purpose and similar applications.

Thanks for that - not heard of it before. Wouldn't the TSR in this case, 20mph from 125mph line speed caused by an 85mm crack and severe enough to need a watchman, qualify as high risk?

 

[Bromley boy]

Thanks for that - not heard of it before. Wouldn't the TSR in this case, 20mph from 125mph line speed caused by an 85mm crack and severe enough to need a watchman, qualify as high risk?

I’ve never heard of that either, I wonder if it’s a Scottish thing?

I can imagine that opening cans of worms in terms of drivers ending up with SOL incidents where the boards have been laid out incorrectly.

 

[lammergeier]

I think it is, it needs a fairly big fix too from what I hear. Was meant to be done at the end of the month but I dont think they can get access.

This was in the late notices as due for repair and reinstatement to normal running from Sunday 4th August but I haven't been down that way since then, has the work not taken place?

 

[mcmad]

TPWS is only fitted to longer term TSR's. Think it has to be planned to be on for more than 6 months. There were trials done (by the High Output track renewals teams IIRC) of fitting it to 20mph safety cover speeds but I don't think it worked particularly well.

 

[SPADTrap]

RAIB Report

These procedures had been in place since a Rule Book change in June 2008 when the requirement to notify drivers of freight and passenger trains of the presence of emergency speed restrictions was removed from the Railway Rule Book after a request from a freight operating company and an analysis by RSSB. This led to the committee responsible for the decision concluding that lineside warning equipment placed on the approach to a restriction to indicate its presence was sufficient notification for drivers. The RAIB has found that the information that this conclusion was based on did not cover all the factors that should have been considered...

This is probably the most damning aspect of that report, I wonder what factors they did consider? Cost, I imagine.

What else have they screwed up because of their agendas?

 

[jfowkes]

This is probably the most damning aspect of that report, I wonder what factors they did consider? Cost, I imagine.

What else have they screwed up because of their agendas?

Indeed. The word "sufficient" is telling. Are we comfortable with safety procedures merely being "sufficient"? That implies that any lapse in attention or protocol will fall below "sufficient" into "insufficient". Safety- or life-critical procedures should be kept way above sufficient to account for the ever present risks of human error and technical failure.

 

[800002]

I can't help drawing a parallel to 'heat speeds' - there have been well documented cases of drivers mis-interpreting the verbal instructions (when given) about their implimentation. Either boarded or un-boarded, with comms going through the signaller.
'failure to reach a clear understanding' is often cited.

If it's not passed on in writing, the potential for incident is greater, due to to the lack of having something to refer to.

The difference though being Heat Speeds are somewhat expected in certain circumstances and then in certain locations - the driver is prepared / forewarned of the possibility.

Not issuing published TSR info, was simply increasing the risk of incident. How on earth did they justify (or mitigate) this increased risk?

 

[edwin_m]

I’ve never heard of that either, I wonder if it’s a Scottish thing?

I can imagine that opening cans of worms in terms of drivers ending up with SOL incidents where the boards have been laid out incorrectly.

Wouldn't that happen anyhow with violation of existing TSRs, if detected, and if not detected the much more serious situation of a possible major accident? If the boards are set out wrongly such that it's impossible to brake for the restriction the driver shouldn't be to blame, and if the boards are set out incorrectly to cause confusion with signal magnets then the driver may be partly to blame but there is a mitigating factor.

Indeed. The word "sufficient" is telling. Are we comfortable with safety procedures merely being "sufficient"? That implies that any lapse in attention or protocol will fall below "sufficient" into "insufficient". Safety- or life-critical procedures should be kept way above sufficient to account for the ever present risks of human error and technical failure.

It's possible for safety measures to become excessive, due to the "something must be done" factor. For example bogies were strapped to car bodies after Potters Bar, but according to someone party to the detailed analysis this was a probable cause for the derailment at Great Heck. Having said that, I would agree that the issue doesn't apply here and written notification of restrictions to drivers is a sensible thing to do.

 

[Bromley boy]

Wouldn't that happen anyhow with violation of existing TSRs, if detected, and if not detected the much more serious situation of a possible major accident? If the boards are set out wrongly such that it's impossible to brake for the restriction the driver shouldn't be to blame, and if the boards are set out incorrectly to cause confusion with signal magnets then the driver may be partly to blame but there is a mitigating factor.

Potentially, yes.

ESRs, by their nature, are “degraded” compared to PSRs which are properly signed and may be protected by TPWS grids. I had always understood that NR undertake a risk assessment simply close the line to traffic if the track damage is severe and the risk of setting up a ESR is deemed too great.

Having spoken to a couple of colleagues, who have worked on various areas of the U.K. network, none are familiar with battery operated TPWS grids being used to protect ESR/TSRs.

I note the document linked to by @Highlandspring referenced testing of these grids in 2000, during the original roll out of TPWS across the network. My suspicion is that these never made it beyond the testing stage.

Can anyone provide any examples of ESR/TSRs where they have been used?

 

[TheEdge]

I've never heard about temporary TPWS set ups for an ESR or TSR. I don't think I've seen it in the rule book and it definitely wasn't mentioned during my driver training sessions on the set up and equipment of ESR and TSRs

 

[mcmad]

As mentioned above (I must be using invisible ink again) trials were undertaken using the 20mph safety cover speeds adjacent to high output track renewals a year or so ago using the temporary TPWS.

 

[Highlandspring]

Can anyone provide any examples of ESR/TSRs where they have been used?

