Southern DOO: ASLEF members vote 79.1% for revised deal

[swt_passenger]

I wonder what percentage of the hem erred new recruit not part of the RMT. Clearly GTR epiphany know.

Please explain...

 

[king_walnut]

As the OBS wont be safety critical they wont be trained to reset passcomms etc, that will be down to the driver.

In what world does resetting a passcom require a safety critical member of staff?

I reset 2 on Thursday. I'm an OBS.

 

[infobleep]

Please explain...

Apologies. I have corrected my post. Some typos I missed.

 

[tsr]

In what world does resetting a passcom require a safety critical member of staff?

I reset 2 on Thursday. I'm an OBS.

With the greatest of respect, you really shouldn't be doing that, even if you've been shown how to. I'm not saying that you've actually done anything other than what your managers have told you to, but the passcom is a piece of safety apparatus designed for use in emergencies, and should only be dealt with by staff who hold competencies in assessing whether the train is safe to move (or, in the case of the 377s which you work, possibly also "continue moving") after it has been activated.

The Rule Book specifies the rules regarding train movement on the national network, and there are no safety instructions in the Rule Book specifically regarding anything of the nature of an OBS resetting the passcom. The only two job roles mentioned in the section about the Passenger Communication Apparatus, otherwise called the passcom, are the driver and guard. OBSs are most definitely neither of those. The full instructions can be found at https://www.rssb.co.uk/rgs/rulebooks/GERT8000-TW1 Iss 11.pdf - page 38 - but the paradox is that the OBS is not required to have any knowledge of the Rule Book, thus would not be specifically required to be conversant with whomever can deal with a passcom.

There are some circumstances involving dispatch, as an example, when a passcom could be activated to alert the driver or guard to situations which an OBS, who is not competent to be involved in dispatch, could not assess. These could be related to a passenger having spotted something amiss in the dispatch corridor along the platform, or requiring urgent release of the doors as soon as the train had otherwise been deemed ready to start. From a personal point of view, I would be very concerned if anyone suggested all OBSs were capable of monitoring the platform/train interface, given the detail of training which some have had. Thus all staff should, unfortunately, be working to the lowest common denominator of OBSs having no responsibilities for checking the safety of the train, no matter how competent you or some of your colleagues may either be or feel.

In this specific case, I would suggest that "safety critical" means a member of staff who has been trained and assessed (in line with recognised national safety standards) to act in control of the movement of a train. From what I know about OBS training, and that's quite a lot, the role does not fall into that category at all.

 

[king_walnut]

Resetting the passcom isn't the same thing as dealing with an incident that might lead to it being pressed. For instance, if someone mistakes it for the toilet flush button, and the person confirms this with the driver, there is no issue with me walking down there and resetting that button.

If it's pressed because someone is being minced to death outside the train then obviously that's the driver's concern and an issue far beyond my remit.

Inserting a T key and turning it (after the issue has been resolved by the driver) could be done by a 3 year old. No safety critical status required.

 

[tsr]

Resetting the passcom isn't the same thing as dealing with an incident that might lead to it being pressed. For instance, if someone mistakes it for the toilet flush button, and the person confirms this with the driver, there is no issue with me walking down there and resetting that button.

If it's pressed because someone is being minced to death outside the train then obviously that's the driver's concern and an issue far beyond my remit.

Inserting a T key and turning it (after the issue has been resolved by the driver) could be done by a 3 year old. No safety critical status required.

I know it's not the same thing - I've probably reset rather more than any OBS has, as well as having dealt (within my remit) with very serious dispatch and safety-of-the-line situations which in slightly different circumstances could have been communicated to a driver by means of alarms, including stopping trains in circumstances which were anything but obvious.

In my experience, on most occasions the driver cannot communicate effectively with the person who has pushed the passcom and must either investigate or send someone to do that. There is a whole multitude of reasons a passcom may be pushed, and sometimes the person walks away, hides, may otherwise not be able to communicate further, or may be in danger. Alternatively they may indeed have just pushed it instead of the flush button. Passengers are not obliged to convey safety-critical information and may not be clear what they mean - it is a member of train crew, conversant with the Rules, who "must" (I quote) reset it.

