Not cable theft at all, but a major power/systems failure in York IECC. I've had a narrow escape today given I just got through before the farce started.
I've just been through York and didn't see much disruption - thing is I was on a train from Manchester going to Scarborough which wasn't delayed at all. Did see a GC HST sitting in Holgate Sidings and wondered what had happened.
Is it just me or are delays/cancellations seem to be getting more frequent? Seems as if everytime I look at the departure boards on any given day there are some delays, and problems like this seem to happen more often.
I personally think signal failues or similar happen far too often and serious steps should be made to stop it happening.
I can understand that things like this happen occasionally and that you can't have a perfect railway, but it does seem to me that they are happening a lot more frequently since the beginning of the year. Perhaps that is just my perception, although I wonder if the bad weather we had earlier has made things worse.
Network Rail have said it was a software failure.
So which is it?I personally think signal failues or similar happen far too often and serious steps should be made to stop it happening.
So which is it?
I'm advised that there has, indeed been a system fault which (it can be hard to isolate domains) appears to be within the procedures (i.e. software).
I also understand that faults of significance are very rare, within railway signalling. On the other hand, signalling failures, due to physical damage, decay, error and other human interventions are more frequent (though in the overall scale of mainland rail signalling are arguably not very significant).
Process Control Software in recent times is readily testable for resilience, exception handling and robustness in the face of improbable circumstances.
I'd be very surprised if you can provide any evidence to show that NR signalling software fails "often". Very surprised.
Can you?
They have specifically stated that it's a software failure. Makes sense, as York is an IECC. This must be a very rare event for a failure to happen in this way. But the passengers won't care whether the software has failed, or the signals. To them, it's a signal failure. So they think that they are becoming more common.
A serious software failure. That's what "it's" about.I certainly recall, in the 90s, everything on ECML was blamed on points failure. I once spent several hours between KX and York watching coal trains trundle by, getting to York at 3.00 am ( a train that left KX at 8pm) blamed on points failure!! It's definitely better now, software/signalling...bah.
Radio 4 has just reported (9.00pm) that a train has been stationary for 6 hours...what can that possibly be about...?
I quite agree with you. That is exactly how passengers will remember today's unfortunate disruption - as they do with all major incidents on our fragile network.To most passengers a delay is a delay, doesn't matter what caused it. Sad as even rare delays such as what has happened today may put off a lot of people from travelling by rail ever again.
I quite agree with you. That is exactly how passengers will remember today's unfortunate disruption - as they do with all major incidents on our fragile network.
What bothered me, is that I'd expect more interest on THIS highly specialised forum in the ACTUAL causes, impact and disruption management procedures which apply. But what we did get on here, is an unfounded accusation of cable theft, a complaint that signals fail far too often, a proposal of homicide, a complaint about football, and a nice video of delayed trains.
I have a very, very great deal of sympathy for the affected EC passengers and have had contact with many today, and would wish to have assisted, and sympathy for the staff having to deal with such an unpredictable disruption to service, and more than all of these, sympathy for the IT personnel who with no forewarning, have to diagnose, reverse engineer the causal events and reinstate a functioning process, all on a day off work!
On here, I had hoped for a more informed technical debate than what we've got.
Well IT'S very poor...Is this lack of investment, incompetance, or some other bl++dy excuse? The ECML has been running superbly for years and this is a huge setback.
Didn't they blame a software problem on the recent massive disruption in South Wales?
Come on you techie boys...get your heads together.
Well IT'S very poor...Is this lack of investment, incompetance, or some other bl++dy excuse?
The ECML has been running superbly for years and this is a huge setback.
Why, when things like this happen and either a TOC or NR come out and give the reason why it happened people call it an excuse ?
It's not a bl++dy excuse, it's a reason
In terms of system design at a macro level, that is quite a profound question. Not amenable to quick off-the-cuff reponses.. . . .
Since it has been confirmed that it is a software issue - what can be done about it in future? Is there some sort of backup that can be used, or something else that could be done? Also does the closure of smaller local boxes and amalgamating everything into one large IECC pose a higher risk of this exact same problem happening again?
I'd speculate there was -
1) A s/w upgrade to ready the system for 22 May Eureka timetable and it went pear shaped.
2) So many charter trains had been scheduled for the London demo that the s/w couldn't cope and crashed and the fail-safes tripped-in; hence NR insisting that no trains moved.
Network Rail have said it was a software failure.
Why on earth would you need an upgrade for a timetable change ?? or have too many trains running ??
As an aside, anyone got the TRUST incident number for this ?? bet the delay minutes are shooting up.
There is (was) also a delayed 20:00 northbound departure, so hopefully many stranded pax are getting away, and ultimately home, from London tonight.
Southbound travellers appear to be less fortunate. Although there are some movements now, I'll guess that staff are well into overtime/out of hours. But for whatever logistical reason, its presumably unlikely that anything other than the Leeds 18:40 and 20:15 will get through tonight (picking up pax from the north at Donny where poss).
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So which is it?
I'm advised that there has, indeed been a system fault which (it can be hard to isolate domains) appears to be within the computer procedures (i.e. software).
I also understand that faults in network software of any significance are very rare, affecting railway signalling. On the other hand, signalling failures, due to physical damage, decay, damage, error and other human interventions are much more frequent (though in the overall scale of mainland rail signalling are arguably not very significant).
Process Control Software in recent times is readily testable for its resilience, exception handling and robustness in the face of improbable circumstances. There are globally adopted standards for software verification which have long passed their development stages and have led to the adoption of very reliable and mature standards of verification.
I'd be very surprised if you can provide any evidence to show that NR signalling software fails "often". Very surprised indeed.
Can you?
What the travelling public won't understand is why trains were held at signals at all, when it is entirely within the wit of man (if not the rulebook) to move a train, such as the one in the video, to a convenient location at a speed at which it can stop if the line ahead is obstructed.
There is really no need, in this day and age, to delay a train between stations, for hours on end due to a failure like this.
I suppose the difficulty comes on whether NR can reasonably guarantee that pointwork will not move injudisciously during failure mode such as this.
What the travelling public won't understand is why trains were held at signals at all, when it is entirely within the wit of man (if not the rulebook) to move a train, such as the one in the video, to a convenient location at a speed at which it can stop if the line ahead is obstructed.
There is really no need, in this day and age, to delay a train between stations, for hours on end due to a failure like this.
I suppose the difficulty comes on whether NR can reasonably guarantee that pointwork will not move injudisciously during failure mode such as this.
In terms of system design at a macro level, that is quite a profound question. Not amenable to quick off-the-cuff reponses.
There is a science of system-scale which can help with questions like this. (i.e. is it more robust to have a myriad of uncoordinated and self-sustsaining local systems forming an emergent system with complex properties, or to have a single over-arching system which is responsive to all localised data but is also culpable for every and any local fault?)
But there is little evidence (so far) to help determine whether today's very significant events on the ECML would favour isolated local line management or global network management.
For what its worth, my personal view is that the ECML, as it stands at present merits global control.
But for as long as the ECML hosts freight and local stopping services alongside the high speed long distance services on the same infrastructure, then I acknowledge good arguments for robust local control and intervention too.
But surely, and despite some of the comments above, we have to acknowledge that today's disruption is very very exceptional. No?
Surely a software system that keeps a vital artery of the country open has a backup system? Even if it means that everything runs to a max speed of 30-40mph? Obviously not if today is anything to go by!