Yes, between Bathgate and Armadale there is a long term TSR caused by mining subsidence which is protected by SPOSS. As part of a previous job I was responsible for going throught the flowchart risk assessment and recommending installation - I used to attend the Track RAM team’s 4 weekly TSR review meeting for this purpose. SPOSS is also used in Scotland for level crossing sighting speeds, especially on the Far North. Delny is the one that sticks out in my mind for the huge number of brake demands it has caused to speeding trains.

 

[Bromley boy]

There were trials done (by the High Output track renewals teams IIRC) of fitting it to 20mph safety cover speeds but I don't think it worked particularly well.

Sorry but I have no idea who the High Output Track Renewals Team are, or what a 20mph “safety cover speed” is!

Is this relevant to the use of battery operated grids to protect mainline ESRs and TSRs?

Where did this trial take place?

Yes, between Bathgate and Armadale there is a long term TSR caused by mining subsidence which is protected by SPOSS. As part of a previous job I was responsible for going throught the flowchart risk assessment and recommending installation - I used to attend the Track RAM team’s 4 weekly TSR review meeting for this purpose. SPOSS is also used in Scotland for level crossing sighting speeds, especially on the Far North. Delny is the one that sticks out in my mind for the huge number of brake demands it has caused to speeding trains.

Ok thanks. It definitely seems like Scotland is a theme here. Any south of the border, to your knowledge?

 

[Highlandspring]

I have no knowledge of anything that happens in that far away land. The Standard we’re working to is the same and the equipment is available so I’d be surprised if it’s just ignored.

 

[mcmad]

Sorry but I have no idea who the High Output Track Renewals Team are, or what a 20mph “safety cover speed” is!

Is this relevant to the use of battery operated grids to protect mainline ESRs and TSRs?

Where did this trial take place??

I give up. Ignored.

 

[Bromley boy]

I have no knowledge of anything that happens in that far away land. The Standard we’re working to is the same and the equipment is available so I’d be surprised if it’s just ignored.

Understood, thanks.

Any further experiences of this would be appreciated.

 

[800002]

Disclaimer: View of a 'non-expert'.

Sorry but I have no idea who the High Output Track Renewals Team are, or what a 20mph “safety cover speed” is!

I believe the poster was referring to the aptly named, High Output Team - delivering 'High Output Track Renewals' in the form of Ballast Cleaning; Track Relaying machines and associated planning. They are able to work adjacent to open running lines - which safety dictates is best with a reduced speed.
The machines require on-track persons during the possession, which requires reduced speeds on adjacent lines.
I suspect the 'safety cover speed' comes from this aspect.
See here:
https://www.networkrail.co.uk/runni.../our-fleet-machines-and-vehicles/high-output/

Is this relevant to the use of battery operated grids to protect mainline ESRs and TSRs?

Quite possibly - I suspect you can't simply plug a TPWS grid into the existing electrical setup to establish TPWS protection for the worksite. The worksite could be considered to be a TSR, as speed is forcibly reduced throughout the possession area on the adjacent open line(s).

I give up. Ignored.

Don't give up! Persevere.

 

[Bromley boy]

I believe the poster was referring to the aptly named, High Output Team - delivering 'High Output Track Renewals' in the form of Ballast Cleaning; Track Relaying machines and associated planning. They are able to work adjacent to open running lines - which safety dictates is best with a reduced speed.
The machines require on-track persons during the possession, which requires reduced speeds on adjacent lines.
I suspect the 'safety cover speed' comes from this aspect.
See here:
https://www.networkrail.co.uk/runni.../our-fleet-machines-and-vehicles/high-output/

Very informative - much appreciated!

 

[Tomnick]

Quite possibly - I suspect you can't simply plug a TPWS grid into the existing electrical setup to establish TPWS protection for the worksite. The worksite could be considered to be a TSR, as speed is forcibly reduced throughout the possession area.

The worksite isn’t a TSR - it relates to a safety speed (i.e. a TSR) on the adjacent line which is open to traffic but too close for trains to pass at linespeed.

 

[800002]

The worksite isn’t a TSR - it relates to a safety speed (i.e. a TSR) on the adjacent line which is open to traffic but too close for trains to pass at linespeed.

Yes, agreed - but I did say 'could be considered to be' although I should have (and now amended) 'throughout the possession on the adjacent open line(s)'.

 

[Tomnick]

Yes, agreed - but I did say 'could be considered to be' although I should have (and now amended) 'throughout the possession on the adjacent open line(s)'.

Fair doos. There’s no doubt about it though - there’s either a TSR (planned, published and signed) or there isn’t!

 

[headshot119]

Sorry but I have no idea who the High Output Track Renewals Team are, or what a 20mph “safety cover speed” is!

Is this relevant to the use of battery operated grids to protect mainline ESRs and TSRs?

Where did this trial take place?

High Output Renewals are things like the HOBC (Ballast Cleaner) etc. There's certainly been various notices about adjacent T/ESRs to worksites in the LNW(N) WON, though it doesn't mention temporary TPWS, but other mitigations.

Ok thanks. It definitely seems like Scotland is a theme here. Any south of the border, to your knowledge?

I can't say I've come across it in the North West.

 

[800002]

Fair doos. There’s no doubt about it though - there’s either a TSR (planned, published and signed) or there isn’t!

Most diefinatly. (one assumes that being in said possession plan and WON entry equates to planned, published and signed).

As an aside: when was the last time the HOBC / HOTR last in the North west (I can't locate my High Output plan / timetable which was published yonks ago!).