The action of resetting the passcom on a 377 is quite a complex one from an electronic point of view, and it has similarly complex implications. What it does do is remove a high-level alert to the driver, disables the camera feed to the location, removes the distress indication from the BIL light, removes the two-way audio communication with that alarm from the duplex audio system throughout the train, wipes the indication of the location from the panel handsets, removes the requirement to activate the driver's footwell override switch, and in short generally makes the train rather more able to proceed. Pushing it again after you realise you missed someone's finger trapped in the door, or smoke seeping from the bottom of the toilet after someone's got out and run away (see also: could have happened in the Eastbourne 377 fire), is likely to confuse everyone and increase the reaction time to an emergency. The train could even be accelerating well out of the station by the time you notice what was actually wrong. If you're not trained to go down to the location and assess all of what could reasonably be wrong with the train and passengers, you shouldn't be sending so many signals to both train and driver that there's nothing wrong.

 

[redbutton]

Resetting the passcom isn't the same thing as dealing with an incident that might lead to it being pressed. For instance, if someone mistakes it for the toilet flush button, and the person confirms this with the driver, there is no issue with me walking down there and resetting that button.

If it's pressed because someone is being minced to death outside the train then obviously that's the driver's concern and an issue far beyond my remit.

Inserting a T key and turning it (after the issue has been resolved by the driver) could be done by a 3 year old. No safety critical status required.

Just to add a bit to what tsr said: The deactivation of a passcom is always the driver's concern.

Personally, as a driver, I wouldn't have an issue with an OBS resetting a passcom at my request (once I've confirmed via voice and CCTV that there's no emergency), but would not be too pleased if the OBS took it upon themselves before I had a chance to investigate.

You can't separate the physical act of turning the key to reset the device from the rules and responsibilities governing that act. This is the same reason many drivers have objected to the OBS being required to put a guard's key on to keep the local door open while checking the platform for passengers needing assistance. They're a non-safety-critical member of staff interfering with a safety-critical task.

But back to the topic of passcoms, my opinion is that an OBS isn't qualified to decide whether or not the passcom should be reset, but once that decision has been made by a suitably-qualified member of staff (i.e. the driver) then he or she should be able to carry out the procedure under instruction.

 

[455driver]

In what world does resetting a passcom require a safety critical member of staff?

I reset 2 on Thursday. I'm an OBS.

On whose authority did you reset them?
You (as an OBS) certainly do not have the authority to reset them!!

Whether you consider yourself to have the required training and knowledge is irrelevant, we work to the NR rulebook and what does that say?

I could probably fix a 455 or drive several of my old routes without an issue but as I no longer sign the traction or the route I wouldnt do it, what we are allowed do is not the same as what we can do!

If your resetting the passcomm causes an issue who do you think the company will blame?

I assume this is another example of Management trying to muddy the waters between a fully trained Guard (who does have the required SC knowledge) and an OBS (who most certainly does not).

 

[BestWestern]

Whether you consider yourself to have the required training and knowledge is irrelevant, we work to the NR rulebook and what does that say?

I assume this is another example of Management trying to muddy the waters between a fully trained Guard (who does have the required SC knowledge) and an OBS (who most certainly does not).

I think GTR stopped worrying about the inconvenience of the Rulebook quite a while ago, they appear to consider themselves above it. Non-safety critical staff operating passenger doors comes to mind.

It seems increasingly apparent as time goes by, that the original position so desired by Horton and Co in the Mickey Mouse Club House is completely unworkable. Instead, what we seem to have ended up with is half a Guard with a silly job title, and Guards being told they might still have to be Guards on the wonderful new DOO network if the DOO kit fails. Frankly, Captain Charlie and his DOO Disaster is utterly laughable; the man looks a complete idiot and has no credibility whatsoever in either managing the daily operations of his company or managing relations with his staff. Sadly the comedy value is far outweighed by the seriousness of the damage being done.

 

[pompeyfan]

Yesterday afternoons fatality at Portchester yesterday afternoon was a Southern service from Fareham to Brighton, the service was running without an OBS which can only have made the whole experience even worse, I'm told of very concerning information as well regarding emergency equipment, but that's not for me to say.

Thoughts to the driver, the BTP and everyone else involved.

 

[Deepgreen]

I think GTR stopped worrying about the inconvenience of the Rulebook quite a while ago, they appear to consider themselves above it. Non-safety critical staff operating passenger doors comes to mind.

It seems increasingly apparent as time goes by, that the original position so desired by Horton and Co in the Mickey Mouse Club House is completely unworkable. Instead, what we seem to have ended up with is half a Guard with a silly job title, and Guards being told they might still have to be Guards on the wonderful new DOO network if the DOO kit fails. Frankly, Captain Charlie and his DOO Disaster is utterly laughable; the man looks a complete idiot and has no credibility whatsoever in either managing the daily operations of his company or managing relations with his staff. Sadly the comedy value is far outweighed by the seriousness of the damage being done.

Agreed - in my experience (so I am not stating this as a universal fact) the OBS is pointless - I have never experienced a Southern train in which I am travelling, which has an OBS, to have derived the slightest benefit from the role - they are invisible, and simply (badly) repeat the recorded announcements. A scandalous waste of resource.

The platform staff also have to be mentioned - I used Dorking this morning and my terminating Southern train (I won't say which one) arrived a little late. The (Southern) platform staff member ambled at about 1mph (no exaggeration) along to the front (why? - he didn't do anything or talk to anyone) and then back to the rear again in a completely aimless manner, with a green signal for the return trip all the while, with the driver in position and no-one else boarding, and eventually deigned to give the 'CD' and 'RA' to allow a five minutes late departure. The following SWT train was also delayed as a result of this aimlessness.

There is so often nowadays absolutely no sense of purpose in timekeeping - the railway is no longer run on pride in a public service job well done.

As an aside here, but illustrating the prevailing attitude on the railway today, EB trains entering my local station, Betchworth, when the platform starter is at red, almost always slow to an interminable crawl (literally about 3mph) at least ten train lengths short of the platform. This is on a significant rising gradient, and is presumably to avoid the slightest possible chance of the dreaded 'SPAD', a driving technique which has, understandably, been engendered by the overwhelming fear of incident, rather than a common-sense attitude to the actual risk of a SPAD (do drivers nowadays even know the gradient profiles of their routes?). Thus, already late trains are needlessly further delayed by a ridiculous over-cautious station approach.

 

[XDM]

As an aside here, but illustrating the prevailing attitude on the railway today, EB trains entering my local station, Betchworth, when the platform starter is at red, almost always slow to an interminable crawl (literally about 3mph) at least ten train lengths short of the platform. This is on a significant rising gradient, and is presumably to avoid the slightest possible chance of the dreaded 'SPAD', a driving technique which has, understandably, been engendered by the overwhelming fear of incident, rather than a common-sense attitude to the actual risk of a SPAD (do drivers nowadays even know the gradient profiles of their routes?). Thus, already late trains are needlessly further delayed by a ridiculous over-cautious station approach.

Many TOC's ask their drivers to approach red platform starters with great caution. It may even be in the rule book. It is for understandable reasons specially if there is a road crossing with passing traffic 40 metres ahead. But 3 mph from that far back seems absurd. It may have seemed like 3mph but might have been 10 mph.

 

[Deepgreen]

Many TOC's ask their drivers to approach red platform starters with great caution. It may even be in the rule book. It is for understandable reasons specially if there is a road crossing with passing traffic 40 metres ahead. But 3 mph from that far back seems absurd. It may have seemed like 3mph but might have been 10 mph.

I understand the point of approaching red signals with caution, obviously, but, no; trains usually slow to less than walking pace way before the platform and crawl in (I see this most mornings from the platform and have frequently experienced it on trains as well), on a gradient of around 1 in 145 rising (and with the level crossing closed but the starter still at red owing to the interlock with Buckland crossing beyond)! Passengers watch the almost comically-slow approach with incredulity. Farcical.

 

[Right Away]

I understand the point of approaching red signals with caution, obviously, but, no; trains usually slow to less than walking pace way before the platform and crawl in (I see this most mornings from the platform and have frequently experienced it on trains as well), on a gradient of around 1 in 145 rising (and with the level crossing closed but the starter still at red owing to the interlock with Buckland crossing beyond)! Passengers watch the almost comically-slow approach with incredulity. Farcical.

There are many stations adjacent to a controlled level crossing. Stopping trains will often approach the platform with the protecting signal at danger. This is in order to prevent excessive delay to road traffic. At certain locations such as Cosham and Bedhampton, there is a piece of TPWS equipment known as an Overspeed Sensor (OSS) on the approach to the signal. This is there to mitigate against a train approaching too fast to be able to stop at the signal and colliding with users of the level crossing. At the mentioned locations, the 'trigger' speed to have a TPWS brake demand is 12.5 mph. This would be treated as an operational incident, with the driver likely relieved of duty and an OTMR download taken. Company instructions require the driver to be doing below 10 mph, with 7-8 mph recommended to allow for the train not retarding as expected or an inaccurate speedometer. Yes it appears painfully slow as you crawl in to the platform, even more so when the signal clears to a proceed aspect immediately after you have reduced the train speed to comply with the OSS. This most definitely not due to poor driving technique, in fact it is very much the opposite!
I don't sign the route at Betchworth so I do not know the exact set-up there but I suspect it may be similar to the above examples.

 

[Deepgreen]

There are many stations adjacent to a controlled level crossing. Stopping trains will often approach the platform with the protecting signal at danger. This is in order to prevent excessive delay to road traffic. At certain locations such as Cosham and Bedhampton, there is a piece of TPWS equipment known as an Overspeed Sensor (OSS) on the approach to the signal. This is there to mitigate against a train approaching too fast to be able to stop at the signal and colliding with users of the level crossing. At the mentioned locations, the 'trigger' speed to have a TPWS brake demand is 12.5 mph. This would be treated as an operational incident, with the driver likely relieved of duty and an OTMR download taken. Company instructions require the driver to be doing below 10 mph, with 7-8 mph recommended to allow for the train not retarding as expected or an inaccurate speedometer. Yes it appears painfully slow as you crawl in to the platform, even more so when the signal clears to a proceed aspect immediately after you have reduced the train speed to comply with the OSS. This most definitely not due to poor driving technique, in fact it is very much the opposite!
I don't sign the route at Betchworth so I do not know the exact set-up there but I suspect it may be similar to the above examples.

As a significant proportion of trains do approach Betchworth station against a red starting signal at what I would call a sensible speed, I must assume there is no such arrangement here.

Anyway, I've taken us off-topic - apologies.

 

[WatcherZero]

RMT have announced a co-ordinated strike on Merseyrail, Northern and Southern on Monday 13th March.

They are certainly attempting to escalate to a national strike.

 

[theironroad]

There are many stations adjacent to a controlled level crossing. Stopping trains will often approach the platform with the protecting signal at danger. This is in order to prevent excessive delay to road traffic. At certain locations such as Cosham and Bedhampton, there is a piece of TPWS equipment known as an Overspeed Sensor (OSS) on the approach to the signal. This is there to mitigate against a train approaching too fast to be able to stop at the signal and colliding with users of the level crossing. At the mentioned locations, the 'trigger' speed to have a TPWS brake demand is 12.5 mph. This would be treated as an operational incident, with the driver likely relieved of duty and an OTMR download taken. Company instructions require the driver to be doing below 10 mph, with 7-8 mph recommended to allow for the train not retarding as expected or an inaccurate speedometer. Yes it appears painfully slow as you crawl in to the platform, even more so when the signal clears to a proceed aspect immediately after you have reduced the train speed to comply with the OSS. This most definitely not due to poor driving technique, in fact it is very much the opposite!
I don't sign the route at Betchworth so I do not know the exact set-up there but I suspect it may be similar to the above examples.

Similarly, I don't sign betchworth but as a level crossing has been mentioned and without being too pedantic, I think the oss grids you mention are actually tpws minus grids which are only provided on approach to starters signals at level crossings where there is a small distance between the signal and the crossing. They are pretty much the same as buffer stops grids rather than the oss sensors for psr speeds. Having said that, I guess with tpws mk IV it will highlight as overspeed on the tpws panel if overspeed at the tpws minus grids.

Leaving all that aside, the poster in question seems to delight in having daily criticism of frontline staff, none of it usually constructive.

 

[Deepgreen]

Similarly, I don't sign betchworth but as a level crossing has been mentioned and without being too pedantic, I think the oss grids you mention are actually tpws minus grids which are only provided on approach to starters signals at level crossings where there is a small distance between the signal and the crossing. They are pretty much the same as buffer stops grids rather than the oss sensors for psr speeds. Having said that, I guess with tpws mk IV it will highlight as overspeed on the tpws panel if overspeed at the tpws minus grids.

Leaving all that aside, the poster in question seems to delight in having daily criticism of frontline staff, none of it usually constructive.

I assure you that "delight" doesn't enter into it. I do bemoan the state of the railway and if there are front line staff failings they should not be immune to criticism, along with planners, managers, etc. Almost by its nature, a smooth-running system does not produce comment, but problems do. I've tried to pull this back to topic, but, to be clear on my point; as some trains at Betchworth approach the red starter at a 'sensible' speed, then those that crawl (5mph or less), uphill, for the last few hundred yards (no matter whether wet or dry weather) must surely be being driven with excessive caution, making already-late trains even later. If this long crawl really is necessary then the timetable should change to accommodate it, but, in fact, one minute has only recently been shaved off my morning train's departure times from Betchworth and Reigate, rather than the other way round.

Anyway, as I said, let's get this thread back on course.

 

[Deepgreen]

My spirits rose when our Redhill to Victoria OBS walked through and checked tickets this morning, but promptly fell again when a passenger opposite me in first class held up a standard class ticket, at which the OBS just nodded and moved on! This was then followed by three abortive attempts at repeating the recorded announcement as we approached Victoria. Each attempt cut off halfway through and nothing more was heard. Laughable and sad at the same time.

 

[CentralTrainer]

My spirits rose when our Redhill to Victoria OBS walked through and checked tickets this morning, but promptly fell again when a passenger opposite me in first class held up a standard class ticket, at which the OBS just nodded and moved on! This was then followed by three abortive attempts at repeating the recorded announcement as we approached Victoria. Each attempt cut off halfway through and nothing more was heard. Laughable and sad at the same time.

This - apparently - is progress and improvement according to those upon't high!

 

[SA_900]

The message you have entered is too short. Please lengthen your message to at least 5 characters.

 

[grid56126]

Yesterday afternoons fatality at Portchester yesterday afternoon was a Southern service from Fareham to Brighton, the service was running without an OBS which can only have made the whole experience even worse, I'm told of very concerning information as well regarding emergency equipment, but that's not for me to say.

Thoughts to the driver, the BTP and everyone else involved.

It's not for you to say about the equipment but perfectly OK to lie about the OBS not being present ?

 

[pompeyfan]

It's not for you to say about the equipment but perfectly OK to lie about the OBS not being present ?

The information I was told was that there was not an OBS present, is this incorrect? the emergency equipment issue is indeed a fact, as my colleague worked a rain involved in assisting the affected unit and emergency services.

 

[grid56126]

The information I was told was that there was not an OBS present, is this incorrect? the emergency equipment issue is indeed a fact, as my colleague worked a rain involved in assisting the affected unit and emergency services.

There was an OBS on the train. I spoke to him. He was relieved on site along with the driver involved.

I am also very aware of the issues surrounding the running of 1Z99 to bring equipment to train from Portsmouth.

 

[tsr]

I was also led to believe there was a second member of crew onboard.

 

[pompeyfan]

There was an OBS on the train. I spoke to him. He was relieved on site along with the driver involved.

I am also very aware of the issues surrounding the running of 1Z99 to bring equipment to train from Portsmouth.

Apologies for the incorrect information being posted, but I don't appreciate being called an outright liar when I was acting on information I was told, perhaps you could have corrected me slightly more tactfully.

I hope both members of crew recover in good time.

 

[XDM]

Apologies for the incorrect information being posted, but I don't appreciate being called an outright liar when I was acting on information I was told, perhaps you could have corrected me slightly more tactfully.

I hope both members of crew recover in good time.

Can I correct you tactfully. Almost all Southern trains rostered for an OBS have one for most of the run. On strike days it is fewer,but I believe at least 50% of Guards/OBS work during strikes,although many are not RMT members. Can I tactfully suggest you qualify your info if it is something you are not sure of.
A couple of months ago you said the unused freight siding beside Fratton station had been converted for 12 car(DOO equipped)377 units. I am afraid that was a lie,obviously unintentional,when I saw the pic a colleague had taken to show the sidings without any third rail in January & exactly as it had been for the last 5 years. We reply on facts here,specially about Southern DOO & new facilities for DOO trains,not fiction.

 

[Juniper Driver]

I understand the point of approaching red signals with caution, obviously, but, no; trains usually slow to less than walking pace way before the platform and crawl in (I see this most mornings from the platform and have frequently experienced it on trains as well), on a gradient of around 1 in 145 rising (and with the level crossing closed but the starter still at red owing to the interlock with Buckland crossing beyond)! Passengers watch the almost comically-slow approach with incredulity. Farcical.

It isn't farcical.I just follow the rules and they seem pretty reasonable to me.There is nothing in the rule book which says you have to rush into stations and if it doesn't suit I wont do it.

 

[HH]

It isn't farcical.

There's defensive and then there's DEFENSIVE. Didn't they change it to professional anyway? Ah, the comment was edited while I was replying

 

[Juniper Driver]

There's defensive and then there's DEFENSIVE. Didn't they change it to professional anyway? Ah, the comment was edited while I was replying

We don't know why the driver was driving in the way he was although on here we all seem to know better.

I remember driving up platforms at <5 mph due to the unpredictability of TPWS girds on slam door trains.